Preventing "Those Terrible Disasters": Steamboat Accidents And Congressional Policy, 1824-1860 by Maust, Peter
  
 
 
PREVENTING “THOSE TERRIBLE DISASTERS”: STEAMBOAT ACCIDENTS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY, 1824-1860 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Peter E. Maust 
August 2012
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 Peter E. Maust 
 
 
  
ABSTRACT 
PREVENTING “THOSE TERRIBLE DISASTERS”: STEAMBOAT ACCIDENTS AND 
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY, 1824-1860 
Peter E. Maust Ph.D. 
Cornell University 2012 
 
 Responding to public outrage over the dangers of steamboat travel and entreaties by the 
press, inventors, and interest groups in the years before the Civil War, Congress investigated 
accidents, published data about the science of steam power, and suggested ways to improve 
vessel construction and operation.  It also had the government test mechanisms, mandated certain 
safety devices, contemplated subsidizing inventors, and, in 1838 and 1852, passed laws requiring 
safety inspections and punishing steamboat operators for misconduct.  These actions lend 
support to revisionist scholars of public policy who argue that the national government was more 
active and interventionist during this era than conventional historical depictions have portrayed. 
Members of Congress believed that the government was responsible for the safety of 
passengers and had the authority to intervene.  They often endorsed policies without contested 
votes and drew support from Whigs and Democrats, as well as all geographical sections.  These 
circumstances are inconsistent with archetypes of nineteenth-century policymaking, such as the 
“party period” paradigm, sectional contests between North and South, or the Southern-
Democratic alliance that sought to restrict government intervention.  The idiosyncrasies of the 
legislative process were at least as important as outside forces in influencing the form, timing 
and disposition of steamboat legislation.  Researchers should be alert to instances of energetic 
government, consensual policymaking, and the complex process of how Congress responded to 
persistent demands. 
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PREFACE 
 
This work began as a paper for a graduate seminar on United States history during the 
Civil War era at Cornell University led by Professors Joel H. Silbey and Richard F. Bensel.  I 
had been interested in the growth of government power for some time, especially the rise of the 
national “state” in American life.  My curiosity developed from early experiences on Long 
Island’s South Shore, where I could see a lookout tower from one of the Lifesaving Service 
stations that had once guarded the approaches to the Port of New York.  I was fascinated by an 
old wreck near my grandparents’ house and my father and grandfather told me stories about 
stranded vessels and the surf men who rescued passengers and crews.  When I grew older, I 
puzzled over the contradiction between depictions of the United States as a country of self-reliant 
individualists whose government had done little for them and the still visible foundations of the 
old Lifesaving stations among the dunes of Fire Island.  Hadn’t we done something for each 
other? 
In the seminar, I planned to investigate the government’s relationship to railroads in the 
second half of the nineteenth century, but Professor Bensel noted that the federal government 
had intervened earlier to regulate steamboats.  Intrigued, I shifted my attention from railways in 
the Gilded Age to waterways in the antebellum era, and learned that though steam vessels played 
a crucial role in the growth of the nation, they were subject to accidents that killed and wounded 
thousands of people and cost millions of dollars in property damage.  A large percentage of the 
general public, many interest groups, and most members of Congress came to believe that the 
national government should act to address the problem.  In 1852, Congress created the first 
federal agency responsible for regulating a private industry.  Outside of wartime, national 
government intervention on this type did not become common until the twentieth century. 
 ix 
This is an account of the evolving process by which Congress responded to steam vessel 
accidents from the 1820s to 1860.  The national government worked to prevent the disasters 
through four different types of policies which represented different degrees of intervention.  The 
first approach, which I label the Information Option, began in the 1820s when Congress started 
to conduct investigations into the problem and publish information.  A second approach, 
beginning in the 1830s, was a Mechanical Option where Congress evaluated, encouraged and, 
eventually, required steamboats to use safety devices while inventors asked Congress to 
subsidize their mechanisms.  The third type of policy was a Penalty Option: in 1838, Congress 
passed a law that relied heavily on threatening steamboat operators with lawsuits and prosecution 
as a way to curb accidents caused by recklessness. 
Federal intervention reached an important landmark in 1852 when Congress passed the 
Steamboat Act.  The law integrated the earlier approaches with a Regulatory Option.  This 
legislation included new provisions, such as examining and licensing steamboat personnel, 
testing boilers, and setting standards for steamboat construction and operation.  In addition, the 
Act formed a permanent administrative body, the Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats, to 
enforce these requirements, oversee accident investigations, evaluate mechanical improvements, 
and recommend further changes in legislation. 
These examples of government activism led me to question historical generalizations of 
the nineteenth-century government as “small” and “weak.”  Many scholars subscribe to the 
notion that for a century or more after the ratification of the Constitution, the national 
government’s lack of influence made it “a midget institution in a giant land.”1  By contrast, 
                                                 
1
 Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of 
the American State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), 228, quoted in Brian Balogh, A Government 
Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 9n.  Ballard C. Campbell summarizes this view: “Government in the United States 
 x 
steamboat policies flowed from a government that was more than willing to use its power over 
commerce.  Another fact that piqued my interest was that the public broadly supported steamboat 
legislation, and divisions between congressmen did not break down along expected partisan or 
sectional lines.  Both Whigs and Democrats sponsored bills and many of the measures were 
passed without recorded opposition. 
The roll call votes in the House and Senate showed that a majority of the members of 
both parties and sections usually supported the proposals.  It appeared that steamboat legislation 
engendered bipartisan support in what historians label “a partisan era.”  Government intervention 
of this sort and the tendency by members of Congress to endorse it without deep-seated partisan 
or sectional conflicts were inconsistent with my understanding of the nineteenth-century political 
environment.  This suggested that this subject provided an exception to historical frameworks 
that identify partisanship and sectional concerns as the most important forces that drove 
antebellum lawmaking. 
Having been trained by Professor Silbey, a torchbearer of the “new political history,” to 
search for a “partisan imperative” that underlay many of the actions of politicians and voters of 
the era, I wondered why such a substantive increase in government power did not call forth more 
opposition from apostles of limited government among the legislators from the Democratic 
Party, why it did not stir resistance from Southerners sensitive to the federal government 
intruding on states’ rights, or why it did not antagonize Whigs and others who thought that the 
national government should promote business growth but not interfere by regulating it. 
                                                                                                                                                             
underwent a major transformation in the years after 1887.  Before the 1880s, government performed a limited range 
of functions and rarely intruded into everyday life.  In our own time, the public sector manages an immense array of 
programs that affect all aspects of society.”  Ballard C. Campbell, The Growth of American Government: 
Governance from the Cleveland Era to the Present (Bloomington & Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1995), 1. 
 xi 
As I reviewed the literature on steamboat legislation, I concluded that the existing 
scholarship did not offer an adequate account of how the national government took responsibility 
for the safety of commerce and passengers, nor did it give a sufficiently detailed description of 
the process by which the government acted.  Two of the most influential works, Louis Hunter’s 
Steamboats on the Western Rivers and John G. Burke’s article “Bursting Boilers and the Federal 
Power,” mentioned these issues without exploring them in sufficient depth.2  I set out to provide 
a more complete picture than is currently available of these policies as they illustrated the 
internal operations of the antebellum Congress. 
Ultimately, I conclude that Congress acted as it did for several reasons.  Underlying its 
decision was the commerce clause of the Constitution and the 1824 Supreme Court decision in 
Gibbons v. Ogden, which affirmed Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.  Perhaps 
an even greater influence was that, since the beginning of the republic, there was a widespread 
consensus that certain publicly funded efforts to protect commerce, such as constructing and 
maintaining lighthouses, were legitimate exercises of government power.  Congressmen saw 
policies to protect steam vessel passengers through this lens.  They were usually certain they had 
the authority and responsibility to act, and thus focused their attention on whether or not 
intervention was wise, and how they should undertake it.
3
  Public fears of steamboat disasters 
translated into broad public support for legislative intervention, which provided an important 
proximate factor that drove bills to passage.  This, along with backing from interest groups like 
                                                 
2
 Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An Economic and Technological History (1949; reprint, 
New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc, 1993), and John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” 
Technology and Culture 7/1 (Winter 1966): 1-23. 
3
 In the first report that Congress produced on the subject, the House Commerce Committee wrote that they 
were reluctant to interfere with private businesses and feared that intervening might discourage mechanical 
innovations and improvements.  However, they did not express any doubt that Congress had the authority to act.  
See Report of the Committee on Commerce, accompanied by a bill for regulating of Steam Boats, and for the 
security of passengers therein, 18
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., May 22, 1824, H. Rept. 125, 1. 
 xii 
associations of steamboat engineers, boards of trade and marine insurance companies, exerted 
additional pressure on Congress to act. 
However, beyond these reasons, most of this dissertation focuses on providing an account 
of how Congress acted.  Over the years, there was a consensus on some aspects of government 
intervention.  Most legislators agreed that the government should investigate and publish 
information about the hazards of steam and that steamboat operators who recklessly endangered 
the lives of passengers ought to be punished.  They also thought it appropriate for the 
government to test safety devices.  However, there was no clear model for the exact form that 
federal intervention should take, nor was there general agreement on what measures would be 
appropriate and effective.  The complex technical nature of the Mechanical and Regulatory 
approaches meant that few members of Congress were willing or able to absorb the details of 
these plans.  Then, when public concern was high and advocates within Congress were pressing 
the House and Senate to act, many legislators took their cues from sponsors who had specialized 
knowledge of the subject.  As a result, when it came time to pass the bills, members acted on 
their belief that public opinion favored some sort of action and tended to defer to individual or 
groups of legislators responsible for drafting the legislation.  The measures were passed, after 
substantial deliberation by a small number of congressmen—i.e., with little direct input from 
most senators and representatives—but usually enjoyed broad and often, near-consensual 
support.  
In investigating Congress’s actions, I am responding to challenges issued by historians of 
nineteenth-century politics and public policy to gain a better understanding of the origins and 
process by which policies were made, and where they fit into our current frameworks describing 
governance in the nineteenth century.  Thirty years ago, Richard L. McCormick asked scholars 
 xiii 
to make “the study of governmental policy as systematic as the study of elections,” and to 
“provide a satisfactory typology of governmental policies.”4  By investigating the proposals and 
actions of Congress from 1824 to 1860, I have attempted to organize and categorize the different 
ways in which the government responded to the problems of steam vessel disasters, and to 
document “the process by which popular expressions of opinion are translated into specific 
recommendations for legislation, [and] the details by which such recommendations are worked 
into law.”5  A senior historian of nineteenth-century America called for a similar agenda, one 
that would look closely at certain aspects of government policy, including “the origin and range 
of public responsibilities, the circumstances of normal policymaking, and the evolution of 
particular policies—the development of commitments to certain of them, and the way they 
moved from idea and/or demand into legislation and thereafter, and changes in the notion of 
appropriate regulative activities.”  This includes the need to “trace how legislation was shaped, 
the institution’s power used, and pressures and ideas from outside dealt with.”6   
It has been more than two decades since William Leuchtenburg suggested that “the 
history of the American state” constituted a “new frontier” for historical investigation and that 
future research should place particular emphasis on analyzing “the role of the state in our 
society.”7  Though nineteenth-century United States government was not the leviathan that it 
became in the twentieth century, it was nonetheless capable of asserting its power in innovative 
ways.  It has been easier for historians to minimize the U.S. government’s activities because they 
                                                 
4
 Richard L. McCormick, The Party Period and Public Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to 
the Progressive Era (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), 87. 
5
 Allan G. Bogue, “Why Has the History of the U.S. Congress Been Unpopular?” Congress and the Presidency 
13/1 (Spring 1986): 120. 
6
 Joel H. Silbey, “The State and the Practice of American Political History,” Journal of Policy History 11/1 
(1999): 16, 17. 
7
 William E. Leuchtenburg, “The Pertinence of Political History: Reflections on the Significance of the State in 
America,” Journal of American History 73/3 (Dec. 1986): 585, 586, 590. 
 xiv 
do not fit the model of the centralized, bureaucratic European state.
8
  If my work helps to explain 
the reasons, form, and context of steamboat legislation, and adds to the expanding store of 
knowledge about aspects of nineteenth century governance, it will serve its purpose. 
Early versions of chapters 2, 3 and 4 appeared in Peter Maust, " 'Congress Could Do 
Nothing Better': Promoting Steamboat Safety in Antebellum America," Prologue 32 (2000): 
101-111. 
                                                 
8
 Balogh, Government Out of Sight, 9. 
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A NOTE ON PRIMARY SOURCES AND RESEARCH 
 
While I have benefited a great deal from the scholarship listed in the bibliography, much 
of this dissertation is based on examination of primary sources.  I first established a chronology 
of legislative activity by reviewing the official Journals of the House and Senate from 1820 to 
1861 for material related to steam technology and passenger safety.  From this, I created a record 
of the communications sent to Congress, committee referrals, and a list of relevant government 
documents published in the Congressional Serial Set.  From 1824 to 1852, Congress published 
eighty documents on the topic of steam vessel accidents (Appendix B), and these provide 
information about steam power and offer an extensive sample of contemporary opinion about the 
causes and cures of the disasters.  In the records of the National Archives and Library of 
Congress, I found copies of bills that address aspects of maritime safety as well as the related 
laws published in the Statutes-at-Large (Appendix A).  From these I could track the development 
of dozens of legislative proposals regarding vessel safety.  I documented the way bills were 
shaped, found the debates in the Annals of Congress and the Congressional Globe, noted that 
many proposals died before they could be considered, but that a small number passed, and were 
signed into law.  In addition, I reviewed the National Archives’ unpublished records in all 
instances where the subject of steam disasters and remedies was referred to a committee, as well 
as the files on individual bills.  I have documented the geographical and partisan background of 
legislative sponsors, as well as the instances and outcomes where roll call votes were cast 
(Appendices A and C).  I also reviewed the unpublished papers of members of Congress who 
played important roles in the legislation, such as Senators John Davis of Massachusetts and 
Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, as well as the edited papers and public addresses of prominent 
commentators and advisors on the use of science and technology, especially Princeton physicist 
 xvi 
and later Secretary of the Smithsonian, Joseph Henry.  These sources have been supplemented 
with information from popular non-technical publications, such as Niles’ Weekly Register and 
Niles’ National Register, and specialized periodicals concerned with technology and science, 
such as The Journal of the Franklin Institute and Scientific American.  Additional primary 
sources are listed in the bibliography.  From these documents and the written work of many 
scholars, I have worked to construct a story that adds to our understanding of the role of the state 
in ways that portended the latter’s vast expansion in American life. 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
STEAMBOAT DANGERS AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
 
On the evening of December 17, 1850, as it departed from New Orleans, the steamboat 
Knoxville’s boilers exploded.  Nineteen people died, including sixteen passengers and three 
members of the crew.  The blast wrecked the boat and damaged several nearby vessels.
1
  The 
steamer Yorktown was docked two boats down from the Knoxville and its captain, Thomas J. 
Haldeman, described the disaster to a New Orleans newspaper: 
There were two distinct reports following each other in rapid succession; the first 
I took to be a cannon, but with the second came a volume of steam, with an awful 
crashing sound, that convinced me that some boat had exploded.  I received a 
severe shock and was considerably staggered by the concussion of the 
atmosphere.  I immediately went out on the wharf to the bow of the Knoxville, 
and could see, though by moonlight, she was a perfect wreck; a broadside from a 
seventy-four, it seemed to me, could not have more completely torn her to pieces, 
and the two boats next to her on each side—the Martha Washington, which had 
steam up, and Ne Plus Ultra—were severely shattered; particularly the Martha 
Washington, as I discovered that some one of her pipes about the boilers was 
broken, and steam all blew out of her boilers ….  The iron-safe of the Knoxville 
was blown over the Ne Plus Ultra and the Yorktown, and fell on the lower guard 
of the Buckeye, after passing through her boiler deck.  This, sir, is the first time in 
my life I have been so near as to see and feel the effects of an explosion, and I 
hope most sincerely that it may be the last, for never can I erase from my memory 
the awful shrieks and cries for help, among those poor souls who were scalded 
and struggling in the river for their lives, but sunk to rise no more.
2
 
The Knoxville explosion was one of the many accidents aboard steam vessels that killed 
thousands of individuals and caused millions of dollars of damage in the course of over four 
                                                 
1
 James T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory and Disasters on the Western Waters (Nashville, TN: Land 
Yacht Press, 2000), 158-59. 
2 Clipping of a Dec. 23, 1850 letter by Thomas J. Haldeman sent to the New Orleans Bulletin and reprinted in 
the Cincinnati Daily Commercial; Committee on Commerce, Committee Papers, S. 223, folder 1 of 2 (Sen32A-E2), 
32
nd
 Congress, Records of the U.S. Senate, RG 46, NA. Haldeman was an experienced steamboat captain who 
endorsed federal intervention and wrote to Congress a number of times on the topic of steamboat accidents.  See 
Thos. J. Haldeman to Sen. John Davis, May 1, 1852, Ibid. 
 
 2 
decades before the Civil War.  There were no similar events in mid-nineteenth century America, 
and disasters like this tarnished the “golden age of the steamboat,” which ran roughly from the 
1810s through the 1850s.  As the United States spread across the continent during the first half of 
the nineteenth century, steamboats aided geographic and economic growth and became one of 
the nation’s most important modes of transportation.3  Innovators improved the design and 
efficiency of the vessels, and they increased in number, size, and power in the years after Robert 
Fulton drove his North River steamboat up the Hudson River in 1807.
4
  The vessels spread to the 
West following the voyage of Nicholas Roosevelt who, with the backing of Fulton and other 
investors, captained a steamer from Pittsburgh to New Orleans in 1811.
5
  By the 1820s, steam 
vessels were common sights on the nation’s waterways.  From 1820 to 1860, the total tonnage of 
steam-powered vessels in the United States increased from 22,000 to 868,000.
6
  By the 1850s, 
steamers with auxiliary sails were making regular trans-Atlantic passages.  By 1851, nearly 1400 
steam vessels were transporting more than 32 million passengers yearly on trips in U.S. waters.
7
 
                                                 
3
 George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (New York, NY: Rinehart & Company, 1951), 58. 
4
 Despite popular belief, Fulton was not the inventor of the steamboat; he did, however, build and run the first 
commercially successful vessel.  For an extended account of the early efforts by inventors John Fitch and James 
Rumsey, see James Thomas Flexner, Steamboats Come True: American Inventors in Action (Bronx, New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1992). 
5
 Louis C. Hunter, “The Invention of the Western Steamboat,” Journal of Economic History 3/2 (Nov. 1943): 
201-202. 
6
 Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, Part 2 (Washington, DC: Bureau of the 
Census, 1975), 750.  The Secretary of the Treasury estimated that in 1838 there were 3,010 steam engines operating 
in the United States, with about 800 in steamboats, approximately 350 in railroad locomotives and about 1,860 
engaged in manufacturing.  Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting … Information in Relation to 
Steam Engines, 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21, 3. 
7
 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the Statistics of the Steam Marine of the United States, 32
nd
 Cong., 
1
st
 sess., Jan. 21, 1852, S. Exec. Doc. 42, 55.  The use of steam engines in manufacturing expanded even more 
rapidly than their use on the water.  There was only one recorded steam engine used in industry in 1776 and only 43 
as of 1820.  However, this number increased to 25,557 in 1860.  See Jeremy Atack, Fred Bateman, and Thomas 
Weiss, “The Regional Diffusion and Adoption of the Steam Engine in American Manufacturing,” Journal of 
Economic History 40/2 (June 1980): 285. 
 3 
The growth of maritime commerce inside the U.S. paralleled the expansion of the 
nation’s foreign trade, and affected aspects of the legal system, as the growing number of craft 
called attention to the need for prudent management on crowded waterways.  Judges and lawyers 
rethought legal concepts of negligence, and began to impose new standards to determine liability 
in accidents.
8
  
While steam vessels were introduced in the East, and were used extensively along the 
coasts and Great Lakes, they were essential to developing the navigation of the Western rivers, 
helping to drive the economic and population expansion of the Mississippi Valley.  Steamers had 
their biggest impact by lowering the cost of carrying goods and people and cutting the time spent 
doing so.  They improved trade downriver, but notably created an upriver trade where little had 
existed before.
9
   
Much of the increasing commerce took place on the Mississippi and Ohio rivers and their 
tributaries between rapidly growing cities like Cincinnati, Pittsburgh, Louisville, St. Louis, and 
New Orleans, where steam navigation “telescoped a half-century’s development into a single 
generation.”10  Cincinnati, the “Queen City of the West,” more than doubled its population, from 
46,338 inhabitants in 1840 to 115,436 people in 1850, and became a great center of meat 
packing, the iron industry, and steamboat construction.
11
  Between 1848 and 1850, more than 
3,600 steamboats per year stopped in the city.
12
 
                                                 
8
 Nan Goodman, Shifting the Blame: Literature, Law, and the Theory of Accidents in Nineteenth-Century 
America (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000), 38; John G. Burke, “Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power,” in 
Marcel C. Lafollette and Jeffrey K. Stine, eds., Technology and Choice: Readings from Technology and Culture 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 59-60. 
9
 James Mak and Gary M. Walton, “Steamboats and the Great Productivity Surge in Water Transportation,” 
Journal of Economic History 32/3 (Sept. 1972): 625. 
10
 Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: Pioneer Life in Early Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Lexington, Louisville 
and St. Louis (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1959), 70.   
11
 Jon C. Teaford, Cities of the Heartland: The Rise and Fall of the Industrial Midwest (Bloomington, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1993), 3, 6-7.  See also Daniel Aaron, Cincinnati, Queen City of the West: 1819-1838 
 4 
Steam vessels played an important role in extending the market economy for American 
agriculture in areas touched by water transport, as farmers shipped grains, produce, and other 
commodities on the network of rivers, lakes, and canals.
13
  They were also a crucial part of the 
slave economy, as they transported both slaves and the products of slave labor.  As Thomas 
Buchanan notes, “Fifty-five percent of the South’s cotton crop, 1,915,852 bales in all, came 
down the Mississippi in 1860.”14  Most Americans embraced the new technology, and observers 
commented that, with improvements in transportation and communication, the nation was 
engaged in annihilating space.  Some praised the machines in extravagant language, as when 
Representative Edward Rumsey of Kentucky, whose uncle’s efforts to create a working 
steamboat predated Robert Fulton’s, spoke to the House of Representatives in the late 1830s: 
How vast and incalculable are the results of this triumph of genius!  How 
beneficial its influence upon the social intercourse, the agricultural industry, the 
commercial prosperity, the general improvement, the safety and permanence of 
the Union!  The whole nation, in its magnificent onward march, has received new 
energy and animation from it.  The great valley of the West, more especially, 
through the agency of steam in transporting a mighty commerce on its numerous 
rivers, has, in a few years, been accelerated to a point in population, in power, in 
wealth, in comfort, and happiness, which it would not otherwise have attained in 
ages.
15
 
 
Despite being a pioneering technological innovation, steam vessels were vulnerable to 
new dangers as well as the hazards that watercraft had experienced for centuries.  In the years 
from 1807 to 1853, more than 7,000 people died from accidents on board steamers.
16
  Vessels 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1992), 14-15 and 24-25. 
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 5 
foundered in the wind and waves, and though boats that ran in sheltered rivers and harbors 
largely avoided this danger, those that navigated the coasts, the Great Lakes, and the wider seas 
could not.  Steamboats ran aground, too, and the shallows, shifting channels, and sand bars that 
were endemic to the Western rivers made such events quite common.  Other hazards came from 
colliding with obstructions and with other vessels.  There was no general system of markers or 
universally accepted manner of safely passing other craft; nor were there standardized 
navigational signals to guide vessels at night and in other circumstances of poor visibility.
17
  
Collisions often caused property damage and moderate injuries, but some had disastrous results.  
The greatest loss of life from a single accident in all the years before the Civil War occurred in 
October 1837, when the steamboat Monmouth was struck by another steamer during a rainy 
night on the lower Mississippi.  The boat was closely packed with hundreds of Creek Indians 
being removed from their ancestral lands to the trans-Mississippi West.  Between 200 and 400 
people, mostly Native Americans, were killed as a result of the collision.
18
  Another peril came 
from running into obstructions, including wrecks that littered dangerous stretches of the rivers 
and, even more commonly, the uprooted trees and logs that floated downstream and sometimes 
lodged in the bottom or banks to become “snags” or “sawyers.”  Crashing into obstructions sank 
almost 350 vessels during the 1850s, which composed more than half the total number of 
steamboats sunk from all types of accidents during that decade.
19
  The national government 
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 6 
attempted to mitigate or eliminate hazards by financing improvements in the rivers, lakes, and 
harbors.
20
  To address the problem of snags, the government funded the development and 
operation of specialized steamers designed to pull tree trunks out of the rivers called machine 
boats and snag boats.
21
  Though Congress did not commit resources in a consistent fashion, 
between 1789 and 1861 it devoted a substantial sum, $18,544,222, to build harbors, dredge 
channels, remove snags and undertake related actions.
22
 
However, some dangers were inherent in steam vessels, and could not be addressed by 
upgrading the physical environment in which they operated.  With fires burning continuously to 
generate steam, steamers faced greater chances of conflagrations than sailing vessels, canal 
barges and unpowered flat boats.  Wooden structures were exposed to hot metal, embers fell 
from the fireboxes into the engine rooms, and sparks from chimneys settled onto decks and 
cargoes.
23
  The largest steamboat fire on a Western river took place at St. Louis in 1849, where 
one burning vessel set others ablaze.  The fire spread, eventually destroying a large portion of the 
city’s waterfront.  Twenty-two steamboats were destroyed, along with over 400 buildings.  The 
city was fortunate that a calamity on this scale cost only twenty lives.
24
 
The disasters became regular fodder for the press.
25
  Though people feared fires, 
collisions, groundings, and founderings, testimony from the time suggests that explosions, like 
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the one that destroyed the Knoxville, generated the greatest anxiety among passengers, workers, 
and the general public.  These sudden and violent events created, according to one informed 
witness who had traveled extensively on the Western river system, “an almost universal feeling 
of terror and apprehension.”26  Of the many accidents that befell vessels on America’s rivers, 
lakes, and coasts, more than three hundred boiler explosions killed 3,187 people from 1816 to 
1860, often in a gruesome manner, as they were scalded or had their bodies blown apart.
27
  
The psychological impact was very substantial because these explosions were the most 
novel and stunning demonstrations of the destructive power of the steam age to affect the lives of 
a largely rural people.  Boiler explosions attracted attention because they 
killed indiscriminately, quickly, and in large numbers—at the time there weren’t 
any other cases of such large losses of life occurring as a result of human 
endeavors.  Hurricanes and floods may have killed more, but, at this time in the 
early nineteenth century, nothing else created by humans could wreak such havoc 
outside of war.
28
 
 
Louis C. Hunter, whose history of Western steamboats remains the most comprehensive 
examination of the development and operation of these machines, concluded that steamboat 
accidents, even at the peak of their destructiveness, were less common and less deadly than 
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 8 
conventional shipwrecks that plagued water transport.  However, Hunter also noted that an 
important reason that people were concerned about steam boiler explosions was that they 
repeatedly took place close to the growing population centers of the West, so that the disasters 
were “frequently at one’s very doorstep.”29 
The Washington, which blew up on the Ohio River in 1816, was the first steamer to 
explode.
30
  The popular press often recounted the catastrophes in dramatic language and these 
articles brought the danger home to Americans, even when there were no explosions in the 
vicinity.
31
  Compared to newspaper accounts that included explicit descriptions of the gore and 
human suffering, Captain Haldeman’s account of the Knoxville disaster was on the milder end of 
the spectrum.  A report of the destruction of the steamer Moselle serves as a graphic example of 
a typical story, replete with grisly images and pathos.  Crowded with almost 300 passengers 
during a voyage in April 1838, the Moselle was a new boat and her young captain sought to build 
up her reputation as a fast vessel.  After a brief stop, she started down the Ohio River from 
Cincinnati bound for Louisville.  The captain kept the steam pressure up while passengers 
boarded, intending to use a full head of steam to show off his craft as she passed along the 
Cincinnati waterfront.
32
  However, a local newspaper reported that, as the Moselle left the shore, 
instead of making a triumphant display of speed, 
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her boilers burst with a most awful and astounding noise … heads, limbs, bodies 
and blood were seen flying through the air in every direction, attended by the 
most horrible shrieks and groans from the wounded and the dying.  —The boat … 
was rendered a perfect wreck.  She seemed to be torn all to flinders [and] began to 
sink rapidly…. 
       The Captain was thrown by the explosion entirely into the street, and was 
picked up dead and dreadfully mangled … and limbs and fragments of bodies 
[were] scattered about the river and shore in heart-rending profusion. … 
       We are told that one little boy on shore was seen wringing his hands in 
agony, imploring those present to save his father, mother and three sisters, all of 
whom were struggling in the water to gain the shore, but whom the poor little 
fellow had the awful misfortune to see perish, one by one almost within his 
reach.
33
 
 
As many as 150 people were killed when the Moselle exploded and sank.
34
 
Some critics believed that the explosions were a symptom of larger failings in U.S. 
society, including an inordinate love of speed.  People wanted to “fly” down the rivers rather 
than merely move along them, and a vessel with a reputation as a fast boat was said to attract the 
most passengers and to be more profitable.
35
  Crews engaged in dangerous practices to move 
more swiftly.  Engineers, for instance, would tie down safety valves, which were designed to 
open and let off steam when pressure built up inside the boilers.  Kept closed, the pressure rose 
quickly, producing more power and speed, but at greater risk of an explosion.
36
 
Angry observers commented on the lack of regard for human life.  After the steamboat 
New England blew up in 1833, Hezekiah Niles, editor of the widely read periodical, Niles’ 
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Weekly Register, condemned the perpetrators of the disaster.  Niles was especially exercised 
about reports that the New England had been racing another boat and the engineer raised the 
pressure beyond safe limits.  He charged that the vessel master’s reckless actions had 
“murdered” seventeen people and “crippled and tortured” many others.  Niles argued that laws 
ought to make the malefactors think twice about their actions and, if necessary, punish them with 
penalties as severe as death or life-imprisonment.  If the government declined to act, Niles wrote, 
the survivors would be justified in resorting to the “law of nature” by seizing and executing any 
reckless master who survived an explosion.
37
 
Editorialists like Niles, other commentators, as well as members of the national 
government and the public, accused the steamboat operators of being reckless.  Historian Arthur 
McEvoy has argued that in “technologically advanced societ[ies]” viewers tend to indemnify the 
technologies themselves from blame, while often attributing catastrophic failures to “poor 
equipment or, more typically, the carelessness of the injured worker.”38  
Beginning in 1826, some states passed laws to address the problem.  These statutes 
prescribed “rules for passing, carrying gunpowder, keeping the vessel in safe trim, and making 
landings.  They also forbade racing and required that the boat be kept in seaworthy condition and 
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that the machinery be ‘substantial and sufficient.’”  However, these laws proved ineffective 
because of defects in their design, inadequate modes of enforcement, and especially because 
state jurisdiction was limited to intrastate commerce while most of the well-trafficked rivers and 
lakes touched on multiple states or served as state boundaries.
39
 
Congress considered responding to the dangers in 1824, even before the states had begun 
to pass their own measures.  The first bill introduced into the House did not pass, but it 
inaugurated decades of federal attention to the problem.  The bill’s sponsors wrote that they had 
a duty to protect individuals who did not have “the power to protect themselves” but “whose 
safety may be endangered by ignorance, avarice, or inattention.”40  When it became clear that 
individuals could not assure their own safety, and that local and state governments could not 
effectively oversee interstate commerce, the U.S. government deemed “federal control” the only 
viable remedy.
41
 
The national government’s policies to prevent accidents reached a plateau of regulatory 
sophistication with the Steamboat Act of 1852.  During an era where federal interventions in the 
economy and oversight of business interests were more circumscribed than they are today, this 
law required the U.S. government to supervise private enterprise to a degree that would not be 
matched in peacetime until the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. 
Legislators tended to see activity on this subject as a broad spectrum of potential actions 
rather than as a stark choice between laissez faire and comprehensive government oversight.  As 
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noted in the Preface, the Steamboat Act of 1852 integrated elements from four types of policies 
that Congress had experimented with since the 1820s.
42
  Of the four, the Information Option was 
the most characteristic and pervasive, because it was already a common form of government 
activity.  This policy of facilitating and providing information to the public had deep roots.  A 
high proportion of the English colonists were literate, and during the Revolutionary era, they 
developed an additional interest in reading about, discussing, and attempting to address 
prominent areas of public concern.
43
  Leaders advocated keeping the people informed of the 
government’s actions.  Many Americans came to value the free exchange of information, and 
encouraged discussion of public affairs, while legislators and administrators believed the 
government had a duty to facilitate this process.  Newspapers and other periodicals supplied 
ever-increasing amounts of information.  The U.S. postal system made it relatively easy to 
convey information throughout the country.  This, along with improvements in transportation 
and printing technology, as well as the growing use of the telegraph as a new method to transmit 
information, wrought a communications revolution.  Demand for information increased during 
the same period, as some intellectuals were seeking to foster a science of society to measure and 
assess social and economic facts and they pressed to have the government gather and publish 
more data.  The market economy was expanding and businesspeople wanted greater access to 
economic facts and figures.  On the social and cultural front, as an outgrowth of the Second 
Great Awakening, religious reform movements sought to use printed matter to advance their 
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causes.
44
  Government printing of all sorts, including presidential messages and congressional 
reports, increased significantly after the War of 1812.  One of the most important reasons for this 
increase, especially from the 1820s onward, was that politicians used government documents to 
communicate with their constituents and to support their campaigns.  Some administrative units 
of the national government also sought to publicize their accomplishments via government 
printing.  Thus, political elites had the incentive to publish large numbers of documents and to 
pay for them out of the public treasury.
45
 
As part of this process, Congress published a great deal of information on the subject of 
technology.  Constituents were interested in receiving data on agricultural advances and the 
development of new machines for industry and transportation.  This grew out of the practice of 
“print statism,” which Oz Frankel describes as the federal policy of printing and disseminating 
documents on a wide variety of subjects, and this included the design of mechanical devices and 
use of technological systems.  Frankel argues that printing was an important form of nineteenth-
century state activism supporting territorial expansion and economic growth.
46
  The government 
used this information to formulate policy and also distributed documents in order to encourage 
people to adopt and employ advances in technology.  The best material in these publications 
added to the overall understanding of steam power, while reports of accidents stimulated public 
discussion about corrective measures, advanced the quality of technical inquiry, informed 
congressmen about potential responses, and helped them devise remedial proposals.
47
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After 1852, though Congress still conducted investigations and published reports, the 
Steamboat Act bureaucratized and regularized this process, creating a board of supervising 
inspectors to gather information on technical improvements and safe practices, transmit this 
information to the Secretary of the Treasury, and thence to Congress and the American public.
48
 
Scholars have not systematically examined the government’s repeated efforts to improve 
the safety of steam technology, but the way that the government pursued this approach is 
consistent with the “associative state” framework of nineteenth-century government 
intervention.
49
  Brian Balogh argues that, rather than working through a large bureaucracy, 
people in the U.S. preferred a kind of state activism where the government aided individuals and 
private organizations to perform tasks that would benefit society.
50
  Attempts to upgrade steam 
machinery and encourage safety measures were also consistent with the government’s “strong 
interest in the improvement not only of steamboats, but also of the telegraph, railroads, 
agricultural science, and other technological advances of similar economic significance.”51  In 
the case of steamboat improvements, most legislators wanted the government to subsidize 
promising inventions when private investment was not available, and some of them wanted to 
endorse, purchase, or mandate the use of particular devices. 
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Congressmen and other officials believed that the Mechanical Option could be effective 
because they had everyday experience of the technological advances that were transforming the 
country.  Most of them traveled on steamboats and, beginning in the 1820s, saw that their 
countrymen were receiving ever-greater numbers of patents.
52
  They thought that mechanical 
advances were bringing deep social changes and moving the country toward “democratic 
objectives of political, social, and economic equality.”53  With such positive views of the 
material and social benefits of technology, they were optimistic that technological improvements 
could ameliorate many evils.  Historian Steven Usselman has described this as “the lure of 
technology—the faith that mechanical devices would solve problems of extraordinary 
complexity.”54  Hoping that innovative devices could prevent accidents gave members of 
Congress an incentive to purchase inventions and encourage technological advances.  Beginning 
in the early 1830s, the government investigated engine designs, safety valves, lifeboats, and 
other apparatus, and made recommendations about adopting equipment.  Though they resisted 
mandating patented devices, eventually Congress passed laws requiring vessels to carry 
equipment like safety valves, lifejackets and water pumps. 
In the 1830s and 1840s, the government employed experts to report on the virtues and 
shortcomings of steamboat mechanisms.
55
  While not all of the tests met high standards for rigor 
and fairness, many of the investigations were innovative and thorough.
56
  The government 
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already had some experience in purchasing inventions and evaluating technologies to acquire 
armaments and other machines.  Congress solicited advice from technical experts, and came to 
rely on a number of people for guidance.  Some of these experts worked for the Navy 
Department, Patent Office, and Coast Survey, but the government also solicited advice from 
experts who held academic positions and/or were members of technologically savvy 
organizations like the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia. 
Inventors naturally hoped to benefit from government evaluations, publicity, and 
endorsements, but they attested that their primary goals were to serve their country and the cause 
of humanity.  Some of them devised valuable safety features, though they created many 
inventions that were mechanically flawed or commercially unsuccessful.  However, even their 
failures could be useful, by reminding congressmen that they needed to be cautious in selecting 
which devices were worthy of government support. 
By requiring devices such as boiler safety valves in 1838 and metallic lifeboats in 1852, 
Congress contributed to the standardization of a number of safety measures and helped to direct 
inventive activity along certain paths.  It also unintentionally offered competitive advantages to 
inventors who sold versions of products mandated by legislation.  Government investigations 
also showed that even the best mechanisms could not provide perfect security.  Officials came to 
realize that statutory remedies could only be successful if they included a range of interventions. 
Congress eventually designed a system of penalties and regulatory control over steam 
vessel construction and operation.  Before 1838, steamboat owners had been subject to lawsuits 
under the common law, as well as state laws.  Beginning with a steamboat law in 1838, Congress 
specified a Penalty Option that sought to discourage recklessness and negligence by threatening 
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steam vessel operators with punishment in the event of misbehavior.  These legislative tactics, 
alluded to by Hezekiah Niles in the passage quoted earlier, “relied on enhanced civil and 
criminal liability to promote steamboat safety.”57  The idea was to give steamboat owners as 
much freedom as possible to run their vessels, but also to discourage recklessness by threatening 
to punish them for any transgressions.
58
 
The 1838 steamboat law made vessel owners and masters who failed to obey safety 
standards liable for damages; anyone operating a steamboat when life was lost in an explosion 
was liable to be charged with manslaughter, punishable by up to ten years of hard labor.  It also 
placed the burden of proof on the defendants in civil liability suits by stating that any injuries or 
deaths caused by the uncontrolled release of steam would count as prima facie evidence of 
negligence.
59
  Steamboat operators objected to the provision that they would have to prove their 
innocence to avoid liability for negligence, and Congress did away with this presumption of 
liability in the 1852 Steamboat Act.  However, the 1852 law also increased the number of 
infractions with which steamboat operators could be charged, and imposed additional penalties if 
they were convicted. 
Though members of both major political parties proposed legislation that included 
penalties for misbehavior, Jacksonian Democrats were more inclined than Whigs to believe that 
a Penalty Option would curtail accidents even without additional administrative oversight.  
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Proponents of the Penalty Option tended to attribute steamboat disasters to the flawed and 
reckless behavior of the human operators.  Thus President Andrew Jackson, in his 1833 Annual 
Message to Congress, placed the blame for boiler explosions on the “criminal negligence” of the 
masters and crews of the vessels.
60
  They thought that the threat of punishment would be 
sufficient to discourage steamboat operators from running their vessels in a hazardous fashion 
and preferred legislation that relied on the courts for enforcement rather than government 
administrators. 
Beyond the Information, Mechanical and Penalty Options, the fourth and final element of 
federal intervention was a Regulatory Option, which was introduced in a limited fashion in 1838, 
but was embodied in a more comprehensive and sophisticated manner in the 1852 Steamboat 
Act.  While individuals and interest groups proposed and pushed for legislation, a small number 
of legislators, most of whom have not received a great deal of historical attention, played 
indispensable roles gathering information, reviewing plans, and synthesizing data into coherent 
proposals.  Congressmen who specialized in constructing complex legislation, such as Senator 
John Davis of Massachusetts, play a larger role in this story than some of their more famous 
colleagues. 
The 1852 Steamboat Act established a regulatory body of sixty inspectors, who would be 
stationed at ports throughout the country under the direction of nine supervising inspectors 
appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.
61
  This organization had all the 
characteristics of a twentieth-century regulatory body.  As Bernard Schwartz writes: 
The distinguishing feature of the modern regulatory agency is the possession by it 
of the power to determine, either by rule or decision, private rights and 
obligations.  The typical regulatory agency has vested in it both legislative and 
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adjudicatory authority: the legislative power to promulgate rules and regulations 
having the force of law and the judicial power to decide individual cases.
62
 
 
The Steamboat Act “pioneered … scientific regulation,” which was to be based on the best 
available understanding of physical principles and mechanical operations.  It also initiated “the 
‘board’ or ‘commission’ form of administrative organization that would loom so large in 
Progressive and New Deal regulatory legislation; and … the use of administrative rulemaking as 
a principal technique for articulating regulatory standards.”63   
The law went into effect in 1853 and compelled owners to meet standards for vessel 
design and construction, to have boiler metal examined and approved before it was used, and to 
allow salaried government inspectors to scrutinize their boats, test the strength of their boilers, 
and issue licenses giving vessels the legal right to operate in U.S. waters.  The inspectors would 
check to make sure the boats were equipped with required safety equipment, and could conduct 
inspections without prior notice.  In addition, these inspectors would help to assess engineers and 
pilots for competence and, if applicants demonstrated acceptable qualifications and character, 
grant them licenses permitting them to ply their trades.  The inspectors could suspend or revoke 
these licenses when the recipients did not follow the rules.  The Steamboat Act provided that the 
Board of Supervising Inspectors would meet to oversee the law and to draw up regulations on 
operating steamboats, such as issuing “rules of the road” directing how they were to pass each 
other safely.  The Board would forward reports on the efficacy of the law to Congress to help 
them formulate any future legislation.
64
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As they gained experience with the issues associated with steamboats, congressmen 
proposed, tried, and modified a variety of tactics in the effort to achieve their goal, and 
succeeded in building an increasingly complex framework intended to achieve greater safety for 
passengers.  It was an important step in American development and a step in the evolution of a 
very different kind of national government. 
 
 21 
CHAPTER 1 
STEAMBOATS AND THE NATIONAL STATE 
 
1. Strong Action in a “Weak” National State 
It is a case of selective memory that scholars usually cite the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887 as the first independent national regulatory effort.
1
  Drawn to the development and growth 
of massive industrial enterprises and their abuses, scholars of nineteenth-century government 
regulation have portrayed it as a response to the growth of large corporate enterprises after the 
Civil War.  These have had “a well-established place in the American imagination as a sinister 
repository of private power.”2  However, regulatory ideas and policies were neither new to the 
Gilded Age nor unique to railroads.  By 1887, steamboats had been operating under national 
guidance for thirty-five years.  Steamboat intervention suggests that the degree of concern an 
industry generated was not just a function of its size, but also that its failures had deleterious 
effects on the public. 
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In the case of sailing vessels, the government began to intervene in the activities of 
individuals and businesses shortly after the Constitution was ratified.  This set important 
precedents as officials and the public came to believe that the U.S. bore the responsibility to 
ensure public safety in interstate and international commerce, and protect lives on waterways.  
This was based on a “social vision” that emphasized the public good and “public happiness” 
“rather than private goods and interests.”3   
Even with these early regulatory forays, scholarly portraits of the antebellum United 
States government often depict it as small and feeble—a polity which did not intervene in most 
people’s lives in a meaningful way.4  As one historian has written, in “practice governance in 
Washington barely mattered in the lives of ordinary Americans,” and while there were “latent” 
powers in the Constitution, they lay largely unexploited.  The election of 1800 brought Thomas 
Jefferson, with and his supporters, with their hostility to “consolidated national authority,” into 
power, and signaled the triumph of the “country” party, which in its Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, or 
Democratic versions, controlled the government more often than not from 1800 to 1861.  The 
United States undertook energetic foreign policies, such as encouraging expansion, waging wars, 
and removing Indians, but these sought to enlarge the decentralized republic rather than to 
change its character.
5
  By these accounts, the central government “in the antebellum years was a 
cipher, a mirage,” and power was concentrated in the individual states.6 
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A number of scholars have contested this framework.  They argue that, rather than being 
palsied by the will of their constituents, governments in the U.S. attempted to influence the 
economy through a wide variety of activities.  States and localities promoted commerce and 
economic development.
7
  Historians of American law argue that judges and the legal system 
encouraged the release of entrepreneurial energy to facilitate economic growth.
8
  The courts 
helped to set priorities, and “even to effect significant redistributions of wealth and power in the 
economy,” while economic historians have shown how policy decisions had a substantive impact 
on “the rules and institutions that have shaped and constrained market processes.”9 
The United States instituted protective tariffs to promote manufacturing, sold vast tracts 
of public land at low prices to encourage settlement, and subsidized internal improvements, such 
as railroad lines and river and harbor works.
10
  While Henry Clay’s American System was never 
comprehensively enacted, the central government appropriated funds to assist commerce and 
improve public safety.
11
  The programs for federal river improvements expanded after the 1820s, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Revolutionary Settlement to Antebellum Crisis,” Journal of the Early Republic 29 (Spring 2009): 6-7; see also 
Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1995), 18-19. 
7
 William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State, “American Historical Review 113/3 (Jun. 
2008): 766.  Robert Lively, “The American System: A Review Article,” Business History Review 29/1 (Mar. 1955): 
81-96.  The description of an active government that promoted growth and practiced some forms of oversight is 
often known as the “commonwealth” theory of government.  See Oscar and Mary Flug Handlin’s influential study 
of Massachusetts, Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 
1774-1861 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, rev. ed., 1969). 
8
 Novak, “Common Regulation,” 1073-74; Harry N. Scheiber, “Public Economic Policy and the American 
Legal System: Historical Perspectives,” Wisconsin Law Review (1980): 1159-89; James Willard Hurst, Law and the 
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1956), 6. 
9
 Harry N. Scheiber, “Regulation, Property Rights, and Definition of ‘The Market’: Law and the American 
Economy,” Journal of Economic History 41/1 (Mar. 1981): 104. 
10
 Bernard Wishy, Good-bye Machiavelli: Government and American Life (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1995), 103.  States and localities also encouraged economic growth by issuing corporate charters, 
awarding subsidies, and funding infrastructure projects. 
11
 Paul F. Paskoff, Troubled Waters: Steamboat Disasters, River Improvements, and American Public Policy, 
1821-1860 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2007).  Others are more skeptical of the positive 
impact of national support for internal improvements and argue that the money the federal government appropriated 
 24 
though not the result of a “grand design,” but pursuing the “prosaic and pragmatic goal of 
reducing the risk of movement on the Great Lakes and especially the western rivers.”12 
In an influential framework to characterize types of activity, Theodore Lowi divides 
government intervention in the economy into three major categories: “distribution, regulation, 
and redistribution.”13  Distributive policies involved the government giving away resources and 
privileges.
14
  Lowi contends that these distributional or “promotional” policies were among the 
most frequently practiced forms of government activism during the nineteenth century.
15
  
Richard L. McCormick agrees and enshrined the understanding of a nineteenth-century 
American government whose most “characteristic achievement” was “the distribution of 
economic benefits.”16 
Lowi’s and McCormick’s concepts may be used to frame one of the basic questions of 
this investigation: How and why did the national government undertake regulatory policies in a 
distributive era?  My answer has several parts.  First, the characterization of nineteenth-century 
politics as “distributive” ignores significant exceptions—cases in which the antebellum state 
undertook regulatory interventions, which were not as alien to the period as many have argued.  
Legislators and other officials were not rigidly committed to a philosophy of laissez-faire and the 
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theory did not exercise a predominant influence on public policy until after the Civil War.
17
  
While the national government usually left the responsibility of regulating economic interactions 
to states and municipalities, congressional representatives were willing to pass regulatory laws.   
Second, the government distributed resources to ensure public safety as well as to 
promote economic growth.  Advocates of distributing benefits argued that the public interest 
involved saving lives as well as encouraging commerce.  They asked for federal appropriations 
claiming that building harbors of refuge, removing snags from rivers, and similar actions would 
save lives as well as protect property.
18
  Members of Congress accepted that the United States 
had an obligation to secure the health and safety of its citizens engaged in interstate and 
international commerce, and that it was legitimate to appropriate money for these ends.
19
 
Third, some types of intervention were made easier because the government was merely 
extending policies it was already undertaking in other areas.  As we shall see in Chapter 2, the 
Information Option for steamboats was part of a larger set of government publications and 
investigations.  The Mechanical Option relied on mobilizing private citizens, such as inventors, 
to act on behalf of the public good by pursuing their own interests.  Today, with OSHA, the 
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FDA, the NTSB, the FAA, and a host of other federal agencies dedicated to public safety all 
setting standards and exercising some degree of control over products, businesses, and 
transportation, we may not perceive these earlier, more modest types of government influence as 
important forms of government activity, but they were common styles of intervention in the 
nineteenth-century. 
Louis Hunter saw federal regulation of steam vessels as the logical endpoint of 
intervention, but to achieve it the government needed to surmount obstacles including “the dead 
weight of social inertia, the opposition of vested interests,” preference for limited government 
and “ignorance and inexperience.”20  Hunter’s and John G. Burke’s classic accounts draw on a 
common understanding that national administrative institutions developed as responses to the 
failure of markets to control the negative effects of economic activities.
21
  Thomas McCraw 
observes that scholars have generally argued that the government undertook regulation to benefit 
the “public interest” and responded when the “public good” was threatened by market failures.22  
American law designated that particular businesses operating in the public interest should be 
“subject to a strong application of the police power.”23  Carrying millions of people and millions 
of dollars of cargo, steamboats were a vital branch of transportation and lawmakers believed that 
they should be subject to government oversight. 
For Hunter, the key precipitant of government intervention was the shock that steamboat 
disasters delivered to both “public opinion” and “legislative bodies.”  A number of explosions 
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triggered the introduction of the steamboat acts of 1838 and 1852, while public anxiety and 
demands drove the bills to passage.
24
  Congress also advanced along a learning curve as 
members discovered what needed to be done.
25
  According to Hunter, it experimented with 
regulatory oversight by passing a law in 1838 that was insufficiently rigorous and 
administratively deficient, but corrected its errors when it passed the 1852 Steamboat Act. 
But neither Hunter nor Burke developed the point that the national government began to 
oversee private businesses in the Federalist era and continued through the Civil War.  The 
government regulated sailing vessels before steamboats were even in operation and there was a 
clear constitutional path for these actions because Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution 
gave Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
states.”  In 1789, the 1st Congress passed a law that organized U.S. commercial vessels, issuing 
certificates of registry to American owners for vessels trading abroad, “certificates of enrollment 
and license for coastal vessels over twenty tons, and licenses only for coastal shipping” for 
vessels from five to “twenty tons displacement.”26 
Congress passed an act to regulate seamen the following year, prescribing the rights and 
duties of seamen and masters, and setting standards for vessel safety and the well-being of 
passengers and crews.  The law provided that an officer and majority of the crew could force a 
vessel to head into port for inspection if they believed the vessel was unsafe.  It also required that 
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each vessel must carry a medicine chest and that all vessels undertaking trans-Atlantic voyages 
must carry adequate provisions.27  In 1819, Congress limited the total number of passengers per 
ton that vessels could legally carry and expanded the prerequisite that vessels be stocked with 
sufficient provisions.28  The government extended these requirements in the 1840s, directing that 
ships provide adequate ventilation as well as ample food and water.  It also extended the laws to 
American vessels on the Pacific Ocean.29  Congress passed a Passenger Act in 1855 that 
strengthened all of these requirements.
30
  In 1860, it passed a law intended to protect female 
passengers from inappropriate treatment.31  The laws tacitly or explicitly designated customs 
officials, already stationed at ports of entry, to oversee the acts, and offenders could be sued for 
damages in federal courts.  Congressmen assumed that these were legitimate areas of federal 
concern and rarely questioned the constitutionality of such legislation, though they sometimes 
cited Article Three, Section Two which awarded the courts judicial power “in all cases of 
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” as the source of their authority.32   
Congress passed much of the maritime safety legislation with broad support, without roll 
call votes and without serious on-the-record opposition.
33
  The passenger laws served as 
precedents for the use of Congress’s regulatory powers when it was considering steamboat 
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legislation and leant a patina of legitimacy to its actions.
34
  Rather than appearing alien and 
threatening when it considered intervening on steamboats, the government was acting in ways 
that were familiar and expected.   
Congress assumed responsibility for the safety of passengers in other ways, as well.  In 
the first law appropriating funds for public works, the 1
st
 Congress had the U.S. assume control 
of all aids to navigation.  Politically, both former Federalists and Antifederalists supported the 
law and it “sailed through both houses without recorded debate.”35  The fact that lighthouses had 
been publicly financed during the colonial period and that the first three U.S. presidents oversaw 
the system and personally approved contracts for navigational aids probably reassured those who 
might question the program.  Through the 1790s, few congressmen, either Federalists or 
Jeffersonians, objected to the lighthouse program and lighthouse appropriations “never met 
significant political opposition.”36  Interest “groups concerned with safety at sea—such as 
merchants, ship-owners, captains, marine insurance companies, and naval officers” applied 
pressure to the government to improve navigational aids and gave Congress additional reasons to 
act.
37
  From the 1820s through the 1850s, while battles over national funding for a general 
system of internal improvements became a major arena of conflict, funding aids to navigation 
stirred few questions about their constitutionality and propriety.  Democratic legislators and 
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administrators set aside their inclinations toward strict construction and fears that excessive 
government intervention was a sign of corruption in the polity to support these programs.
38
  They 
accepted that safeguarding the lives of mariners and passengers was the proper responsibility of 
the general government.
 39
  Democrats endorsed a positive role for the state to secure safety and 
promote commerce by funding “light-houses, beacons, buoys and public piers” because these 
undertakings had appeared, since the beginning of the republic to be “on their very face of so 
decided a national character, that Congress undertook them at once, as a matter of course, 
without a critical reference to the charter of its powers, and depending upon a unanimous popular 
approbation for its support.”40  Every president from Jackson through Buchanan signed bills for 
navigational aids each worth more than one million dollars.  Congress appropriated over $3 
million during Andrew Jackson’s two terms in office, but the largest expenditure during any 
presidential term, $3.5 million, came when Democrat Franklin Pierce was in office.
41
   
The editor of Putnam’s Monthly Magazine praised the United States along with the 
governments of France, Prussia and Russia because they saw “the system of aids to navigation as 
a national trust or duty” and therefore appropriated money out of general revenues to pay for 
them directly, unlike countries such as England, Holland and Sweden which financed their 
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lighthouses by taxing vessels.
42
  According to Putnam’s, the government should undertake this 
public trust in a spirit of generosity rather than demanding payment for services rendered. 
Another reason why potential opponents may not have mobilized against these acts is that 
Congress avoided antagonizing defenders of states’ rights and local privileges in other areas of 
maritime safety.  The 1st Congress refrained from asserting the right to control aspects of 
navigation where local arrangements were already in place.  Rather than setting up a national 
system to regulate coastal and harbor pilots, the 1789 lighthouse law directed that existing state 
laws would continue to apply to pilots guiding vessels in and out of harbors.
43
  In 1837, Congress 
passed a law intended to destroy state piloting monopolies on ships using U.S. ports by allowing 
vessel masters to employ pilots from any state that touched the waters of any harbor.  The action 
was consistent with the concept of dual federalism affirmed in Gibbons v. Ogden.  Congress 
could have chosen to regulate pilots directly.  Instead, relying on local and state governments 
when those bodies were in a position to “fulfill public purposes,” it left the matter in their 
hands.
44
 
Congress and the Executive promoted maritime safety in other ways.  In 1837, Congress 
authorized public ships to cruise off the coasts during the winter season to aid vessels in 
distress.
45
  Congress began to appropriate money for lifesaving stations in 1848 to help victims 
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of shipwrecks.
46
  In 1851 and 1852, it organized and empowered a Lighthouse Board to oversee 
and advance the system of aids to navigation.
47
  The government’s other efforts to improve the 
environment for commerce, such as removing snags from rivers and subsidizing harbors of 
refuge also fulfilled the dual purposes of encouraging commerce and safeguarding lives and 
property.
48
 
Congress’s efforts to improve steamboat technology in the 1830s, 40s and 50s, mirrored 
its efforts to support mechanical improvements in other areas.  It sought out information on 
technological advances used by the French in their lighthouse system.
49
  The United States sent 
naval officers to Europe to examine lighthouses in 1840 and 1845.
50
  Captain Mathew C. Perry 
purchased Fresnel lenses in Paris to install in U.S. lighthouses.
51
  The members of the Lighthouse 
Board, particularly physicist and longtime Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution Joseph 
Henry, investigated lenses, bells, whistles, and other markers and warning devices for use along 
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the coasts.
52
  Congress also provided funds for the early Lifesaving Service to test surfboats, 
mortars, rockets, and other equipment in the years from 1848 to 1871.
53
 
These actions did not, except in the case of funding lighthouses, necessarily involve 
consistent and major expenditures by the national government.  Nevertheless, they indicate that 
legislators and administrators were willing to ameliorate dangers relating to waterborne 
commerce, and to experiment with policies and technology intended to ensure public safety.
54
 
 
2. The Limits of Partisanship in a Partisan Era 
While the impetus to respond to steamboat disasters provides one explanation for why 
Congress was moved to act, it does not offer a sufficient account of how Congress acted, what 
sort of remedies it proposed, and which legislators supported them.  The fact that congressmen 
introduced bills showed that they were willing to do something, but how they arrived at their 
ultimate prescriptions requires further examination.  The explanation that Congress responded to 
an overwhelming sense of danger also does not adequately address the political context in which 
the steamboat laws of 1838 and 1852 were enacted.  Despite the maritime regulations and other 
interventions discussed above, in these years the national government was not very active in 
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overseeing the economic actions of its citizens, nor were the national parties known for 
cooperating to enact major legislation. 
One substantial hurdle that any steamboat law would have had to clear is that many 
members of the Democratic Party, which held majorities in both houses of Congress when these 
laws were passed, subscribed to a political ideology that was intensely suspicious of certain 
forms of government activity.
55
  Partisanship played an important role in antebellum governance.  
As one scholar has put it, “party was the paramount force in the shaping of public policy in both 
Congress and the state legislatures, the main terrain of nineteenth-century American 
government.”56  The parties gained their power because they were effective organizations which 
“reflected, organized, and articulated” social and cultural divisions in the larger society.57 
Democrats wanted to avoid rewarding particular interests and were reluctant to endorse 
actions that went “beyond establishing general rules” and securing public “order.”58  They 
thought that government intervention would favor one group over others and that the wealthy 
and powerful would make government “their tool.”59  Idealizing a simple agrarian society and 
determined to clear away impediments so that individuals could achieve their goals, most 
Democrats resisted programs, like protective tariffs, that were intended to advance particular 
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types of economic development.
60
  In the year the Steamboat Act of 1838 was passed, President 
Martin Van Buren and his fellow Democrats insisted that the government should not intervene 
aggressively to address the economic crisis that afflicted the country.
61
  Yet in his annual 
message to Congress the previous December, Van Buren had asked members to pass legislation 
to prevent steamboat accidents.
62
  Why did Democrats not fight harder against laws that 
interfered with the steamboat operations—a vital and rapidly growing industry?  Scholars who 
have examined steamboat legislation have not investigated this inconsistency in any detail. 
If the Democratic majority should have been troubled by steamboat legislation, how then 
did steamboat legislation get passed?  The Whigs, as champions of internal improvements, 
believed that the government should promote economic growth, but they were not known for 
advocating oversight of business, except in cases of regulating moral practices through policies 
like prohibition on the local and state levels.  Perhaps, though, the situation with steamboats was 
similar to internal improvements where most Whigs favored appropriations to build roads, canals 
and improve waterways, while many Democrats opposed them.  If Whigs provided the main 
support for steamboat legislation, it would have been consistent with some portions of their 
guiding philosophy.  They tended to embrace economic and technological progress believing it 
would also “elevate the intellectual and moral level of society.”63  With leaders such as Henry 
Clay and Daniel Webster who favored an energetic national government, and with party 
members who advocated government intervention on the state and local level, they appeared to 
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be the group most likely to push for steamboat regulation.  If this was the case, one might expect 
the voting outcomes for steamboat legislation to be similar to the voting coalitions that favored 
internal improvements, where the Whigs provided the core of support and enough Northern and 
Western Democrats joined them to secure majorities to pass the 1838 and 1852 steamboat acts.  
After all, as Michael Holt noted, there was a “growing congruence between the parties on almost 
all issues by the early 1850s,” and this would fit with the timing of passage of the 1852 act.64 
Though members of Congress generally demanded roll call votes on contentious issues, 
they did not ask for one in the House or Senate when the 1838 bill was being considered for final 
passage and they passed it without substantial opposition.  Unlike the contests over tariffs and 
internal improvements, partisan affiliation was not the best indicator of how congressmen would 
vote on steamboat legislation.  The absence of a rancorous contest over the 1838 measure is 
puzzling; one might have expected more controversy, especially given the highly charged 
political environment of the 25
th
 Congress, when the parties, in the wake of the Panic of 1837, 
fought over proposals like the independent treasury system.
65
  Fourteen years later, the situation 
in Congress was calmer; the members of the 32
nd
 Congress were not as preoccupied with the 
sectional issues that had engaged their recent predecessors.
66
  Still, one might have anticipated 
energetic opposition from at least some Democrats and Southerners who opposed the 1852 act 
because they supported small government and states’ rights. 
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However, few opponents raised objections to the steamboat acts and those who did found 
little support.  Members of Congress did not usually call for roll call votes on these types of 
legislation, preferring to pass them by general consent (Appendix A).  The consensus support 
was similar to when other steamboat and passenger safety bills were passed.  About 85% of 
members in the House and Senate supported the law in the final roll call votes on the 1852 
legislation.  Majorities of Whigs and Democrats, as well as congressmen from both the North 
and the South, voted in favor.
67
  In this way steamboat intervention resembled legislation later in 
the century which did not provoke “partisan conflict,” such as the Interstate Commerce Act of 
1887 and the Hatch Act to fund agricultural experiment stations.
68
 
All of the approaches to steamboat safety enjoyed support from both sides of the aisle 
and I found no evidence that Whigs, Democrats, or Republicans used them for campaigning.  
Most Democrats “acknowledged that Congress could regulate what the Supreme Court would 
later call ‘the instrumentalities of commerce’ for reasons of public safety.”69  The lack of partisan 
divisions was also reflected in the fact that there were no consistent differences between the 
proposals crafted in committee by legislators of different parties.  Both Whig and Democratic 
members of Congress composed bills to subsidize inventors, require safety equipment, inspect 
vessels, test boilers, issue licenses to steamboat operators, and set standards for safe operation.
70
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How could there have been such widespread support for policies that ought to have been 
controversial? 
Since there were relatively few roll call votes to provide systematic evidence of 
congressional preferences on these issues and because there is no clear evidence of candidates 
who raised the steamboat issue in election campaigns, I have charted Congress’s actions in this 
area from the 1820s to the 1850s by examining the type of information it gathered, the 
recommendations it made, the characteristics of the legislation it introduced and passed, and the 
affiliations and comments of the congressmen and other government officials who sponsored and 
shaped it.  Much of this data is outlined in the Appendices. 
Given that the government had regulated sailing vessels for decades, steamboat 
legislation represented more aggressive versions of existing types of federal oversight, rather 
than entirely new types of activity.  As we shall see, while the steamboat acts of 1838 and 1852 
intervened more substantively in the operation of vessels than acts regulating sailing vessels, all 
were similar in that Congress asserted its authority in the name of public safety.  What was 
distinctive about the 1852 Steamboat Act was the way that Congress combined Informational, 
Mechanical, Penalty, and Regulatory policies, and how a small number of congressmen devised 
a complex set of administrative requirements to oversee and enforce these policies. 
Steamboat legislation was thus in tune with the goals and practices of related policies, 
while it broke new ground in other ways.  Legal scholar Jerry Mashaw contends that steamboat 
legislation contradicts the notion that the nineteenth-century polity was feeble and incompetent.  
The legislation, he argues, particularly the 1852 Act, provided a series of breakthroughs in 
American governance.
71
  Overseeing steam vessels was “the national government’s first major 
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health and safety regulatory program,” which pioneered “scientific regulation”—i.e., regulation 
based on expertise and knowledge gained through verifiable evidence.  It initiated the “‘board’ or 
‘commission’” form of administration staffed by independent experts who were not directly 
answerable to the Executive branch, as well as the process of “administrative rulemaking,” 
where the board propagated rules to dictate practices in areas under its authority.
72
  If steamboat 
intervention was such an important development, its design and the ways it was carried out 
deserve a closer examination. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 “THE GREAT SCHOOLMASTER OF THE PEOPLE” 
 
1. Introduction 
In an effort to prevent steamboat accidents, members of Congress and the Executive 
branch gathered and disseminated information to people who designed, operated and traveled on 
the vessels.  Of the four policy approaches we are examining, discovering and disseminating 
information was the one the government practiced most persistently for the longest period and 
was consistent with government efforts to gather information and publish documents on other 
subjects of public concern.
1
  As part of this Information Option, from 1824 to 1852 Congress 
published eighty documents on the subject.
2
  These included assessments of the reasons for 
steam vessel accidents, advice on how to build and operate them, news on safety equipment, and 
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received on the topic, they provide a good sample of the knowledge, beliefs and concerns in the United States at the 
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discussions of existing and potential government policies (see Appendix B).  The documents 
were intended to facilitate the use and improvement of steam power and Congress distributed 
them, along with hundreds of thousands of copies of other documents dealing with the economic 
life of the nation, such as Coast Survey reports, census materials, reports on Commerce and 
Navigation, and the annual report of the Patent Office.
3
   
In the case of steam power, the government tried to guide steamboat operators toward 
safer use of their vessels, rather than to dictate their day-to-day operations.  Readers could 
educate themselves and make informed decisions.  One Senate committee constructed an 
appendix of information they believed would be “most useful to builders of steam vessels and 
steam-engines, or to the owners who have the care of them” and ordered 1,000 extra copies to be 
printed.
4
  This was a way of promoting the public interest with a light touch, without requiring 
that vessels be inspected or engineers licensed, and without the preferential treatment that came 
with awarding subsidies to particular inventors.   
Historian Oz Frankel has coined the phrase “print statism” to describe the way that the 
nineteenth-century governments of the U.S. and Britain gathered and disseminated information.  
In the United States, government personnel conducted investigations and wrote reports on an 
array of topics.
5
  The documents covered subjects as exotic as exploration of the South Seas and 
provided accounts of the lives of native peoples in the West, and were sometimes as technical 
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and specialized as analyses of the qualities of anthracite and bituminous coal.
6
  The government 
produced these reports at the public expense and distributed them free of charge.  The United 
States created a Post Office, extending its services to remote areas of the country, and used the 
mail to transmit newspapers and other periodicals to create a market for news about national 
affairs.
7
  Taking on the responsibility to keep citizens informed about federal activities, the 
national government became what one congressman labeled as the “great schoolmaster of the 
people.”8 
Congress first inquired into the causes of steam vessel disasters in 1824, when the House 
of Representatives asked the Treasury Department to investigate the problem.  With this, the 
national government joined state, local, and private entities that were inquiring into steamboat 
accidents.
9
  Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford thought that congressional action would 
do more harm than good and recommended against legislation.
10
  But by publishing information 
about steamboat accidents and operation, Congress had already begun to intervene in a way that, 
though modest, was typical for the period.  Committees in both houses scrutinized the issue, 
                                                 
6
 For a brief discussion of the government publications related to the U.S. Exploring Expedition of 1838-42, 
commanded by Lt. Charles Wilkes, and the work of ethnographer Henry Rose Schoolcraft, see Frankel, States of 
Inquiry, 112-18 and Chapter 7.  Prof. Walter R. Johnson wrote the report on coal for the U.S. Navy; it was printed as 
28
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1844, S. Doc. 386. 
7
 Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 112; and Oz Frankel, “Potholes on the Information Superhighway: Congress 
as Publisher in Nineteenth-Century America,” in David Thorburn and Henry Jenkins, eds., Rethinking Media 
Change: The Aesthetics of Transition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003), 139. 
8
 CG, 31
st
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Mar. 12, 1850, 503.  North Carolina Democratic representative Abraham Venable 
condemned this practice while trying, and failing, to block an attempt to print extra copies of two sections of the 
Patent Office annual report on agriculture and the mechanical arts.  “Information is of value, it is true,” said 
Venable, “but this Government was never intended to be the great schoolmaster of the people.” 
9
 See HJ, 18
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., May 26, 1824, 599, and HJ, 18
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Jan. 31, 1825, 188. 
10
 Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on Accidents in Steamboats, 18
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Jan. 31, 1825, H. 
Exec. Doc. 69.  One congressional committee in 1830 thought that it was best to keep Congressional intervention to 
a minimum and to rely on technical advances, “the improvements of the age” to solve the problem.  See John K. 
Brown, Limbs on the Levee: Steamboat Explosions and the Origins of Federal Public Welfare Regulation, 1817-
1852 (Middlebourn, WV: International Steamboat Society, 1989), 30. 
 43 
asked for information from the executive departments, and Congress subsequently appropriated 
funds for additional inquiries. 
Using Leroy Merritt’s typology of government printing, the data the government 
accumulated under its research function was probably the most significant in expanding 
knowledge of the causes of accidents and preventative measures.  The federal government sought 
out experts to investigate the problem of explosions and distributed reports that pointed the way 
toward safer operating practices.  Ideally, in the government’s service function, people who 
operated steamboats could refer to this data and come to understand the safest ways to use 
machinery.
11
  Government officials knew that their documents did not need to reach everyone.  
Private publications could be counted on to reprint relevant material.
12
  This practice worked 
both ways as the government also reprinted reports and documents that were produced by private 
individuals.
13
  In the case of steamboats, it was reasonable for congressmen to assume that many 
of the documents it printed would be reprinted, summarized or discussed in periodicals such as 
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make them available to both steamboat operators and the public.  Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury 
Transmitting … Information in Relation to Steam Engines, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21, 433. 
12
 For example, one article “Monthly Record: Politics and Statistics: Steam Boat Explosions,” The New-
England Magazine 3/1 [July 1832], 66-67), summarized the findings and recommendations of a House Select 
Committee on Steam (22
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1832, H. Rept. 478 - See Appendix B).  The Journal of the Franklin 
Institute, the Boston Mechanics Magazine, the New York City Mechanics’ Magazine, and the Journal of the 
American Institute in New York carried copies of an 1833 report investigating the explosion of the steamer New 
England on the Connecticut River.  See R. John Brockmann, Twisted Rails, Sunken Ships: The Rhetoric of 
Nineteenth-Century Steamboat and Railroad Accident Investigation Reports, 1833-1879 (Amityville, NY: Baywood 
Publishing Company, Inc., 2005), 26.  Editors of periodicals were willing to publish excerpts, summaries, and 
extended commentary about government documents on the topic of steamboats.  In 1840, The North American 
Review published a twenty-three-page essay on steamboats prompted by two reports: one on the causes of 
explosions, prepared at the request of the citizens of Cincinnati after the 1838 Moselle disaster (“Steamboat 
Disasters,” The North American Review 50/106 [Jan. 1840], 19-43), the other was the massive document prepared 
by the Secretary of the Treasury and issued in Dec. 1838 (25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21 – See Appendix B).  
J. B. D. Debow regularly published material taken from government documents, including statistics taken from S. 
Exec. Doc. 18 in 1849 (Appendix B) on the causes of steamboat accidents.  “Miscellaneous: Steam Boiler 
Explosions,” Debow’s Review 8/1 (Jan. 1850), 91-92. 
13
 The House of Representatives appended the report on the New England explosion to a massive collection of 
steamboat-related material gathered by the Secretary of the Treasury and published as 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1838, H. 
Doc. 21, and printed 10,000 extra copies in 1838 (see Appendix B). 
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Scientific American and the Journal of the Franklin Institute, which covered issues relating to 
technology, including steam power.
14
 
Documents concerning technology were among the largest and most popular ones that the 
government published.  Legislators and administrators believed that printing and diffusing 
technical information about steam power would help inventors and practical mechanics make 
improvements in engine design and vessel construction.
15
  If the minds of inventors could be 
seeded with ideas about how to improve steam engines, they could come up with ways to protect 
people’s lives and limbs.  To this end, many of the documents on boiler explosions in the 1830s, 
1840s, and 1850s included technical information on safety mechanisms.  The sponsors of these 
investigations thought that they could foster the process of invention by providing learned 
critiques, descriptions, diagrams and models to serve as sources of ideas to make further 
improvements.  This belief reflected their understanding of how people learned to build and use 
machinery and how improvements were made in the arts and crafts.  Mechanics, artisans, and 
skilled laborers learned their vocations through a process of “emulation.”  They worked with an 
experienced practitioner of their craft, often as an apprentice to a master.  When they fully 
understood current techniques, tools, and the relevant technology well enough to work 
independently, their apprenticeship was complete and they could strike out on their own.
16
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 Scientific American trumpeted the fact that it contained engravings illustrating “new inventions,” “scientific 
principles” as well as notices of “mechanical and other scientific improvements,” “essays on the principles of the 
sciences” and “instruction in various arts and trades.”  SA 2/5, Oct. 24, 1846, 40.  The magazine was intended for 
non-specialists and, according to its publishers, was directed toward “mechanics and manufacturers,” as well as 
“farmers.” 
15
 In the 1920s the government also printed technical information on agricultural subjects and published guides 
on the safe use of automobiles to facilitate “safety education” and promote “uniform traffic control laws.”  See Ellis 
W. Hawley, “Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an ‘Associative State,’ 1921-1928,” The 
Journal of American History 61/1 (Jun. 1974): 131. 
16
 Brooke Hindle, Emulation and Invention (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1981), 13.  Many of 
the government documents on steamboat accidents listed in Appendix B included diagrams and descriptions of 
safety mechanisms and apparatus.  Alexander Dallas Bache, for example, head of the Franklin Institute
 
Committee 
 45 
By providing inventors and mechanics with descriptions and visual representations of 
machinery, legislators hoped that interested Americans would reconceptualize and tinker with 
the existing machinery and devise further improvements.  In 1855, James C. Booth, chief 
metallurgist at the U.S. Mint, investigated steam safety devices on behalf of the Treasury 
Department and Board of Supervising Steamboat Inspectors.  He recommended soliciting the 
advice of interested Americans: Booth would make a formal report to the department “on the 
methods of employing the [inventions], accompanied by illustrative drawings,” which would 
then be distributed to machinists throughout the country.  “It appears to me,” Booth wrote, “that 
such a course would call into the field a large amount of ingenuity and skill, which will lead to 
the construction of more perfect apparatus than has been hitherto devised.”17 
Public officials expressed a great deal of confidence in the mechanical capabilities of 
their fellow citizens.  These attitudes, along with the rapid increase in the “mechanical 
capabilities of craftsman” from 1800 to 1850, convinced many Americans that they were living 
in an age of progress, one in which the dangers of steam could be minimized or avoided while it 
still served great national and commercial purposes.
18
  Confidence in the United States’ 
technological future was consistent with “the spirit of political and intellectual optimism” that 
prevailed during the period.
19
  President Andrew Jackson wrote in 1831 that “science is steadily 
                                                                                                                                                             
investigating boiler explosions, devised an improved safety device and included an illustration and description with 
the Institute’s report.  24th Cong., 1st sess., March 1, 1836,  H. Doc. 162, 38-39. 
17
 James C. Booth, U.S. Mint, to James Guthrie, Secretary of the Treasury, Philadelphia, Jul. 14, 1855, 
Miscellaneous Correspondence Received by the Secretary of the Treasury, 1852-1862 (Bound Volume), Bureau of 
Marine Inspection and Navigation (BMIN), Steamboat Inspection Service (SIS), RG 41, NA.  The Treasury 
Secretary had asked Booth to examine and refine a metal alloy safety device that had been invented by Cadwallader 
Evans. 
18
 Eugene S. Ferguson, “On the Origin and Development of American Mechanical ‘Know-How,’ ” 
Midcontinent American Studies Journal 3/2 (1962): 3. 
19
 Donald Zochert, “Science and the Common Man in Antebellum America,” Isis 65/4 (Dec. 1974): 470.  
Experience should have tempered the confidence that elected officials expressed in their fellow citizens.  Americans 
conceived passionate enthusiasms for improbable and impossible (for the time and sometimes for all time) 
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penetrating the recesses of nature and disclosing her secrets, while the ingenuity of free minds is 
subjecting the elements to the power of man and making each new conquest auxiliary to his 
comfort.”20  Improvements were visible for everyone to witness and steamboats themselves 
provided evidence of the continuous advancement in human affairs, “the sublime progress of the 
race.”  Americans were sure theirs was a land of opportunity and that their democratic system 
provided incentives for people to advance their “own comfort and status.”21  
While the government published a lot of high quality material, its system of 
disseminating information had significant imperfections in both supply and demand.  The 
government documents on steam, like many of its publications, were often poorly organized and 
this probably limited their usefulness to those who read them.
22
  Most importantly, the 
government was much better at gathering evidence and testimony than it was at differentiating 
which claims had a solid evidentiary basis.  While some of the documents reflected the best 
scientific and practical knowledge of the day, portions were flawed and misleading, endorsed 
errant or questionable theories, and failed to unequivocally condemn dangerous practices.  The 
fact that there was inadequate quality control likely indicated that lawmakers assigned a higher 
                                                                                                                                                             
inventions that ranged from flying machines to mesmerism and perpetual motion.  But despite these misconceived 
manias, the rapid material progress taking place in the country seemed to justify their faith in themselves and their 
fellows. 
20
 Andrew Jackson, Third Annual Message (Dec. 6, 1831) in James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Volume II, Part 3: Andrew Jackson, March 4, 1829, to March 4, 1833 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910), 1108. 
21
 Leo Marx, The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America (New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), 88, 105, 129, 197, 204.   
22
 For example, the editor of the New York Review noted that 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21, printed in 
Dec. 1838, and at 472 pages the lengthiest of the steam-related documents published by the national government 
during this period, was “wanting in any regular and lucid order” while lacking a classification scheme or an index.  
The commentator went on to say that the subject was an important one and lamented that any person who wanted 
the information simply had to “wade through” all of it.  See The New York Review 6/9 (Apr. 1839): 462.  A writer in 
the North American Review echoed these criticisms the following year when he characterized the “mass of 
documents” in H. Doc. 21 as “ill-arranged and undigested.”  He acknowledged that the publication presented a wide 
range of opinions about the causes of steamboat accidents, but he disapproved of the fact that it did not provide 
definitive answers or map out a persuasive case for an effective governmental response, which would require, he 
thought, more study.  See “Steamboat Disasters.”  North American Review 50/106 (January 1840): 37. 
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priority to pleasing their constituents by sending them printed books and reports, than in assuring 
that the contents of the reports were accurate.
23
 
Beyond this problem of supply, there were also difficulties with demand.  Despite the fact 
that steam engines had been in use for over a century, most nineteenth-century Americans had 
only a rudimentary understanding of the physical processes that governed steam power.  The 
science of thermodynamics was still in its infancy and many people, often those who operated 
steam engines, fervently believed in myths about the causes of steam engine accidents.  
Publications were more effective in expanding the state of knowledge than in getting all 
steamboat operators and builders to believe and use it.  Vessel owners and engineers were often 
reluctant to adopt new equipment and follow safer practices. 
Despite these limitations, over time the investigations and publications probably 
enlightened at least some of their intended audiences, and pointed the way for steamboatmen to 
adopt better practices and use improved safety devices, which had a positive impact on vessel 
safety. 
 
2. Environment and Infrastructure: Print Culture, Government Printing and Technological 
Knowledge 
Disseminating documents on steam was part of a vital print culture that 
accompanied a commitment to government printing and an effort to publish information 
on public affairs and technology.  The public printing, that is printing that was ordered by 
the government and done at public expense, served as an instrument of the national 
government’s efforts to disseminate information about steam power, but was only a small 
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 This should not be surprising in a democratic republic where lawmakers were influenced by their desire to 
serve particular popular constituencies.   
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part of a larger project where Congress regularly printed many copies of documents on a 
wide variety of subjects.
24
  Congressmen used some of these documents in Washington, 
but they also mailed many to their constituents using the franking privilege, the legal 
right every congressman and select members of the executive branch had to send out mail 
for free.
25
 
The government printed huge numbers of documents every year and the numbers 
increased over time.  Testifying before a committee of the House of Commons in 1853, 
an agent of the Smithsonian noted that  
the federal government issued each of its papers in 1,500 copies, but in every 
session … about ten to twenty documents received publicity unmatched by any 
parliamentary literature.  Printed in large editions of between 5,000 to 100,000 
copies, they were allocated through congressional representatives and senators to 
hundreds of libraries, learned associations, and athenaeums.  As a matter of law, 
Washington sent some of its most lavish print productions to state governments, 
colleges, and incorporated literary institutions, mostly historical societies.
26
  
The Parliamentary committee praised the fact that by gathering information and distributing 
documents without charge, the U.S. (and state governments) served as part of an educational system 
of schools, libraries and other institutions to diffuse knowledge throughout the country.
27
  While 
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 The best brief overview of this topic can be found in Frankel, States of Inquiry, Chapter 2.  See also Sarah 
Jordan Miller, “The Depository Library System: A History of the Distribution of Federal Government Publications 
to Libraries of the United States from the Early Years of the Nation to 1895” (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1980).   
25
 John, Spreading the News, 58, 251.  Congressmen claimed that the franking privilege provided a reasonable 
means to distribute documents.  On franking out copies of annual reports of the Patent Office, see CG, 31
st
 Cong., 1
st
 
sess. Mar. 7, 1850, 473-75.  For an impassioned defense of the franking privilege, where one congressman claimed 
that the “Government is a great educational apparatus, and its most beneficent operation is that in which it diffuses 
knowledge in reference to all matters that relate to [the] public interests among the people,” see the remarks of 
Representative Charles Wentworth Upham in favor of extending the franking privilege to the superintendent of the 
Coast Survey.  Upham pointed out the benefits to commerce and to the security of life that Americans enjoyed as a 
result of the Survey’s work and that his proposal would make it much easier to send out documents that were both 
useful and popular.  CG, 33
rd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jan. 24, 1854, 245.  Act of February 2, 1854, Ch. 8, “An Act Granting 
the Franking Privilege to the Superintendent of the Coast Survey, and the Assistant in Charge of the Office of Said 
Coast Survey.” 
26
 Frankel, States of Inquiry, 72. 
27
 Ibid., 73-74. 
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fostering this system, the national government “paid incessant tributes to the informative value of 
[its] publications, whether the knowledge released was expected to guide the decision-making 
process in the national legislature or the choices individual citizens had to make in the 
marketplace.”28   
Within the federal establishment, Congress played the most important role in the growth 
of government publishing.  Most government documents were issued in the “Congressional 
Series” and published or purchased by order of either house of Congress.29  Congress usually 
initiated the inquiries that led to the documents and, with the constitutional power of the purse, 
appropriated the money to pay for them.  It determined most of what would be printed and hired 
private firms to print the documents until the Government Printing Office began operating in 
1861.
30
 
An important reason for the growth of government printing was that there were fewer 
procedural barriers to publish a document than to pass a law.  All it took was for the House or 
Senate to pass a nonbinding resolution, which did not require the approval of the other house or 
                                                 
28
 Ibid., 32. 
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 Merritt, The United States Government as Publisher, 3. 
30
 Jerrold Zwirn, “Federal Printing Policies, 1789-1861,” Government Publications Review, 7A/3 (1980): 179.  
Congress produced only a modest number of documents up until Thomas Jefferson’s presidency, and until the late 
1810s, the format and quality of materials varied greatly, and editorial oversight of the content left much to be 
desired.  See August. A. Imholtz, Jr., “The Printing and Distribution of the Serial Set: A Preliminary Contribution to 
19
th-Century Printing,” DTTP: Documents to the People 31/1 (2003): 8.  Some of this was due to the undeveloped 
condition of the new national capital after the government relocated there in 1800.  Large printers had been available 
when the capital was in New York and Philadelphia, but when the seat of government was moved to the District of 
Columbia, it was difficult for several years to find print shops capable of doing the work.  See Culver Smith, The 
Press, Politics and Patronage: The American Government’s Use of Newspapers, 1789-1875 (Athens, GA: The 
University of Georgia Press, 1977), 3.  There was no uniform classification system or method to ensure that 
government documents were distributed to everyone who was supposed to get them, and this created problems until 
the mid-1810s.  Members of Congress often complained about the high cost and poor quality of the printing.  See 
Robert E. Kling, Jr., The Government Printing Office (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 10.  The Printing 
Act of 1819 addressed some of these problems, but it also meant that government printing contracts became very 
profitable in subsequent decades.  The cost of printing declined as technology improved while government 
reimbursement stayed the same.  This may have increased the support among congressmen for publishing 
documents, since legislative spoilsmen could endorse government printing as a way to reward printers who 
supported a particular party or faction within the party.  See Imholtz, “Printing and Distribution,” 13; Frankel, States 
of Inquiry, 74; and Smith, Press, Politics, and Patronage, especially chapters 6–9 and 12–15. 
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of the president.  Most printed material was authorized by resolutions in either house of Congress 
and paid for out of their contingency funds or money that Congress had appropriated for the 
public printing.
31
  A majority in either house could send a document to the printer and print extra 
copies.  Most questions of printing never even came to a roll call vote and proposals to print 
documents were generally approved by unanimous consent and without debate, though often on 
the recommendation of a designated committee.  As a result, the House and the Senate quickly 
authorized most resolutions for printing the usual number of documents and extra copies.  Of the 
eighty documents produced from 1824 to 1852 concerning steam vessel accidents, only one of 
them was contested in a roll call vote in Congress.
32
 
Congress increased the number and quality of documents it printed after the War of 1812 
as individuals and interest groups solicited the government to disseminate information more 
widely.
33
  For example, settlers, speculators, and politicians who favored western expansion 
called for additional copies and wide distribution of the reports composed by government 
exploring expeditions.
34
  The government responded to these requests, sponsored investigations 
and printed documents.  Members of Congress franked out thousands of them.
35
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 sess., Feb. 6, 1852, S. Misc. Doc. 32.  Among the eighty steamboat-related 
documents, there were four other times when the Congress did not print what a member had requested.  In one case, 
the Senate approved printing only 10,000 out of the requested 30,000 extra copies of a document.  See 30
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 Cong., 
2
nd
 sess., Jan. 8, 1849, S. Exec. Doc. 18.  In two other cases, the House of Representatives declined to print extra 
copies of a document: 24
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 Cong., 1
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 sess., March 1, 1836, H. Doc. 162, and 26
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 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jul. 10, 1840, H. 
Rept. 651.  In both of these instances, the motion to print was not defeated, but the session ended before the issue 
was addressed; see HJ, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess. Mar. 2, 1836, 444 and HJ 26
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jul. 10, 1840, 1255.  In 
one other case, a report was referred to a committee, but was never ordered printed; see HJ, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess. 
Dec. 20, 1836, 76. 
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 For instance, as professional librarians organized themselves in mid-century, they lobbied Congress to 
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1876-1956,” Journal of Government Information 22/1 (1995): 46. 
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The growth of government bureaucracy also increased the number and demand for 
government documents.
36
  Some administrators advocated printing and distributing copies of the 
reports they were producing.  Alexander Dallas Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey, 
realized that one method to cultivate support from members of Congress was to make sure that 
they received copies of the Survey’s reports where they could read about the good work 
accomplished by the bureau.
37
  The Coast Survey reports provided positive publicity that 
supporters could use to justify further appropriations.  It became standard procedure for Congress 
to order thousands of extra copies of the Survey’s annual report.38   
Commercial groups clamored both for the Coast Survey reports and for more extensive 
information about the subject of trade.  By 1836 the House of Representatives was ordering 
10,000 extra copies of the annual report on commerce and navigation.  Representative Gideon 
Lee stated that not only was the report 
                                                                                                                                                             
their own use, though some were routinely sent out to states, newspapers, designated individuals, libraries and other 
outside organizations.  Congress increased the usual number of printed documents as the country grew, though not 
in direct proportion to the expanding number of states and congressmen.  By the mid 1840s, during the second 
session of the twenty-eighth Congress, the Senate’s “usual number” of documents was 1214 copies of documents, 
770 copies of public bills, and 554 copies of private bills.  For the House, the usual number was 1380 copies of 
documents and reports and 600 copies of bills by 1847.  Many documents were printed in much larger numbers as 
the Senate and House ordered thousands of extra copies of certain documents, such as the President’s Annual 
Message.  See Imholtz, “Printing and Distribution,” 10-11. 
36
 Frankel, States of Inquiry, 8. 
37
 Hugh Richard Slotten, “The Dilemmas of Science in the United States: Alexander Dallas Bache and the U.S. 
Coast Survey,” Isis, 84 (1993): 31.  Bache was one of the most prominent scientists in the country, he was an 
excellent administrator, and his own reputation and that of the survey was likely helped by the positive press 
coverage they received.  In an 1852 article portraying life in Washington City, Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 
praised the Survey and commended Bache for his “able superintendence.”  Harper’s New Monthly Magazine 6/31 
(Dec. 1852): 11. 
38
 CG, 34
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess. Feb. 14, 1856, 413.  By the mid-1850s, Bache had run the Survey for over a decade 
and he could count on supporters in Congress to help him get documents printed and make the case for funding the 
Survey.  Bache’s lobbying and adept use of the Survey’s reports helped garner enough congressional support to keep 
it under civilian control when in the 1840s and 1850s some members of Congress attempted to transfer it to the 
Navy Department.  In 1856, the Senate and House ordered 10,000 extra copies each of the Survey report.  See CG, 
34
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Feb. 18, 1856, 441.  Six thousand of the extra copies were reserved for the use of House 
members, while four thousand were designated for distribution by Bache as the Superintendent of the Survey.  
Democratic Senator and Chairman of the Commerce Committee Hannibal Hamlin attested in 1856 that many men of 
commerce asked for the report and he was confident that the Coast Survey office could distribute them efficiently. 
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required by every merchant and trader … but was no less required by every 
farmer, planter and manufacturer.  This paper recorded truly and faithfully the 
commercial transactions of this great nation, detailing, item by item, the quantity 
and value of our annual imports and exports.  … Every man, of every trade and 
profession should have it.  Ten thousand copies were usually printed, and he was 
informed … that this number had fallen far short of the pressing demands.39 
Boards of trade in port cities also lobbied the government to publish commercial 
information.  In 1856, the Boston Board of Trade wrote Congress that it intended to create a 
library.  The best way to promote commerce, they said, was to collect and make available 
statistics on products, manufactures, imports, and exports, as well as information on “navigation 
laws, treaties, and commercial regulations and usages of the United States and of the world.”  
The Board asked Congress to send them documents on these subjects and to also send them to 
every other board of trade and chamber of commerce that requested them.
40
  Requests like this 
were in tune with the demands to have the government gather and provide access to facts that 
would more accurately describe society.
41
  Political theorist Francis Lieber wanted the national 
government to gather information systematically and disseminate it widely.
42
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As time went on, Congress created more documents and printed more copies of popular 
ones.  Despite the fact that technological advances were making printing less expensive, the 
portion of the national budget dedicated to the public printing increased faster than the overall 
budget as additional documents were printed and distributed.  During a ten-year period from 
1846-1856, for example, the amount the government spent on printing rose from about $86,000 
to over $500,000, increasing almost 6½ times, while overall outlays by the federal government 
rose about 2½ times in the same period.  The actual amount spent on printing was likely much 
larger—these figures greatly underestimate the costs since they do not include the expenditures 
for specialized printing services like engraving and lithography, and do not consider the amount 
of money it took for the Post Office to deliver government documents sent via the franking 
privilege.
43
 
The United States also sent documents to institutions that would make them available to the 
public.  After 1813, as a precursor to the depository library system, Congress increased the usual 
number of copies of documents it printed and sent them to governors and legislatures, universities 
and colleges in each state, with an additional copy to go to state historical societies.
44
  It also passed 
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a law to send copies of the House and Senate Journals and other Congressional documents to 
libraries.
45
   
Citizens were interested in receiving the information and, with the development of an 
extensive public sphere, were prepared to use it.
46
  Both the demand and the supply of printed 
information increased rapidly in the first half of the 1800s.  A mass consumer culture developed 
where readers sought inexpensive amusement and writers sought to attract popular audiences.
47
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The reform efforts associated with the Second Great Awakening also helped to expand print 
culture.
48
  By the 1830s and 1840s advances in technology made it cheaper to produce 
newspapers and other periodicals, making them more accessible to wider audiences.
49
  
Americans were stimulated by “patriotism, religion, recreation and trade” to establish and seek 
out “newspapers, printed sermons, organizational tracts and specialized journals that entertained 
and edified.”50  The 1850 census reported that there were 2,800 newspapers and periodicals in 
the country with a circulation of about 5 million and aggregate copies of approximately 422 
million.
51
   
Political contests in the early national and antebellum periods contributed to the 
expansion of print culture and increased the amount of printed material by and about the 
government.
52
  The rivalry between Jacksonians and National Republicans in the 1820s boosted 
people’s attention to the government and debates about public policy led to production of more 
written material.  The U.S. developed an expanded electorate of “voter-readers” and partisan 
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papers worked hard to publicize the party line, cement voter loyalties, and get them to the polls.
53
  
By 1840, both the Democratic and Whig parties had developed a national system of elected 
officials, newspaper editors, and activists disseminating speeches, newspapers, and pamphlets.
54
 
Americans drew ideological sustenance for their commitment to distribute information 
about the government from eighteenth-century ideals “that demanded government accountability, 
open debate, and public scrutiny of the affairs of state.”55  Some national leaders wanted to 
distribute news about governmental affairs because they believed that the people required as 
much information as possible to oversee their representatives and hold elected officials 
accountable for their actions.
56
  By the late eighteenth century, it was becoming conventional 
wisdom among American leaders that a democratic republic needed to keep its citizens well 
informed about their government.
57
  This attitude continued well into the nineteenth century.  
One representative, writing in 1848 on behalf of the House Committee on the Post Office and 
Post Roads, stated that the government should continue to aid the circulation of newspapers and 
periodicals.  According to him, it was consistent 
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with the principles of our republican institutions, which can be best sustained by 
the diffusion of knowledge and the due encouragement of a universal national 
spirit of inquiry and discussion of public events through the medium of the public 
press.
58
 
Public-private partnerships developed to facilitate this process.
59
  Most readers probably 
experienced government proceedings and documents through the numerous passages reprinted as 
“long excerpts in the daily press and reviews in journals.”60  
Americans did not rely entirely on the medium of print to disseminate information about 
technology and founded organizations such as mechanics institutes.  The institutes, which were 
most active from the 1820s through the 1850s, were among the many educational institutions 
“including lyceums, mercantile libraries, apprentice libraries, and young men’s institutes,” 
designed “to provide educational opportunities to what many viewed as a woefully 
undereducated populace.”61 
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3. “The Power of Acting Intelligently” 
As time went on, the government expanded the range and depth of its inquiries and, as 
Margo Anderson has written, “Americans called for new institutions to support a more complex 
and integrated economy.  In the 1830s and 1840s, the infant statistical community had begun to 
press for the creation of a more professional national statistical system.”62  Proponents of 
government reports on technology argued that printing them was a comparatively modest way to 
promote the interests of mechanics and farmers.  Besides, people wrote to their congressmen 
asking for copies of reports and appreciated receiving them.  The prevailing sentiment was that 
the people needed and wanted to know more, not less, and printing and distributing documents 
was a means to achieve this goal. 
As one example, members of Congress expanded the information that was gathered and 
published in the census.  Senator John Davis served on a committee for the 1850 census and 
received a letter suggesting that it ought to include information on domestic conditions, 
occupations, manufacturing, physical condition, education, crime, agriculture, mining, 
machinery, internal improvements, commerce, and insurance.
 63
  The census, argued Davis’s 
correspondent, “is essentially the true friend of the people ... the government extends a 
knowledge of all, and all alike have access to its developments which cannot prove otherwise 
than a fruitful source of practical suggestions, leading to new sources and objects of enterprise 
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and industry.”64  Representative William Strong contended that census information also served 
the same purpose as having a Library of Congress; that is, it existed “to inform members of 
Congress – to aid them in the discharge of their duties as legislators, to give the power of acting 
intelligently.”65  Strong thought that citizens should have similar opportunities to use government 
information and the 1850 census included more data than any previous census.
66
 
Small government, cost-conscious, and strict-constructionist opponents sometimes 
objected to the growth of government printing, but won, at most, only temporary victories, and 
enough members supported the public printing that it continued to expand.  The overall 
sentiment among most members of Congress was that it was appropriate to print large numbers 
of documents and send them out at the public expense.  Senator John P. Hale remarked in 1850 
that he had “opposed propositions [to print extra copies of documents] so often and so 
unsuccessfully that really I feel disheartened.”  Hale went on to say that  
although we daily hear lectures from all sides of the house about our extravagance 
in printing, yet there are continually presented wise propositions for extra 
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printing, which find somebody to claim an exception for them from the charge of 
extravagance, and despite all of the lectures on economy, they are adopted.
67
 
 
The House and Senate required printing committees to review documents before they 
were printed.  While these committees sometimes limited the numbers of copies, they did not 
stem the tide running in favor of producing more documents.  Senator Solon Borland of 
Arkansas, chairman of the Committee on Printing, explained that the members of the committee 
wanted to see expenditures “curtailed.”  He noted, however, when the committee members 
recommended printing extra copies, they were merely conforming “to what appeared to be the 
evident sense of the Senate … in favor” of additional printing.68 
The government printed many documents concerning steamboats and steam power, 
sometimes with thousands of extra copies (Appendix B).  In the first large publication, the House 
printed 6,000 extra copies of an 1832 document which included the results of French experiments 
that charted how quickly pressure rose in heated boilers.  The committee that assembled the report 
wrote that these facts were “matters of interest, and are worthy to be communicated to the public, 
from which much scientific and practical information can be derived by those engaged in 
constructing and navigating steamboats.”69  In 1836 the House published the results of a five-year 
investigation into the causes of steam boiler explosions.  In 1838, the House printed 10,000 
additional copies of a document that included hundreds of pages of testimony on the causes of 
steamboat accidents.  In 1849, the Senate printed 10,000 extra copies of an evaluation by the 
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Commissioner of Patents on the reasons for boiler explosions and the efficacy of devices designed 
to prevent or mitigate them.
70
  One senator proposed that this report be disseminated throughout the 
country and a copy be placed on board “every steamboat in the United States.”71  The Senate in 
1852 published a lengthy study by a steam engineer who had investigated the practices and 
machinery of steamers on the western river system and ordered 5,000 extra copies for distribution.  
The document included technical specifications of the author’s inventions and contained 
information that Senator John Davis used to compose the 1852 Steamboat Act.
72
 
Government publications on steamboats were part of the huge number of documents that 
Congress ordered printed on the subjects of agriculture and the mechanical arts.
73
  It distributed 
information about cultivating and processing crops,
 74
 and in 1832 the House and Senate 
published 7,000 extra copies of a report by the British House of Commons regarding designs for 
steam carriages.
75
  Technology was developing all the time and Congress hoped that the report 
and others like it would encourage the creativity of U.S. inventors.
76
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The Patent Office also worked to “stimulate invention” and to diffuse “technological 
knowledge.”77  Legislators believed that the national government could encourage technical 
advances by making information more widely available to inventors and the general public.  A 
1793 law required that patent applicants submit working models with their applications.  
Inventors realized that they could review Patent Office records to learn from the work of others.  
To construct the first reliable and commercially successful steamboat, Robert Fulton studied 
existing knowledge on the subject.
78
  Fulton had a draftsman copy “all the specifications and 
drawings of mechanical boats on file at the Patent Office” to help him design his own vessel.79  
The Patent Law of 1836 expanded the right to review the materials in the Patent Office, giving 
access to all of the office’s drawings and specifications to anyone who paid a copying fee.80 
After a fire destroyed the Patent Office building in 1836, Senator John Ruggles argued 
that the destroyed models should be replaced and their replacements exhibited.  Ruggles believed 
that “specifications, models, and drawings” served as sources of ideas and inspiration “so that 
anyone can apply [their] principles to practical use, or make them the foundation of further 
improvements.”81  
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Despite the fact that public officials wanted to provide and disseminate technical 
information, their ambitions frequently brushed up against limits on expenditures imposed by 
Congress’s rule of parsimony, the goal to operate the government as frugally as possible.82  The 
number of models supposed to be housed in the Patent Office increased, for example, as 
Americans applied for greater numbers of patents and despite the fact that many Americans were 
interested in its activities, Congress did not provide adequate funds to allow the Patent Office to 
fulfill its statutory mandate to display models of the patented devices.
83
 
Despite the budgetary and space constraints, the Patent Office came to serve as an 
important nexus to disseminate information about technology.
84
  Congress printed the Annual 
Report of the Commissioner of Patents and distributed it to encourage use of innovations and to 
give inventors ideas for further improvements.  The report trumpeted the achievements of 
American ingenuity and declared that they were the happy result of the “equal rights and 
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privileges” extended to everyone under the laws and the Constitution.85  In addition to listing the 
patents issued every year, beginning in the late 1830s the office compiled and published 
information on innovations in agriculture and the mechanical arts.
86
  The annual report included 
sections on metallurgy, steam and gas engines, navigation and marine implements, and other 
fields.
87
  Many inventors sought patents for safety equipment for steamboats and steam engines, 
such as safety valves, spark arrestors, life preservers, and devices to fend off snags.
88
 
In 1843, Senator John C. Calhoun protested that the Commissioner of Patents was 
assuming responsibilities beyond his powers.  Calhoun thought that the growth and 
dissemination of the Patent Office Annual Report was a sign of creeping centralization and 
evidence that the Patent Office was assuming the extra-legal responsibilities of a home 
department.  He could not sanction, he said, government patronage “of agriculture, or any other 
interest.”89  Lawmakers also complained about the expense of printing the documents and 
objected that the public did not really desire them and could not possibly find them useful.  
Despite these protests, majorities of the members supported printing the documents.
90
  By 1852, 
the Patent Office annual report was an enormous publication.  That year it ran over 1,000 pages 
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and the House and Senate combined to order over 200,000 extra copies of the report, making it 
one of the largest imprints in the United States.
91
 
Beyond disseminating information so that Americans could take advantage of 
improvements in technology, the government contemplated taking additional steps to educate 
steam engineers.  In 1838, an army officer, Major Charles Mapes, proposed establishing a 
government-funded national school for engineers.
92
  A few years later, Congress introduced a 
bill to appropriate $20,000 to set up schools in Cincinnati and St. Louis, but the measure died in 
the House.
93
 
Other groups advocated founding a national school for steam engineers and suggested a 
system where the only ones who would be permitted to manage vessels would have at least three 
years of experience or a diploma from the school.
94
  In his investigation into the problem of 
steamboat disasters in 1848, Commissioner of Patents Edmund Burke recommended similar 
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prerequisites, apparently modeled on the requirements for physicians in the army and navy, 
where the engineers would train and then be licensed by the government after they had been 
tested for competence.
95
 
The proposal to create a national school for steam engineers resembled similar types of 
intervention where government-educated and trained experts were employed on public works 
projects.  The government had been providing army engineers to work on internal improvements 
since the 1820s, though they worked in areas that required expertise in topographical and civil 
engineering, mostly to survey lands and supervise transportation projects.
96
   
The government also struggled with how to train steam engineers for the naval service.
97
  
As early as 1826, the Secretary of the Navy noted that steam-driven ships would become an 
increasingly important part of national defense and that the United States should make them a 
part of the fleet.
98
  In 1841, Navy Secretary Abel P. Upshur wanted to convert the navy from sail 
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to steam, experiment with the screw propeller, and develop explosive shells for naval guns.
99
  
While a political conservative, Upshur was forward-looking in his views on modernizing the 
navy.  He pushed to adopt technical improvements and to train personnel to use them.
100
  Upshur 
noted that using steam war vessels would require officers to have greater “scientific knowledge” 
and urged that naval schools be established on the model of the Military Academy to give 
officers exposure to both scientific theory and mechanical practice.
101
  As the Navy Department 
added steam vessels it also undertook a long-term program to cultivate mechanical expertise 
within the service.  By 1854, it was establishing a machine shop at the naval academy and 
making sure that a steam vessel would be available to train midshipmen in practical 
engineering.
102
   
But even with these precedents, the chances were slim that the government would have 
founded a school for civilian steamboat engineers.  The Pittsburgh Board of Trade pointed out 
that, though they were concerned about steamboat accidents and wanted to promote practical and 
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theoretical knowledge of steam engineering, they feared that opponents would raise 
constitutional objections to establishing a government school, and this made founding one 
unlikely.  The Board also thought that “local jealousies” would arise that would compromise the 
school’s usefulness.  The Board advised that a more practical measure would be for mechanics 
and engineers in western cities to form their own organizations and educate themselves.
103
 
Some steamboat engineers formed associations, such as the Pittsburgh Mutual Aid 
Society of Steam Boat Engineers, which was founded in 1848.  Members thought that employing 
incompetent engineers was a major cause of steamboat accidents and they intended to “elevate 
the character and standing of engineers.”  The group planned to evaluate and classify engineers 
according to their knowledge and experience, and would form a board to investigate the causes 
of accidents.
104
 
Endorsing these engineering associations, one commentator thought that engineers would 
become more professional and competent if they met regularly to discuss “the principles of the 
engine and the causes of explosions.”  Congress might, he suggested, aid these groups by 
supplying them with experimental apparatus and appointing boards of examiners to help judge 
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the competence of engineers.  Over time, engineers would be able to blend science with practical 
knowledge and elevate the profession, gaining greater mastery over their mechanical charges and 
prevent boiler explosions.
105
  By 1848, Scientific American noted that associations of steam 
engineers were proliferating in cities along the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers and that though the 
intentions of these organizations were good, they were “inefficient” and needed 
reorganization.
106
   
 
4. Government Investigations and Publications about Steam Accidents 
Steamboat accidents, particularly boiler explosions, raised a number of questions related 
to science and technology.  Why did they happen?  Could they be prevented by improving vessel 
designs and machinery?  Could better knowledge of the causes of explosions alter how vessels 
were operated, and lead to greater safety?  Government investigations into accidents provided  
testimony, data, and suggestions for how to reduce the dangers.
107
 
There were two main types of steam engines used in the United States during this period, 
low-pressure engines on the Boulton and Watt model and high-pressure engines of the type 
invented by Oliver Evans.  High-pressure engines, because of their lighter weight and 
proportionally greater power, were commonly used on the shallow rivers of the West.  They also 
made greater economic sense in that region where higher credit rates made it difficult to finance 
the capital costs of the larger and more expensive low pressure engines, while inexpensive fuel 
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made it less important that the engine be energy efficient.
108
  But because the high pressure 
engines confined a huge amount of energy into a small space, the boilers could burst with 
remarkable violence. 
Congress began to look into the matter of steam vessel disasters when the high-pressure 
steamboat Aetna exploded in New York harbor in May 1824.
109
  Though some members of 
Congress rushed to blame the incompetence and recklessness of the steamboat operators, others 
saw it as a mechanical problem and proposed a technical fix.  Representative Samuel Vinton of 
Ohio introduced a resolution that would have forbidden the use of high-pressure engines by 
denying a license to any steam vessel that used one.
110
  It was late in the session and the House 
eventually postponed the bill and never took it up again.
111
  However, the House also asked the 
Secretary of the Treasury to investigate and report on the causes of the disasters and what 
measures would provide greater safety.
112
  Congress subsequently sponsored dozens more 
inquiries. 
Congress paid less attention to the issue from 1825 through 1829 as reduced numbers of 
deadly accidents made the problem less urgent.  This changed in 1830 when a House select 
committee, with Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky as chairman, began to look for ways to protect 
the lives of passengers from bursting boilers.
113
  The members became interested after the 
explosion of the steamboat Helen McGregor at Memphis, Tennessee in February 1830.  The 
                                                 
108
 Harlan I. Halsey, “The Choice between High-Pressure and Low-Pressure Steam Power in America in the 
Early Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Economic History 41/4 (Dec. 1981): 725. 
109
 Sinclair, Philosopher Mechanics, 173. 
110
 Hunter, Steamboats, 290. 
111
 HJ, 18
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., May 19, 1824, 544, and May 24, 1824, 576. 
112
 Ibid., May 26, 1824, 599. 
113
 HJ, 21
st
 Cong., 1
st
 sess. 1830, 473, 509.  Wickliffe had earlier advocated river improvements and also 
wanted to use steamboats to deliver the mail.   
 71 
blast killed between thirty and sixty people, which was the greatest loss of life due to a boiler 
explosion up to that time.  This was only one of many deadly accidents that year, as 14 
explosions killed 189 people.
114
   
Wickliffe’s select committee reported a bill, but also asked the Secretary of the Treasury 
to gather data about steam navigation and report any information useful to enacting regulations 
to prevent boiler explosions.
115
  The bill made no progress, but the Treasury Department 
formulated a set of questions, sent them out to people who had a working knowledge of steam, 
and reported back to the House.  Treasury Secretary Samuel Ingham also discovered that the 
Franklin Institute had independently begun its own investigation.  The Secretary and the Institute 
agreed to cooperate and Ingham made $1,500 available to fund experiments by the Institute.
116
 
The arrangement between the national government and the Franklin Institute was a nice 
marriage of the government’s desire for knowledge with the expertise provided by an 
independent organization that could conduct technical research.
117
  This was the first time that 
the government cooperated with a private research institution to carry out this sort of 
investigation.  Beginning in the twentieth century the government would, of course, commonly 
finance this sort of work.  When the Franklin Institute began its inquiry, their members did not 
have a budget to perform experiments and were undertaking a modest effort to collect facts and 
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testimony about the problem.
118
  With the promise of Treasury Department funding, the 
Institute’s committee on the explosion of steam boilers broadened its inquiry to execute a set of 
experiments on how boilers worked, why they failed, and the strength of materials involved.
119
 
The Institute was well suited to embark on the boiler investigation, and the committee 
that oversaw the experiments boasted skilled mechanics, such as foundry owner and locomotive 
builder Matthias Baldwin, as well as Frederick Graff, superintendent of the Philadelphia Water 
Works.  Knowledgeable men of science with academic credentials like Alexander Dallas Bache 
and Dr. Robert Hare were also members of the committee.
120
  Bache began as a member of the 
Institute’s boiler investigation committee and soon became chairman.121  In the early 1830s he 
was starting a career that would lead him to become a leader in the American scientific 
community and head of the Coast Survey.
122
  With his friend physicist Joseph Henry, he became 
one of the most prominent and important voices on scientific issues in the country who also held 
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a position in the national government.  Along with some of the other members of the Franklin 
Institute Committee, he also became part of a group of experts to whom the government turned 
for advice on issues relating to science and technology.
123
  The results of the steam boiler 
experiments earned Bache an international reputation.   
Though President John Quincy Adams’s failed to get the government to commit to a 
national program of scientific investigation and education, Congress enacted piecemeal programs 
dealing with technical issues in response to particular needs and demands by various 
constituencies.
124
  In the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s, Congress and certain executive departments 
built relationships with academic experts and private associations, such as the Franklin Institute, 
from which they procured the services of academics like Bache and Walter R. Johnson. 
The Institute’s investigation took five years, but their committee, especially Professors 
Bache and Johnson, the latter of whom did the lion’s share of labor on a subcommittee 
investigating the strength of boiler materials, produced an exceptional amount of data on the 
reasons for boiler explosions, the characteristics of steam and the strength of metals.
125
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Steam vessel accidents persisted during the early 1830s while the Franklin Institute 
investigation was underway, and Congress produced its own reports about the problem.
126
  A 
Select Committee of the House of Representatives generated the first large congressional report 
on steamboat accidents in 1832.  In nearly 200 pages, the Committee published a wealth of 
information, including technical data from experiments on the characteristics of steam by Walter 
R. Johnson, Dr. John D. Craig of the Patent Office, and a translation of a paper from the French 
Academy of Sciences, concerning that body’s investigation into the characteristics of steam, 
including its elasticity at high temperatures.
127
  The report included theories about the causes of 
explosions and descriptions of engine designs and safety devices.  Together the House and 
Senate printed 9,000 additional copies for distribution.
128
  
The report’s insights, strengths, and flaws were characteristic of ones that Congress 
repeated in subsequent publications.  The committee conveyed information, printed testimony 
from interested parties, and made a number of perceptive observations.  However, they also 
passed along myths and misconceptions about the causes of boiler explosions.  Congressmen and 
administrators, in this case members of the House Select Committee and the Treasury 
Department, were better at gathering information than they were at sorting through it and 
determining what was reliable.  They repeated popular myths without forcefully debunking them 
and passed along inaccurate or misleading assessments even when the weight of experimental 
evidence or scientific principles discredited them.   
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Congressmen sometimes conceived enthusiasms for particular ideas and projects without 
making the effort to inform themselves as to whether they were possible or practical.  Critics 
noted that Congress did not always sufficiently distinguish between diffusing useful knowledge 
and misinformation.  To be fair, they were making decisions based on an incomplete 
understanding of how steam engines operated and the relevant physical laws.  Steam engines had 
developed “from the empirical observations of practical men, most of them ignorant of 
contemporary science.”129  Even though practitioners of natural philosophy were making strides 
in understanding thermodynamics and engineers were obtaining a better grasp of the forces they 
were harnessing, the average user of steam, much less the average legislator, understood it in a 
limited way, seeing it as a profoundly useful, sometimes dangerous and potentially revolutionary 
force, but also one that was a bit mysterious.  The country lacked effective gatekeepers to vet 
technical information and, as Donald Scott has noted, “With the partial exception of science and 
theology, there were few if any clearly bounded ‘communities of the competent’ to which one 
directed intellectual production and which certified its standing as knowledge and meted out 
position and prestige.”130   
The situation of Joseph Henry, one of the country’s leading scientists and later Secretary 
of the Smithsonian Institution, illustrates some of these issues.  Henry used his influence to help 
scientific institutions in the government and aid his friend and fellow scientist Alexander Dallas 
Bache.  While a professor at Princeton Henry wrote an article in the Princeton Review praising 
the work of the Coast Survey, which was later republished as a separate pamphlet.  Henry and 
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other leaders of the scientific community strongly desired the Survey to be successful lobbied to 
have Bache named as Superintendent in the early 1840s.
131
   
In 1838 Henry protested against Congress’s publishing 5,000 copies of a document about 
the theories of Henry Hall Sherwood.  Sherwood, a physician, described a “new” theory of 
magnetism and asked for government aid to develop a navigational device based on his theory.  
Henry objected that not only were Sherwood’s theories incorrect, but that by printing many 
copies of the document the government was implying that it endorsed Sherwood’s erroneous 
conclusions.  As a leading member of the growing class of professional scientists, Henry was 
concerned that too many people used scientific-sounding concepts that were either wrongheaded 
or deliberately deceitful.  To prevent the government from disseminating errant data and make 
sure that fakirs were not offered government subsidies, he thought that scientific and technical 
innovations should be reviewed by experts before Congress published documents about them.
132
  
Some years later he confessed to his friend Bache that he was almost driven to despair when he 
contemplated the “avalanch[e] of pseudo-science” that fell upon those who were trying to sort 
through and uphold high standards for scientific knowledge.
133
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76.  In addition to the fact that Americans inside and outside of government were easily seduced by the claims of 
scientific charlatans, Henry was also frustrated by the fact that many of his countrymen were skeptical of “the 
practical utility of basic science.”  He thought that this situation existed throughout the world, but was particularly 
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through technological applications and believed they had no need to understand the underlying truths that governed 
the operation of mechanical devices.   
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A great flaw in some of the congressional documents on steam was the tendency to print 
opinions for which there was little scientific evidence.  Like inventors carried away by their 
theories, or steamboat operators who doggedly stuck with their own beliefs in the face of 
contrary evidence, government officials sometimes had limited interest and ability to separate 
truth from fiction.  They privileged the testimony of eyewitnesses and the opinions of 
experienced individuals over experimental evidence and scientific understanding of physical 
principles.
134
  One difficulty with relying on first hand accounts of steamboat disasters was that 
members of the crew made poor witnesses—they were not disinterested and sometimes, through 
“mismanagement or want of vigilance,” were responsible for the disasters.  They certainly did 
not have incentive to be forthright when it might reflect badly upon them.  Accounts by 
passengers and observers, on the other hand, were often biased by the fact that they were in a 
state of shock due to the sudden violence they had experienced or simply had imperfect 
knowledge of the circumstances that led to the accident.  Accounts in the press were frequently 
not helpful, especially since they tended to focus on the horrors of death and destruction rather 
than inquire closely as to the causes.
135
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Henry was proud of the advances in knowledge that were being made by the growing generation of 
professional scientists and he wanted to make sure that they received their proper due from society.  However, his 
critique of the limitations of practical men was not merely a matter of pride of place, but also borne of fear that, 
without knowledge of principles, even ingenious mechanics would run out of new ideas and be limited to endlessly 
repeat existing practices.  While Henry had substantial regard for the technical innovations birthed by practical men 
and thought they played a major role in expanding economic growth and fostering social improvement, he was 
concerned that without greater scientific understanding such progress could not continue indefinitely.  See Molella 
and Reingold, “Theorists,” 334-35, 337. 
134
 Oz Frankel has noted that the standards of proof in most 19
th
-century government investigations reflected 
“common law methods of determining facts” and included “courtlike” testimony and presentation of evidence rather 
than employing exacting standards using empirical data and expert opinion.  The latter are more characteristic of 
modern science and the social sciences.  See Frankel, States of Inquiry, 13. 
135
 JFI, 22/4 (Oct. 1836): 219. See also Memorial of Alfred Guthrie, A Practical Engineer, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 
1852, S. Misc. Doc. 32, 26.   
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When Congress or an executive department prepared a report, they usually began with a 
summary overview where the author(s) set out their understanding and opinions.  They then 
attached selected evidence and testimony that was representative of what had they received or 
discovered about the topic.  The 1832 House select committee report set the pattern for 
subsequent steam-related documents.  The committee provided its views in the introduction, then 
attached additional information it thought was relevant and interesting, mostly letters from 
onlookers or participants in steam navigation.  Even though they did not vouch for this 
testimony, they still integrated it into the publication and left it to the “judgment” and 
“experience” of readers to determine its value.136  This meant that the investigators sometimes 
gave a greater priority to gathering testimony than determining if it was accurate and did not base 
their conclusions on the best available understanding of physical principles.  By contrast, making 
careful experiments, combining them with cutting edge physical knowledge and attempting to 
make a definitive examination of the issue to separate fact from myth was a primary goal of the 
Franklin Institute investigation.  Even though the investigations such as the Franklin Institute 
report provided extensive evidence for their conclusions, legislators did not always use this to 
guide them and substantiate the content of subsequent documents. 
The documents Congress printed on steam accidents from 1824-1852 were intended to 
serve a number of purposes.  First, to educate people as to the causes of boiler explosions; 
second, to provide a set of guidelines to design, build and operate steam engines safely and third, 
to give examples and ideas for mechanisms that American inventors could use to improve steam 
engines.  They had a mixed record for the first category and better results for the second and 
third.  It is worthwhile to look more closely at these publications and especially at one of the 
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 Steamboats: Report by the Select Committee, 22
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1832, H. Rept. 478, 2. 
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documents, the Franklin Institute Report of 1836-37, in order to get a clearer idea of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the print statist campaign to prevent steamboat accidents. 
The Franklin Institute took five years to complete the investigation and published its 
report in three parts in 1836 and 1837.  Part One of the report was completed in the summer of 
1835.  It was a technical report on the experiments that Alexander Dallas Bache and his 
subcommittee had done to test the causes of boiler explosions.  Difficult for the layman to 
understand because of its specialized bent, it included descriptions of the experiments, diagrams 
of the testing apparatus and charts and graphs of the data.  The investigating committee 
conducted an exhaustive series of experiments to test popular theories of the causes of 
explosions.  They examined common safety equipment and other inventions.  Further, they 
overloaded and exploded some test boilers to gather additional data.  By trying to find definitive 
reasons why boilers exploded, the Franklin Institute committee hoped to lead “ingenious men” 
toward useful plans and “away from false suppositions, which can only waste their time and 
talent.”137 
Part Two of the Institute’s report was a general report of the committee on the causes of 
boiler explosions.  By far the easiest to read of the three parts, it was written in a clear and 
accessible style, referred to and interpreted the data in the two other parts of the report and linked 
the experimental evidence to testimony the committee received from steamboat operators, 
builders, and special correspondents.  Part Three of the report concerned the strength of steam 
boiler materials.
138
  Like the first part of the report, Part Three was highly technical and included 
diagrams of the apparatus used to test the metals along with tables and graphs containing the 
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 Sinclair, Philosopher Mechanics, 183.  Part Three was not ready until the beginning of 1837, though in Part 
Two, the general report, Professor Bache sometimes drew upon data that had already been gathered by the tests for 
Part Three. 
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experimental data.  All three reports were published in installments in the Institute’s periodical, 
The Journal of the Franklin Institute.
139
 
At the time, there was no definitive answer explaining the causes of steam boiler 
explosions, but observers had a number of well-founded notions, as well as some misplaced 
beliefs.  The Franklin Institute committee had to contend with some pervasive and potentially 
deadly myths, the explosive element myth, the low water alone myth and the water flashing into 
steam myth.  As one steamboat engineer later wrote, “absurd opinions sometimes gain 
circulation, and many persons, without examination, repeat and adopt them” and errant 
commentators often combined portions or all of these into their accounts and explanations for 
steam boiler explosions.
140
  The explosive element myth was the belief that processes in the steam 
boiler caused an explosive element or compound to form.  The most common version of this 
myth was that when the water interacted with the metal the water decomposed into oxygen and 
explosive hydrogen.
141
  The belief in an explosive element was often combined with the low 
water alone myth to theorize that hydrogen gas formed when water was added to a heated boiler 
and the water came into contact with the hot metal.
142
  The Institute’s findings contradicted these 
beliefs.
143
  Dr. Thomas P. Jones, the editor of the Journal of the Franklin Institute, wrote in 1837 
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explosions closely resembled the explosions from gunpowder, “lightning, gas and other explosive matter,” that they 
must have similar causes.  See John Clowes, C.E., “On the Causes of Explosions of Steamboat Boilers and the 
Accidents to the Working Gear of Steam Engines” (New York, NY: W.E. Dean, Printer,1848), 5-6.  See also, Rice, 
Minding the Machine, 131.  
142
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 JFI 18/4 (Oct 1836): 230-31.  Even in the most extreme circumstances only minute traces of hydrogen 
separated from oxygen in boilers because, while hydrogen might be formed when the metal of a boiler oxidized, 
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that, although there continued to be intelligent people who asserted that the explosion of a 
dangerous gas in steam boilers accounted for the force of some explosions, he had never known 
any person with knowledge of chemistry who believed this was the case.
144
 
Another widespread belief, the low water alone myth was especially common in the West 
and it stated that low water in the boiler was the most important (or only) cause of explosions.  
One version of the myth was related to the explosive element myth, that metal uncovered by 
water somehow interacted with other elements to produce an explosion.  The other version of the 
myth held that parts of the boiler and flues were uncovered and became overheated when water 
became low; when the supply was renewed the water contacted the hot metal which caused it to 
flash into highly expansive steam (the water flashing into steam or “hot metal” myth) and cause 
an explosion.
145
  Calling this a myth is somewhat of a misnomer, since low water could and did 
contribute to explosions, though it was not the only, nor the most important, cause.
146
 
                                                                                                                                                             
these amounts would also be very small, hardly enough to make an impressive explosion.  The explosive element 
theory had, in fact, already been debunked numerous times, including by a panel of experts who investigated the 
1833 explosion of the steamer New England on the Connecticut River.  The panel, which included both academic 
scientists and steamboatmen, pointed out that formation of hydrogen in such quantities had never been proven and 
“steam has never been decomposed by heat alone.”  They stated that while electricity can separate the hydrogen and 
oxygen comprising water, merely heating the water would not do it.  They wrote that only a small amount of 
hydrogen could be produced, and it would need a lot of air in order to make it flammable—air that was not available 
within the boiler.  Even if they had been heated to white heat, the New England’s copper boilers would never have 
produced explosive hydrogen gas.  The investigators also noted that any hydrogen, even if it had been formed, 
would have escaped into the atmosphere through the air pump.  See Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury 
Transmitting … Information in Relation to Steam Engines, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21, 466-67. 
144
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 JFI 18/5 (Nov. 1836): 290.  One problem was that overheated metal, without a supply of water to moderate 
the heat, lost tensile strength and became more vulnerable to catastrophic failure, even at ordinary working pressures 
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The third common misunderstanding about the causes of boiler explosions was the water 
flashing into steam myth.  One version of this was pushed especially by engineer Jacob Perkins, 
author of a well-known work on steam, who claimed that overheated boilers could produce 
steam so saturated with heat that when water was added it was instantly converted to expansive 
steam that burst the boiler.
147
  The Franklin Institute’s experiments showed that this was simply 
wrong—adding water to hot steam reduced the pressure of steam inside a boiler rather than 
increasing it.
148
  Another version was more of a case of misdirection than a myth, and diverted 
attention from other causes of explosions.  While water could turn rapidly into steam if exposed 
to very hot metal from careening or foaming, more explosions were probably caused by a 
gradual increase of pressure, and that was the danger that most needed to be guarded against. 
In addition to debunking myths and providing solid evidence for the reasons that boilers 
exploded, the Franklin Institute report made important observations and set forth guidelines 
about designing, maintaining, and operating boilers.  The committee tested and critiqued various 
safety devices, and made suggestions for improving them.  Boilers needed to be thicker and 
                                                                                                                                                             
of steam.  Another problem was that boiler parts that were unevenly heated expanded and contracted over time, 
fatiguing the metal, loosening rivets and weakening the integrity of the system.  Vessels that had parallel boilers 
with a common water supply could become endangered when they heeled over as they were being loaded or 
unloaded, or simply when the vessel was poorly trimmed.  Called “careening,” the water would run to the lowest 
boiler and would rush back to the other boilers when the boat returned to an even keel or heeled in the opposite 
direction; if it contacted overheated metal it would form highly elastic steam that could expand rapidly and might 
explode the boiler. See JFI 18/4 (Oct. 1836): 228.   
Another problem arose when the engine was started and the water was low, the remaining water would tend to 
foam up inside the boiler bringing it into come into contact with the hot metal and suddenly convert into steam.  
Also, an engineer who found that the water in his boilers was low might try to quickly add more water, thereby 
creating too much pressure as the new water changed rapidly into steam.  The belief that low water alone caused 
explosions could also create substantial dangers of its own.  When steamboat operators concentrated on keeping the 
water level high and were less concerned with keeping boiler pressure within safe limits they could, and did, easily 
explode boilers that had plenty of water in them.  Hunter, Steamboats, 293-94.  While low water in boilers was a 
danger, but adding water to a hot boiler that had low water probably led to fewer explosions than was commonly 
believed.  See 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1838, H. Doc. 21, 103.  Steam engineer Elihu Bunker pointed out that since 
water feed pipes generally came into the bottom of boilers that injecting cold water into hot water would simply cool 
the water and diminish the expansive power in the boiler rather than increase it. 
147
 Sinclair, Philosopher Mechanics, 179. 
148
 24
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 Cong., 1
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 sess., March 1, 1836, H. Doc. 162, 25.  JFI 18/4 (Oct. 1836): 292-93.  As designed and built, 
especially on the Western waters, steam engine boilers were often too thin and made with metal of inferior quality. 
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made of better quality metal, and made of wrought iron.
149
  Safety valves were often poorly 
maintained, and as a result would not open to release excessive pressure.
150
  Valves were 
regularly too small and could not relieve pressure quickly enough when steam was being 
generated rapidly.
 151
  The report recommended that there be two safety valves on every boat, 
and that one be secured so that it could not be tied down or tampered with in any way.
152
  Boilers 
needed to be cleaned regularly, especially to keep them free of deposits that accumulated from 
the dirty and unfiltered water that was used in the engine.
153
 
Two-thirds of the major explosions on Western rivers took place, as in the case of the 
Moselle in 1838, when vessels were just leaving a landing or were stopped to take on or 
discharge passengers and cargo.
154
  The committee recommended preventing the steam from 
building up during times when the engine was idling and urged steamboat operators to better 
maintain their equipment.
155
  The committee concluded that racing between steamboats should 
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be forbidden, because in the heat of competition some engineers built up unsafe levels of 
pressure in the boilers in order to generate more power and gain more speed.
156
 
The Franklin Institute committee examined safety devices and recommended that some, 
such as safety valves, should be required by law.
157
  They tested some patented devices, 
published critiques and made substantive suggestions for ways to improve them.
158
  Of the 
inventions they examined, they found that some were promising, but none were completely 
reliable.
159
  No automatic apparatus could replace the skill and attention of the engineer on 
watch. 
All in all, the Institute’s committee reached some important conclusions and provided 
excellent guidelines for safe operation.
160
  They showed that a boiler could burst from gradually 
increasing the pressure, this could produce extremely violent explosions, and was the most 
typical reason for boilers to fail.
161
  This contradicted the widely held belief that boilers burst 
solely from the sudden generation of steam caused by low water.  It also contradicted the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the boiler should be allowed to cool, sometimes by banking the fires, before adding more water to the boilers.  
During normal operations, the crew needed to maintain temperature gauges and to allow safety valves to function 
freely. 
156
 JFI 22/4 (Oct. 1836): 227. 
157
 JFI 22/4 (Oct. 1836): 222, 227.  An effective pressure gauge was not available for high-pressure engines as 
of 1836.  For low-pressure engines, the committee recommended a mercury gauge.  However, the committee noted 
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 Cong., 1
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 sess., March 1, 1836, H. Doc. 162, 75-78. 
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corollary, also widely held on the western waters that no boiler would explode if it was supplied 
with enough water.
162
 
The Franklin Institute report provided extraordinarily detailed overview of the subject.  
Many who read it or heard about it, however, did not find it persuasive.  Part of the reason lay 
with the report itself, part lay with how it was disseminated and part lay with the steamboat 
operators to whom it was directed.  First, the national government did not do its utmost to 
circulate the report.  Congress did not print the results of the report quickly or publish many extra 
copies.  This was probably due to the fact that the report was completed and published in 
portions, rather than as a whole, and because the system of public printing depended on members 
of the House and Senate to take the initiative to print extra copies of documents. 
The investigation had taken more than five years when in 1835 and 1836 Secretary of the 
Treasury Levi Woodbury pressed the Franklin Institute’s committee to complete it.  The first 
part, the technical report, was finished in June 1835 and Woodbury had 500 copies printed for 
the House and Senate.
163
  However, the House of Representatives did not formally receive the 
first part until nine months later on March 1, 1836.  Representative Harmar Denny of 
Pennsylvania moved to print 5,000 extra copies of the report and managed to get a vote of 88 to 
44 in order to suspend the rules of the House to consider the motion.  The subject was postponed 
and the House agreed to print only the “usual number” of 1035 copies.164  In addition to the 
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Parks of Maine objected because he wanted to read the report before voting to print extra copies.  When Denny tried 
to have it taken up again on Mar. 22, an objection was raised to considering the matter as the House launched into a 
lengthy and heated debate on another subject, the value of bank notes issued by the Bank of the United States.  The 
resolution to print the extra copies was not taken up again during that session and no extra copies were ordered 
printed.  See CG, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Mar. 22, 1836, 276.   
It is not clear why Representative Denny’s attempt to have extra copies printed did not succeed, though it is 
possible that if he had persevered and continued to raise the subject during the session that he might have gotten 
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copies printed of the first part of the report, the Treasury Department also asked the Institute to 
print 350 copies of Part Two, the general report.  However, aside from this, neither the second 
nor the third parts of the report were printed as Congressional documents.
165
 
Except for items that were mandated to be printed by law, in order for a house of 
Congress to print something, a legislator or committee had to advocate for it and the body had to 
give its consent.  Getting government documents printed depended on the attention of at least 
one advocate within Congress and the good will or acquiescence of the other members.  This was 
usually a routine matter and when a Senator or Representative asked to print a document, the 
house would often, though not inevitably, grant permission.  Both the House and Senate 
routinely printed committee reports and communications from executive departments. 
Considering the number of copies that Congress printed of other steam-related 
documents, as well as the quality of the work that went into the Franklin Institute Report, it is 
puzzling and unfortunate that Congress did not order more copies.  Without direct evidence, one 
                                                                                                                                                             
more copies printed at some point.  There did not appear to be significant resistance in the House; no legislator made 
a substantive objection to printing the report and the Mar. 2 vote on the subject, though preliminary, indicates that 
the House was open to printing extra copies.  The Senate also ordered the usual number printed for its chamber.  See 
Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting A Report of the Franklin Institute, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Feb. 
26, 1836, H. Doc. 162; SJ, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Mar. 1, 1836, 193; and Imholtz, “Printing and Distribution,” 10-11. 
165
 Sinclair, Philosopher Mechanics, 183.  The general report arrived in the House in December 1836, near the 
beginning of the second session of the 24
th
 Congress.  It was immediately referred to a select committee on 
steamboat navigation where it stayed for the rest of the session.  The committee did not report any bills on the topic.  
See HJ, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Dec. 20, 1836, 76.  The select committee was chaired by Edward Allen Hannegen of 
Indiana.  The general report was also received by the Senate and referred to the Commerce Committee where, as in 
the House, the committee did not introduce any related legislation during the session or ask for the report to be 
printed.  See SJ, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess. Dec. 19, 1836, 42.  Even though the Senate did not take action on the issue 
during the session, we shall see in Chapter 5, that the Senate used some of the information in it to draft bill S.1 in the 
25
th
 Congress.  For example, when Felix Grundy of Tennessee introduced S.1 on Dec. 6, 1837, it included a 
provision in Section 7 that would have required steam vessels to continue to supply water to the boilers whenever 
they stopped, to keep the steam down and to open the safety valve.  These were provisions recommended by the 
Franklin Institute.  For the first version of S.1, see Library of Congress, American Memory, A Century of 
Lawmaking for a New Nation, Senate Bills and Resolutions, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsblink.html.   
The House of Representatives received Part Three of the Institute report, on boiler materials, on Dec. 7, 1837.  
The report was tabled and not printed by the House.  See SJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess. Dec. 7, 1837, 31.  Despite the fact 
that Congress did not disseminate the final two parts of the report, they remained in the House and Senate where 
they served the legislative function of providing information to shape bills on the subject.  See Rice, Minding the 
Machine, 132. 
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can guess that, after the publication of the first part of the report containing the technical data on 
boiler explosions, Congressmen believed that they had already printed the most important 
information from the investigation.  Perhaps they therefore felt no sense of urgency to print the 
subsequent parts.  It may have also been that no legislator felt the proprietary interest in the 
report necessary to motivate them to seek to print more copies.  Of the ten Congressional 
documents on steam from 1824 to 1852 where a legislator requested to have extra copies printed, 
the request was generally made by a member of the responsible committee.  In only two cases 
after a congressman had proposed printing extra copies did the body decline to do so.  These two 
were the first part of the Franklin Institute report in 1836 and the report by the Senate Select 
Committee on Steam in 1840.  In both instances the requests lapsed rather than were defeated by 
vote (see Appendix B).
166
  
In the case of the Franklin Institute report, it was finally received in the House six years 
after the report had been requested.  The select committees that had originally been concerned 
with the topic had expired.  Charles Wickliffe, who had headed the select committee in the 
twenty-first and twenty-second Congresses, was no longer a member of the House of 
Representatives.  Representative Denny, the Pennsylvania Anti-Masonic representative who 
asked to print extra copies of Part One of the report, was not on any of the committees, such as 
Commerce or Naval Affairs that might be interested in the report, so he did not have an 
institutional responsibility bearing on the topic.  The members were also occupied with other 
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matters during the 1836 session, including Andrew Jackson’s specie circular and the upcoming 
presidential election. 
Despite the fact that Congress did not publish all of the Franklin Institute report, its 
conclusions, recommendations, and some of the data were made available via other sources.  
Subsequent government and private reports cited it frequently and portions were reprinted in 
other government documents.
167
  The report was referenced in a massive 1838 report on steam 
engines that was printed with 10,000 extra copies.
168
  In 1849, the Commissioner of Patents 
conducted an examination of the topic where he praised, cited and excerpted portions of 
Institute’s report.169 
An important limitation on using print statism as a government policy to diffuse 
information and modify behavior was that even when knowledge was gained it did not mean that 
everyone would believe it or that they would apply the lessons from that knowledge.  It is often 
difficult to change both the “behavior and expectations of workers” as well as “the outlook and 
orientation of managers” in any complex technical system and business operation.170  The 
Franklin Institute’s investigation demonstrated that steam boilers exploded for two reasons, 
either the pressure was too high or there was a weakness in the boiler, but many people did not 
accept these facts as the definitive word on the topic.  This was especially tricky because steam 
engineering was entering an awkward adolescence and some steam vessel operators and 
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observers believed they understood much more about steam power than they really did.  Many 
engineers, with relatively little training, experience or scientific knowledge, still conceived of 
themselves as being highly qualified for their jobs.
171
 
The Franklin Institute report was probably less effective than it might have been because 
the first and third parts of it were presented in a highly technical format not easily 
comprehensible to most steamboatmen.  Thomas P. Jones, editor of the Journal of the Franklin 
Institute, thought that the boiler explosion report had to be shorter and less technical if it was 
going to be of interest to the average mechanic.
172
  It probably did not help that Part One, the 
highly specialized portion that focused on the boiler experiments, was also the part where the 
government printed the most copies.  The abstruse document was, for some steamboatmen, the 
face of government advice on the issue, presented in a way that they could not easily 
comprehend or respect. 
Steam engineers and inventors who wanted others to pay attention to them learned to 
flatter their audiences and make it clear that they respected the native wisdom of common 
workers.  Cadwallader Evans, an inventor who authored a treatise on steam boiler explosions, 
was careful to disassociate his pamphlet from “elaborate scientific works” filled with “algebraic 
signs” and “mathematical problems.”  He wrote that he would “explain himself in the language 
of a practical engineer.”  Evans wanted, he asserted, to “elevate rather than to depreciate” 
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engineers and hoped that they would listen to his analysis and also keep his “Safety Guard” 
invention, which he described and advertised in his pamphlet, in mind for use and purchase.
173
 
In addition to government publications, many private citizens published their opinions 
about the causes of steam accidents and Congress reprinted some of them.  Chicago steam 
engineer Alfred Guthrie sent a pamphlet to the Senate in early 1852; Guthrie had privately 
conducted a fourteen-month long investigation of steamboats operating on the Mississippi River 
and its tributaries and claimed to have examined nearly 300 vessels.  He analyzed the reasons for 
boiler explosions and recommended particular standards for boiler design, operation, and 
maintenance.  In the vein of the Franklin Institute committee, he contested some of the stubborn 
myths about the causes of explosions.  Guthrie also critiqued safety equipment and 
recommended features for a new steamboat law.  He believed that his study would enable 
steamboatmen and legislators “to form a correct judgment, and to take the proper measures for 
preventing the further occurrence of these dreadful calamities.”174  The fact that he used his 
memorial to publicize his own designs for steam and water safety gauges and a new safety valve 
suggests that he was motivated by commerce as well as by his concern for the public weal.
175
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Yet despite government documents like the Franklin Institute report and the efforts by 
individuals like Cadwallader Evans and Alfred Guthrie, years after the Franklin Institute’s 
careful experiments had demonstrated the causes of steam explosions, many vessel engineers, 
captains, and quasi-scientific observers still believed the old myths.  Steamboat engineers of the 
time were much closer to what we might think of today as mechanics, rather than highly 
educated and trained professionals.  Mechanics of the time relied on experience and intuition and 
rarely observed underlying scientific principles.
176
  Their experience and perspective often left 
them unprepared to question and revise their beliefs, since most learned their trade through brief 
apprenticeships that did not expose them to the growing body of knowledge about steam power.  
Even if they made an effort to keep up with the literature, reading reports, and perusing 
diagrams, no matter how clearly illustrated or how well supported by evidence, often could not 
persuade steamboat operators to revise their day-to-day habits, since technical knowledge about 
how to use machines was disseminated more effectively through training, hands-on experience, 
and the migration of skilled personnel than through the printed word.
177
  Long after the Franklin 
Institute report came out, the Pittsburgh Board of Trade, whose members, as representatives of a 
major river port and builders of steamboats were in a position to know better, asserted that the 
causes of explosions were still in dispute, as were the means of preventing them.
178
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Bache and the Franklin Institute committee were aware of and showed some sympathy 
for this situation.  They noted that the causes of explosions had not previously been 
systematically investigated, that even men “well-versed in general science” could easily be 
ignorant of the wider circumstances of steam engineering, and it was not surprising if engineers, 
firemen and builders did not have a good understanding of the matter.  The committee members 
commented that these men were unlikely to become acquainted with scientific principles, but 
that they needed to “have a thorough practical acquaintance with the steam engine” and know the 
rules necessary to avoid common dangers.
179
 
However, even individuals who read the technical literature could find the flood of 
information confusing and doubt that it was authoritative.  A group of experienced engineers 
from Cincinnati complained that there were too many inconsistent sources among the published 
materials.
180
  They wanted more experiments on the causes of explosions, but asked that they be 
conducted by “practical men” whose judgment they trusted.  One of the doctrines about the 
causes of explosions, wrote the group, “is based upon philosophical theory [what we would now 
call ‘scientific theory’], another upon actual experiments, another upon visionary conjectures—
all opposite and contradictory in their conclusions. The writers make this subject appear most 
vague, unaccountable, and mysterious to us; in fact nothing systematic can be comprehended by 
which we can be directed….” The engineers had much greater faith in their own “sure system of 
management, acquired by long practical experience and attentive observation.”181 
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There was no universally accepted source of authoritative information about steam 
engineering and so far, at least in the opinion of the Cincinnati engineers, the government had 
not stepped forward to fill this need.  As a result, even well-informed mechanics and engineers 
continued to debate the causes of boiler explosions into the 1850s and after.  The Cincinnati 
engineers saw themselves as responsible practitioners of their craft, sifting through the 
information to find truths to guide their actions.  As with many professional associations, they 
also wanted to set standards in order to raise the prestige and compensation for their 
profession.
182
  But with so many different theories and resources, and none of them definitive in 
their eyes, even conscientious steamboat men could cling to dangerous myths and 
misconceptions about how to manage their engines.
183
 
Poorly vetted government documents sometimes repeated myths and conveyed inaccurate 
information.
184
  On occasion Congress’s investigating committees also represented myths as 
truth.  A report by the House Committee on Naval Affairs in 1845 stated that low water in the 
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boiler “and incrustation from sediment and salt” were the only causes of explosions.185   A 
concerned observer, Charles T. James of Rhode Island, a steam engine designer, manufacturer, 
mill owner and engineer, wrote to criticize the House for publishing this erroneous and 
incomplete information, but the offending document was already printed and in circulation.
186
 
Steamboat operators were also likely skeptical of the report by the Franklin Institute and 
other government publications because of anti-intellectualism that was common during the 
period.  The people who ran the vessels were not always interested in the latest knowledge and 
techniques.  Working men with calluses on their hands lauded information gained through 
“practical knowledge” over mere “theory.”187  These attitudes and skepticism were reinforced by 
popular publications such as Scientific American that advanced the notion that scientific men 
were lacking in common sense and practical mechanical skill.
188
  Opinions like this were 
especially unfortunate because the Franklin Institute committee, along with many of the other 
government-sponsored inquiries, had gone out of the way to seek the advice of experienced 
steamboat operators when undertaking their investigations.
189
 
These anti-scientific prejudices were not limited to steam engineering and paralleled the 
response some farmers made to proposals by agricultural reformers.  While innovators promoted 
the use of scientific knowledge and experiments to advance new techniques in cultivation, tillers 
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of the soil often denounced the “new fine-spun theories” as useless to the practical man.190  One 
congressman, in remarks about agricultural practices that he might have applied equally well to 
steam power, lamented the  
numerous class who are not anxious for information, who might and ought to be 
enlightened, but are, nevertheless, perfectly at ease in their ignorance.  Among 
them are to be found those who rail out indiscriminately against science … and 
appear to have come to the conclusion, that any fact upon this subject becomes a 
falsehood when printed.
191
 
In 1838, steamboat agent William C. Redfield wrote that he was saddened that too few 
people had reviewed and adopted the conclusions of the report by the commission that 
investigated the 1833 explosion of the steamer New England.  Even though the investigation was 
led by one of the most famous scientists in America, Yale Professor Benjamin Silliman, and was 
a careful attempt to analyze an explosion and use the findings to benefit the public, many people 
simply would not accept that the reason the accident had occurred was because steam pressure 
had been raised too high and overwhelmed the boiler.  Accurate analysis, mused Redfield, was 
not sufficient to open up closed minds and even an insightful “examination, supported by the 
best evidence, would [not] convince those who had long cherished some favorite theory 
concerning explosions.”192 
Another reason that many working people sometimes regarded scientists like Alexander 
Dallas Bache with suspicion was that he and others like him were often from high social strata.  
Deference to established elites was giving way during the era to the celebration of the common 
man and politics shifted “from a notable-oriented and deferential politics on the one hand to a 
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party, electorate-oriented and egalitarian style of politics on the other.”193  American scientists 
were mostly members of the professional and upper classes, and they were developing a set of 
values that relied less on popular approval than on rigorous and obscure methods of 
investigation.
194
  If Bache and Joseph Henry were concerned about the unreliable beliefs that 
proliferated among the populace, common people resented the patronizing attitudes of this rising 
group of elitists, who seemed too worried about the dangers of “pseudo-science.”195 
This did not mean that Americans were uninterested in scientific knowledge, but that 
their opinions on it might shift depending on how it was presented and the mental framework in 
which it was received.  The prevailing American attitudes about scientific knowledge were 
layered and complex.  Walt Whitman may have become tired and sick when he heard the learned 
astronomer, but other Americans listened to him enthusiastically, as long as he knew how to 
entertain his audience and evoke a quasi-religious awe at the mysteries of the universe.  Tensions 
between the scientific elite and the common man were also mitigated by a shared sense of 
national pride and resentment towards Europe.  Even when they did not fully understand the 
discoveries that scientists like Joseph Henry were making, Americans wanted their scientists to 
be fully as good, if not better, than European ones.
196
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Americans were developing great store in science, especially as it showed it could master 
the physical world.  In the 1830s and 1840s, science was extended to a wide portion of the 
population.  The popular press carried technical presentations and commentary by professional 
scientists.
197
  There was a great deal of interest in scientists, contemporary and historical, 
domestic and foreign.  The government-sponsored exploring and survey expeditions, such as 
those led by Charles Fremont and Navy Lieutenant Charles Wilkes, undertook scientific 
investigations and dealt with issues in natural history, garnered a great deal of support and were 
the topic of numerous news reports and editorial commentary.
198
  Most towns boasted a lyceum 
to which people could go to hear lectures and see demonstrations.  Private societies sponsoring 
public lectures were formed in 3,500 to 4,000 communities throughout the country by 1840 and 
the presentations dealt with the sciences, literature, history, philosophy, current events and a 
myriad of other topics.
199
   
Popular scientific lecturers of the period, however, tended to win acclaim with dramatic 
presentations that included flashy displays and inflated oratory, rather than by adherence to high 
standards of evidence.  The developing community of scientists was disturbed that many of their 
fellow citizens valued style over content.  Scientists, seeking to raise standards, began to form 
associations like the American Association for the Advancement of Science to promote and 
recognize professional expertise.  As Joseph Henry put it in a letter to Alexander Dallas Bache in 
1838: 
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I am now more than ever of your opinion that the real working men in the way of 
science in this country should make common cause and endeavor by every proper 
means unitedly to raise our scientific character, to make science more respected at 
home, to increase the facilities of scientific investigations and the inducements to 
scientific labours.
200
 
Bache, Henry and their allies were determined to advance the cause of American science and one 
of their priorities was to make sure that information came from a proper understanding of natural 
philosophy that was based on verifiable evidence.  To them, the character of the popular lecture 
(and popular information in general) was a threat to this goal.  They objected to using popularity 
as the test of legitimacy.
201
 
But prominent scientists did not operate from an ivory tower from which they gazed 
down at the masses in contempt.  Both Henry and Bache were motivated by a sense of duty.  
Henry believed that this obligated him to lend his expertise to “serve as a steward of 
technological progress” and he offered his advice widely to people who came to him for aid.202  
He made a substantial contribution to Samuel F. B. Morse’s development of the telegraph203 and 
knew that he occupied a position his countrymen respected.  Inventor Cadwallader Evans wrote 
and asked him to examine his boiler safety mechanism.  The invention integrated design ideas 
that Bache had laid out in 1836 in the second part of the Franklin Institute Report.  Evans sent his 
Safety Guard to Henry and to scientific institutions in the hope that he could get endorsements 
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that might influence Congress to grant him a subsidy.
204
  Henry wrote back to Evans the 
following year that he had tested Evans’s device and thought it excellent.  Henry also gave Evans 
permission to use his endorsement, which Evans later did.
205
   
Henry’s situation and concerns were emblematic of tensions in the wider society.  
Overall, scientific practice was improving and knowledge increased.  However, with these 
advances the scientific community assumed a greater social distance from people who were in 
great need of their insight, expertise, and methods of careful investigation.  This separation 
contributed to the fact that steamboat operators formed their own opinions from a stew of 
information that contained both healthful and potentially deadly ingredients despite the 
availability of useful information published by the government and others about how steam 
power worked and how to use it safely. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Gathering and disseminating knowledge was one of the most characteristic and widely 
supported policies by the national government during the period.  Congress transmitted 
information about steam technology and encouraged its safe use.  This was part of the flood of 
documents the government produced.  As Richard John has noted, “Congress bombarded the 
public with newspaper accounts of its proceedings, pamphlets, reprinted speeches, and reports 
and documents of all kinds.  By 1830, these publications, along with the publications issued by 
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the governments of the individual states, made up fully 30% of all the imprints in the United 
States.”206 
As we have seen, this reflected a vital print culture and public sphere where the 
government responded to Americans who called for information to help them deal with a 
changing world.  Congress received demands by the public and interest groups to print 
information about fields including commerce and navigation, geography and demography.  
Public officials were also motivated to publish documents by political considerations and 
because of ideological predilections in favor of open government.  Congressmen justified 
extensive printing of documents by arguing that the government of a democratic republic was 
responsible for providing information that gave citizens the opportunity to make intelligent 
choices about how to improve their condition and conduct their affairs.  The military was also 
adopting steam technology and, like civilians, needed to make decisions on how it would expand 
its knowledge, evaluate innovations and improve its operations. 
As part of the torrent of data, the eighty documents the government published regarding 
steamboat accidents from 1824 to 1852 contained a wealth of observations on safe practices, 
inventions and the science of steam.  People who read the information could adopt safe practices 
and work to improve engines and vessels.  Congress played the lead role in initiating these 
inquiries and publishing the documents, though much of their content reflected work by 
members of the Executive departments, outside experts and the testimony of concerned citizens.  
This balance shifted somewhat after 1852 when administrators began to play a larger role as the 
Board of Supervising Inspectors created by the 1852 Steamboat Act took on the task of 
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investigation.
207
  While Congress continued to sponsor inquiries, produce reports and initiate 
legislation, after 1853 the Supervising Inspectors investigated the subject more regularly than did 
the House and Senate and dispensed expert advice on safe practices and mechanical 
inventions.
208
  Congress consulted them and was often guided by their findings when proposing 
action in the 1850s and afterward. 
Steven Lubar has reminded us that in communicating technical information, as with any 
other form of communication, there is a sender, receiver and a communications channel.  All are 
important.  The sender must be able to convey it in a comprehensible manner, the channel must 
be able to carry it and the “receiver must be equipped to understand it.”209  In the case of 
transmitting technical knowledge about steam, there were multiple senders, multiple channels, 
and multiple recipients.  Not all of them were under the control of the government, and the 
government did not always effectively manage the factors that were under its control.  As a 
result, the Information Option had mixed results. 
The national government was good at gathering and disseminating information, what 
Leroy Merritt called its “research function.”  Some of it, such as the Franklin Institute report of 
1836 and 1837, met high standards by forming recommendations based on evidence from 
systematic experimentation.  Publications also contained valuable information drawn from 
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practical experience and functioned as “service” and “informational” functions.  The thousands 
of pages of documents showed that the U.S. was capable of producing excellent data on a 
complex set of problems relating to steam power. 
But while the national government was a voluble schoolmaster on steam power and 
steam vessels, it was not a very demanding one.  Until it passed the 1852 Steamboat Act, it 
provided lessons to its citizen “students” without insisting that they attend classes or take any 
tests.  The government also did not make sure that its “instructors” who produced the documents 
were educated to high standards of expertise.  As a result, government efforts at print statism on 
this topic included errant data and restated common myths that it would have been better to 
debunk.  Also, many users of steam were not prepared to receive and utilize the best of the 
government information and preferred to operate steam engines on the basis of their own 
imperfect knowledge.  
Yet despite the limited popular understanding of steam, steam engines were a maturing 
technology by the 1840s and 1850s, and productively employed throughout the country.  The 
Patent Office issued patents for arrangements that saved fuel, warned of low water, were 
designed to keep the water level high, and to measure and let off excessive steam pressure.  
Effective inventions, rather than redesigning the engines in ways that would bring “marked 
improvement,” focused on modifying elements of the system in order to gain additional 
efficiency and safety.
210
  While some steamboat builders, owners, and operators remained 
unaware or unconvinced by expert advice and preferred familiar patterns and practices to 
innovative ones, they were sometimes willing to try and adopt new types of machinery and 
government actions encouraged this. 
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From the 1820s onward, most of the advances in steam engines, especially on the 
Western rivers, came from gradual improvements and relatively minute adjustments that had a 
cumulative effect on efficiency and safety.
211
  Many of the government documents including the 
Franklin Institute report, for example, emphasized the necessity of well-maintained safety valves.  
Though safety valves were often too small, too few and poorly maintained, they were mandated 
by the 1838 steamboat act and became standard equipment.
212
  It was progress of a sort. 
Even with all of the imperfections of the Information Option, steam vessels became safer 
over time.  It is difficult to quantify the impact of the government investigations and 
publications.  As Edwin Layton noted, it is not easy to discover which inventors read particular 
works relating to their fields, so it is not clear how influential the government-sponsored 
publications were for the inventors and engineers who built and used steam engines and the 
people who operated them.
213
  However, government information was available to interested 
parties and at least some of the concerned individuals read and became familiar with the opinions 
and investigations on the topic.  Accidents continued and explosions were horrific and deadly, 
but the number of vessels and passengers increased more rapidly than the number of accidents.  
When measured by the number of explosions and deaths per million miles traveled by 
passengers, there was a trend toward increasing safety in steam vessels from about 1 explosion 
per 10 million passenger miles traveled in 1830 to less than 1 explosion per 100 million 
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passenger miles traveled in 1852.
214
  This was due in part to increased use of safety valves and 
other technical improvements.  While sundry steamboatmen resisted the recommendations 
disseminated by Congress, at least some of them adopted better equipment and safer practices.  
Government policies facilitated this process and probably, over time, increased safety.
215
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CHAPTER 3 
“THE KNOWLEDGE WE OBTAIN … FROM EXPERIMENT” 
 
 
1. Subsidizing Inventions and Inventors: “The Improvements of the Age” 
In addition to improving the environment for navigation and publishing information to 
enhance the safe use of steam power, the national government implemented a Mechanical Option 
to promote inventions and mandate certain types of equipment for steam vessels.  While 
members of Congress expected that machinery would improve as time went on, they were not 
satisfied with the progress of steam vessel safety under laissez-faire in the 1810s and 1820s, and 
thought the government could assist technological development in this area.  One concerned 
observer wrote to Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury in 1838 that steam could only be 
made as safe as it was useful if the government took steps aimed at “stimulating the inventive 
powers of our countrymen.”1 
Inventors sought government aid because they needed money to finance experimentation 
and to perfect their devices.
2
  When they applied to Congress they often claimed that their work 
was an important national asset.  Congress usually declined to authorize these appropriations, 
citing constitutional concerns for strict construction and the desire to operate the government 
frugally.
3
  Despite these tendencies, the government adopted policies that advanced certain forms 
of technology.  The patent system encouraged mechanical advances by providing a kind of 
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subsidy that gave the patentee a limited monopoly for fourteen years.  The changes made to the 
patent law in 1836, when trained examiners were assigned to review patent applications to 
determine whether an invention was original and constituted a genuine technological advance, 
“led to a substantial increase in the potential returns to inventive activity.”  Patenting rates per 
capita rose sharply from the1820s through the 1880s.
4
  The U.S. also facilitated a major advance 
in industrial practice by devising a reliable system of mass production at its armories.
5
 
Even when inventors were not awarded any money directly, as most were not, they still 
hoped to get government support in the future, and this encouraged them to continue 
experimenting and petitioning for aid.  In this sense, the potential for a subsidy complemented 
the patent system by strengthening the incentives for inventors to make and improve their 
devices.  From the point of view of the individual inventor, the phenomenon bears a resemblance 
to what behavioral psychologists refer to as “intermittent reinforcement,” a situation in which the 
expectation of reinforcement motivates subjects to work harder, even when the chances appear 
slim that they will actually attain a reward for any given action. 
The government was interested in steam safety not just to protect the public, but also 
because it was using steam technology routinely as part of its own endeavors.  The Navy was 
particularly concerned with the subject as it made the transition from sail to steam.  The news 
that the government was conducting investigations into steamboat technology in the 1830s and 
1840s, and that Congress was considering legislation relating to the problem of steam vessel 
disasters induced a flurry of applications from inventors anxious to have their plans considered 
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for government support.
6
  As far back as 1824, the members of the House Commerce Committee 
had written that, since they could not anticipate future applications of steam power, they did not 
want to “fetter, or discourage the ingenuity and skill” of the mechanics who might improve the 
technology.
7
  It was better, concluded one Congressional committee, to leave decisions about 
what sort of machinery to use to the “sound discretion” of steamboat operators and “to the 
improvements of the age.”8  Despite these sentiments, the government saw fit to intervene in a 
number of ways.  One important type of intervention was examining and testing new inventions, 
especially those designed to decrease the danger of boiler explosions.   
 
2. The Navy and Government Support for Investigations 
The United States Navy was transformed during the forty years before the Civil War.
9
  
The Naval Academy was founded in 1845 and new steam vessels were designed or converted 
from sail.  The Navy built or transformed their facilities to service the new technology.  Despite 
false starts, the potential advantages of steam warships were becoming obvious by the mid-
1820s.
10
  John Quincy Adams’s Secretary of the Navy, Samuel Southard, predicted in 1826 that 
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“the powerful agency of steam” would be undergoing continual improvement and would soon be 
a motive force employed by all the great nations of the world.
11
 
The Navy suffered failures and setbacks while adding war steamers and other 
technological advances to the fleet.
12
  Congressmen were dissatisfied with the false starts and 
sponsored investigations into the problems, but they also funded tests of technical innovations.  
Although most of the basic components of steam engines were well established, the exact 
designs, proportions, and features had not yet reached a standardized form, meaning that it was 
all too easy to build a vessel with major flaws.  However, there was also the possibility that 
inventors and engineers would devise innovative machinery that would improve performance.
13
 
In ways that often paralleled the dilemmas facing civilian steam vessel owners, the Navy 
Department and Congress needed to decide how to design its steam warships, how they would be 
constructed, and what equipment would be used aboard.
14
  In 1839, for instance, Secretary of the 
Navy J. K. Paulding reported that the department was going to construct two steam frigates.  The 
Navy intended that they be identical vessels, but also wanted to use them as prototypes to test 
different schemes of propulsion.
15
  In the late 1830s and into the 1840s many inventors were 
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experimenting with versions of the screw propeller, rather than paddle wheels, and the Navy also 
carried out trials with different steam boiler designs.
16
  Technological transformations took place 
through an often painful process of trial and error, some of them in full public view, as when a 
naval gun on the experimental steam warship Princeton exploded during a demonstration in 
1842.  It killed the Secretaries of the Navy and State, four other prominent guests, and narrowly 
missed killing President John Tyler.
17
 
Experimenting with new technology was always a process of educated guesswork and the 
Navy Department wanted to find ways to improve its guesses.  In the early 1840s, Secretary of 
the Navy Abel P. Upshur noted that it would not be prudent to build additional vessels until the 
department could make a more informed determination as to which mechanical improvements 
were most effective.
18
  Upshur argued in his 1842 annual report that the advent of new 
technology called for a change in the mindset and education of members of the department.  It 
was becoming necessary to increase the technical and scientific knowledge of naval officers and 
other personnel and to systematically evaluate mechanical advances using the investigative 
techniques of modern science.  Upshur believed that greater knowledge of the physical sciences 
and experimentation on innovations could be used to improve the quality of the Navy while 
holding down costs.  He requested a regular appropriation from Congress to conduct scientific 
and technical investigations and wrote: 
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The application of scientific principles in the mechanical arts is now universal.  
The mere artisan, whose skill is derived only from practice, is far behind the 
times.  Science is now lending her aid to the arts, in all their departments, 
expanding their powers, multiplying their uses, and perfecting their works.  I 
respectfully suggest that this aid is nowhere more important than in the various 
operations connected with a naval establishment.  When we consider the number 
and variety of the materials which are used, the costliness of many of them, and 
the high importance that they should all be of the best and most valuable kinds, 
the propriety of subjecting them to all necessary tests, and of improving their 
quality as far as possible, will at once be admitted.  This can be done only by the 
union of science and practical skill.  The knowledge which we obtain from 
experience is always slow, always costly, and not always sure; that which we 
obtain from experiment, particularly in physical science, rarely deceives, and 
seldom fails richly to repay us.  The experiments which have already been made, 
under the direction of this department, have imparted to it a degree of information 
which could not have been derived from any other source, and which will more 
than repay their cost in the building of a single ship.  These experiments, 
however, are but the beginning of what might be accomplished …  If the 
department were in a condition to avail itself of the improvements which are daily 
made in practical science, the most important results would soon be realized in the 
improved quality of our ships, and in the general economy of the service.
19
 
Upshur also reported that many inventions to prevent explosions had been sent to the 
Navy Department and that having experts available to review them would be extremely useful.
20
  
Other Secretaries of the Navy and congressmen shared Upshur’s perspective and priorities and 
procured expert advice and supported publicly funded investigations of technical advances.  
Upshur’s predecessor, George Badger, had already asked the House Committee on Naval Affairs 
to apply some of the service’s yearly appropriation to so the department could experiment on 
ordnance, construct steam war vessels and fund other matters related to technological 
improvements.  The committee reported favorably on the request, and the Navy got its money.
21
  
By 1861, Congress instituted a regular process for adopting steam-related inventions for the 
armed forces and instructed the Navy to have all patented articles examined and recommended 
by “a competent board of naval engineers” before they were purchased.22 
                                                 
19
1842 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, ACG, 27
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 44.  
20
 27
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Jun. 25, 1842, S. Exec. Doc. 336, 1-2. 
21
 Naval Ordnance and Ordnance Stores [With Bill No. 9], 27
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jul. 7, 1841, H. Rept. 2, 1-2. 
22
 An Act Making Additional Appropriations for the Naval Service, Approved Jul. 18, 1861, ACG 31, 37
th
 
Cong., 1
st
 sess., 27. 
 111 
Congress passed an act in 1841 which authorized the Secretary of the Navy to spend up 
to $50,000 to test improvements for steamers and ordinance.
23
  The following year Secretary 
Upshur asked for a regular appropriation so that the department could undertake “researches in 
practical science” to investigate matters that bore on the naval service and public interest.24  In 
subsequent years, Congress granted the Navy Department a yearly appropriation of $10,000 to 
evaluate new inventions.  In 1857, Secretary Isaac Toucey asked that the appropriation be 
increased, noting that the service  
feels itself crippled by the limited appropriation.  The sum of $10,000 is not 
adequate to do justice to improvements which promise public utility. Men of 
genius are so devoted to the one favorite pursuit that they are frequently without 
the means necessary to test their inventions. Were Congress to appropriate ten-
fold the sum now allotted to this object for naval purposes, a single successful 
result, after a hundred failures, would reimburse the whole cost, while the 
influence of the measure in aiding the progress of improvement in the naval 
service could hardly be overestimated.
25
 
Admittedly, Toucey’s motive may have been less a dispassionate view of how to procure 
better technology than the desire to increase the appropriations of his department and build his 
bureaucratic turf.  But even so, Congress’s support provides evidence that the Navy and 
members of Congress were attempting to evaluate and foster technological improvements in the 
national interest. 
Members of both major parties supported subsidies for mechanical innovations, though 
Whigs tended to be more enthusiastic.  They, consistent with their support for subsidizing 
internal improvements, were comfortable with attempting to achieve public ends by financing 
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private individuals and groups.
26
  The Twenty-Seventh Congress, elected in 1840 and meeting 
for three sessions from 1841-43, was the only one where the Whigs controlled both houses of 
Congress along with the Presidency, and their actions during this time suggests that they were 
deeply committed to testing and subsidizing inventions.  Despite the constraints imposed by 
economic downturn that began in 1837 and the rising national debt, as well as the political tug of 
war between congressional Whigs and President John Tyler over his opposition to portions of the 
Whig economic program, the 27
th
 Congress funded a number of subsidies and investments in 
new technology, including $250,000 to construct an iron war steamer, $50,000 for the Navy 
Department to test a variety of ordnance, and appropriations to enable Samuel Colt and Samuel 
F. B. Morse to develop and test inventions.
27
   
In 1843, Congress also passed a law requiring the Navy Department to investigate and 
test safety apparatus to prevent boiler explosions.
28
  However, over the years enough Democrats 
supported these types of subsidies to indicate that the issue of boiler safety was not an area of 
deep partisan differences.  A Democratic administration approved the Franklin Institute 
investigation, and Democratic majorities in Congress, along with Democratic presidents, 
approved and funded commissions to research boiler safety inventions in 1834 and in 1838.
29
 
3. Federal Aid and Investigations 
The most common governmental subsidies relating to steamboat safety came in the form 
of technical advice and endorsements from government-appointed experts who evaluated 
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inventions.  Though some proposed regularly funding tests of useful inventions, Congress and 
the Executive branch undertook investigations on an ad hoc basis until the Board of Supervising 
Inspectors was given this responsibility in 1852.
30
  Over the years, many inventors applied to 
have their devices tested.  The investigators, who usually had either an academic background in 
science or practical experience in steam engineering, reviewed descriptions and models of 
inventions.  In some cases they observed prototypes in operation or constructed their own 
versions of the mechanisms and used government appropriations to finance tests.  Inventors often 
lacked the resources to perform their own tests and they saw that government examinations could 
gain them publicity and satisfy the public that their devices had merit.
31
  Inventors probably 
appreciated that they could use a favorable review to advertise and promote their inventions.
32
  In 
this way, the government-sponsored a sort of nineteenth-century version of the crash tests 
conducted on automobiles or the product ratings published in consumer magazines.  Steamboat 
operators could compare different plans and decide which equipment to use on their vessels, just 
as passengers might insist in traveling on vessels that employed notable safety features. 
During its investigation in the 1830s, as noted earlier, the Franklin Institute committee 
tested steam safety devices as part of its inquiry.  While this was a secondary priority for the 
committee, chairman Alexander Dallas Bache examined alarm floats, gauge-cocks, (both of 
which are used to check the level of water within a boiler) and fusible alloy plates (designed to 
give way and either open a safety valve or sound an alarm when the boiler temperature or 
pressure was too high).  Bache critiqued the design and efficacy of these devices and made 
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“The Smithson Institute,” SA 3/20, Feb. 5, 1848, 157. 
31
 Report of the Commissioners to Test Inventions, 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 1839, H. Doc. 170, 8 (Appendix B).  
Congress passed a law in 1843 to establish a commission to render “their opinion as to the relative merits and 
efficacy of such inventions and plans.”  5 Stat. L., 626, Section 5. 
32
 For example, see 28
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Feb. 7, 1845, H. Rept. 115, 3 (Appendix B). 
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suggestions as to how some might be redesigned to better effect.
33
  The government reported on 
additional investigations into boiler safety inventions in 1834, 1838, 1839, 1842, 1844, 1849, and 
1852.
34
 
In 1834, Congress appropriated $5,000 for the first federal inquiry specifically dedicated 
to testing the efficacy of boiler safety equipment and assigned the job to the Navy Department.  
Introduced in the House of Representatives, the bill does not seem to have attracted much 
attention.  Aside from the report by a select committee, congressmen did not discuss it 
extensively as part of the official record.  The select committee’s draft version passed the House 
late in the session without a roll call vote.
35
  In the Senate, the senators passed the bill on the 
final day of the session without debate.
36
  
The House select committee argued that Congress had a broad responsibility to look for 
ways to promote greater safety on the nation’s waterways and that this responsibility included 
conducting experiments to test safety devices.  The committee characterized the expenditure as 
“reasonable,” writing: 
On the question as to the power and the expediency of aid and cooperation on the 
part of the Government in experiments of this kind, the Committee have [sic] 
come to an affirmative conclusion.  When it is considered how intimately the 
subject matter connects itself with the general welfare, looking to the protection 
of the lives and property of the whole people—that it involves considerations of 
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 Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury Transmitting a Report of the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia, in 
Relation to the Explosion of Steam Boilers, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Mar. 1, 1836, H. Doc. 162, 11, 12-16, 17, 27-46 
(Appendix B). 
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rd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess.; S. 73, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
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 Cong., 2
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 Cong., 1
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 Cong., 3
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 sess.; S. Exec. Doc. 336, 27
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess.; S. Exec. Doc. 439, 27
th
 Cong., 2
nd
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th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess.; S. Doc. 405, 28
th
 Cong., 1
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 sess.; S. Exec. Doc. 18, 30
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess. 
35
 HJ, 23
rd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., April 26, 1834, 566; June 27, 1834,855 and 856; June 28, 1834, 875, 878. 
36
 SJ, 23
rd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., June 28, 1834, 385 and 387 and June 30, 1834, 403.  Benjamin Phillips also 
memorialized the Senate for aid to test his safety steam engine, but their Committee on Naval Affairs reported 
against his request.  Report of the Committee on Naval Affairs to whom was referred the letter of Benjamin Phillips, 
Feb. 6, 1834, Committee on Naval Affairs, Jan. 23, 1834 (Sen23A-G11), 23
rd
 Cong., Records of the Senate, RG 41, 
NA. 
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naval and national defense, as well as the general interests of commerce; it is not 
thought that any valid opposing argument can be drawn from the want of power.
37
 
The committee added that if the experiments increased knowledge of how to control the 
powerful and dangerous agent of steam, it “would be cheaply purchased at the cost of a million 
[dollars].”38  If any members disagreed with this expansive assessment of the powers and 
responsibilities of the national government, they were silent while the bill was under 
consideration.  This would be the pattern for legislation and resolutions authorizing this type of 
investigation—the House and Senate tended to pass them with little fanfare and with the 
widespread support (or acquiescence) of the members. 
The 1834 appropriation directed the Secretary of the Navy to test the steam engine safety 
improvements by Benjamin Phillips of Philadelphia, along with any other worthwhile inventions 
that were put forward.
39
  After the law was passed, Secretary of the Navy Mahlon Dickerson 
reported that a number of inventors asked the government to examine their mechanisms.  
Dickerson noted that, in his opinion, the machines had no special value, and did not warrant 
expending any money in order to assess them.
40
  However, the act specifically directed the Navy 
to test Phillips’s steam engine.  Using government money, Phillips constructed a model engine 
with boilers, brought it to Washington, and displayed it to members of the Department, Congress 
and others.  Secretary Dickerson reported that the observers could find no evidence that Phillips 
had constructed an especially safe engine.
41
 
                                                 
37
 Report of the Select Committee on the Memorial of Benjamin Phillips to Accompany Bill H.R. 452, 23
rd
 
Cong., 1
st
 sess., H. Rept. 426, 2. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Act of Jun. 30, 1834, 4 Stat. L., 728. 
40
 The act directed the Secretary to test Phillips’s invention, but the act was phrased in such a way as to give 
the Department discretion whether or not to test any others.  See 4 Stat. L. 728. 
41
 1835 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 24
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., ASP, 4
 
/585: 734.  The experiments may not 
have yielded extraordinary results, but they illustrate that the rule of parsimony was alive in the national 
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From the records, it does not appear that the 1834 examinations were well-thought-out or 
particularly useful.  A public demonstration before members of Congress might be impressive to 
look at (or not), but Dickerson’s report does not indicate that experts studied Phillips’s 
mechanism or tested it methodically in a way similar to the examinations that Professor Bache of 
the Franklin Institute was conducting on steam boilers.  The evaluations appear to have been 
based more on the impressionistic observations of laymen, rather than analysis by experts.  The 
government evaluated another boiler safety device by inventor John C. Fr. Salomon, but this 
effort also did not show signs of systematic or searching inquiry.
42
  Thus, the first set of 
government experiments by the Navy Department, from 1834 to 1836, ended with disappointed 
inventors and without identifying substantive advances in safety. 
The government pursued subsequent experiments less publicly and more comprehensively, 
under the watchful eyes of experts, who issued lengthy and detailed reports on their findings.
43
  
Without direct evidence, one can only speculate as to the reason for the improved quality of the 
inquiries, but this coincided with the completion of the Franklin Institute Report, and the example of 
                                                                                                                                                             
government.  Dickerson reported, proudly, one supposes, that the department expended $519.75 to construct and test 
Mr. Phillips’s device and the remainder of the $5,000 appropriation remained unexpended. 
42
 Salomon wrote that his expenses had been heavy in undertaking experiments and that he needed government 
support to continue his investigations.  Memorial of John C. F. Salomon relative to a patent safety boiler, Dec. 1835 
(Referred Dec. 29, 1835), Committee on Naval Affairs, Petitions and memorials referred to committees, Various 
Subjects,” 1834 & 1835 (HR24A-G12.2), 24th Cong., Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, NA.  
Salomon claimed that his new boiler design was safer than the typical cylindrical boiler and requested $400 to test 
his plan.  Under Salomon’s guidance, the Navy Department financed the construction of two boilers to use for 
comparison, one a standard cylindrical one and another of Salomon’s design.  Secretary Dickerson reported that the 
Navy conducted a demonstration in February 1836 by the eastern front of the Capitol in the presence of many 
Congressmen and others, but “without any satisfactory result.”  Dickerson declined to conduct more tests, but 
allowed Salomon to use the boilers to make further experiments on his own.  See the 1836 Report of the Secretary of 
the Navy, ACG, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 9.  Salomon did not like the results of the Navy’s tests and wrote to Congress 
asking for further evaluation by a committee that would solicit the opinions of both “scientific and practical men.”  
Congress printed his memorial, but did not endorse his request to reexamine his invention.  See Memorial of John C. 
Fr. Salomon, Dec. 29, 1835, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 1836, H. Doc. 114, 1. 
43
 The officials responsible for subsequent investigations issued more detailed reports than the brief overview 
that Secretary Dickerson included in the Navy Department’s annual report for 1834, including more extensive 
accounts of the devices, the tests, and the results.  See 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., Feb. 7, 1838, H. Doc. 170, and 28
th
 
Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jun. 17, 1844, S. Doc. 405 (Appendix B). 
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a sophisticated inquiry of this caliber may have led government officials to expect investigations to 
meet a higher standard.
44
 
Legislators were more inclined to take an invention seriously or offer a subsidy when the 
applicant had a reputation for achievement in science, invention, or construction, or could provide 
evidence that reputable people thought the applicant’s plans and devices were worthwhile.  When 
inventor A. B. Quinby petitioned the government for help in 1837, he attached endorsements of his 
apparatus from two members of the Franklin Institute Committee, Thomas P. Jones and Walter R. 
Johnson, and from Eli Whitney Blake, the superintendent of a gun factory outside of New Haven, 
Connecticut.
45
 
In response to Quinby’s petition, Senator John Davis of Massachusetts laid out a number of 
working criteria for when the government should consider testing a device and otherwise aiding an 
inventor.  According to Davis, the only way to determine a mechanism’s virtues was through 
practical experiments, and he thought that the government should undertake the tests when an 
inventor did not have the resources to try them himself and was unable to find private investors 
willing to fund them.  Davis also wanted the applicants to provide endorsements to assure the 
government that men of “scientific attainments” believed that the invention had merit.46 
                                                 
44
 A more direct connection is that Walter R. Johnson, who conducted a large portion of the research on the 
Franklin Institute Report in the 1830s, also chaired several government investigations, and thus was inclined to work 
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 Petition of A.B. Quinby, Praying an Appropriation to Test his Inventions for Preventing the Explosions of 
Steam-boilers, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Dec. 14, 1837, S. Doc. 17, 17  (Appendix B). 
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 Report with Senate Bill 183, The Petition of A. B. Quinby …, 24th Cong., 2nd sess., February 1, 1837, S. Doc. 
125, 2  (Appendix B).  While Davis thought that the U.S. had a general obligation to encourage “invention and 
discovery” until the dangers posed by the use of steam were removed, and that government representatives should 
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The government initiated its next major effort to investigate steam boiler apparatus in 
1838.  At that time, Congress was considering major legislation to address the problem of steam 
accidents, and the Senate had introduced a bill (S. 1), which would eventually become the first 
law to regulate steam vessels.  Congress passed two other laws (introduced as bills S. 73 and S. 
389) appropriating $6,000 and authorizing “the appointment of persons to test the usefulness of 
inventions to improve and render safe the boilers of steam engines.” As in 1834, the laws 
required the Navy Department to oversee the investigation,
47
 but this time the Navy recruited an 
outside expert, James Renwick, a professor of natural and experimental philosophy and 
chemistry at Columbia College in New York, to head the investigation.  Renwick was a popular 
lecturer with, as one diarist noted, a “clear, familiar and colloquial manner” while addressing an 
audience.
48
  More to the point, however, he was also the author of a treatise on the steam 
engine.
49
  He had served as a consultant for the government and had recently been employed by 
the Navy Department to survey New York harbor and recommend a site for a new dry dock.
50
  
Renwick and his fellow board members reviewed applications, constructed apparatus and 
conducted face-to-face consultations with inventors.  Whether by coincidence or conscious 
decision, the commission adopted some of Senator Davis’s standards to determine which 
mechanisms were appropriate to test.  The investigators decided that Congress had intended for 
them to provide a service to both the inventors and the government by experimenting only on 
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 5 Stat. L., 252 and 5 Stat. L. 261.  See Appendix A. 
48
 Philip Hone and Bayard Tuckerman, The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828-1851 (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead, 
1889), 1:12.  Years later Renwick headed an investigation into the explosion of a stationary steam boiler which 
killed sixty three people.  “Explosions of Steam Boilers,” SA 5/23, Feb. 23, 1850, 181. 
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 See James Renwick, Treatise on the Steam Engine, 2
nd
 ed. (New York, NY: Carvill & Co., 1839). 
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 1837 Report of the Secretary of the Navy, ACG, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 10.  Renwick, like Joseph Henry, was 
trying “to foster the application of science to technology.”  His writings were intended to help practical mechanics 
use natural principles to improve their machinery.  See Edwin Layton, “Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of 
Science and Technology in 19
th
-Century America,” Technology and Culture 12/4 (Oct. 1971): 565. 
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promising machines whose inventors lacked the means to test them for themselves.  Through 
their reports they could inform the public as to the merits of the devices.
51
  They determined that 
they did not have to test the apparatus of some applicants because, in their judgment, many of 
these plans closely resembled existing devices, were unlikely to be effective, or had apparent 
weaknesses in design that made breakdowns likely.  For the mechanisms they did test, they gave 
an overview of the apparatus and summarized their test results. 
The commissioners examined six types of devices:  (1) instruments that would sound 
warnings when the water was too low in the boilers, (2) automatic pumps that would keep the 
water from falling below a predetermined level, (3) thermometers to measure the heat of the 
steam within boilers, (4) plans to redirect the energy from explosions, thus limiting the damage 
when boilers exploded, (5) a safety valve to release excess pressure, and (6) a redesigned steam 
engine without a boiler.  They sought to determine whether the inventions were both useful and 
affordable.  The commissioners reported unfavorably when the mechanisms appeared overly 
complex, liable to problems, or likely to be difficult to repair and replace.  Also, if the inventions 
were already in use, the commissioners checked with people who had been utilizing them for 
their observations on the efficacy of the machinery.  Ultimately, they recommended three 
devices as valuable additions to the existing safety apparatus: a feed pump designed by Paul 
Boynton of Fort Covington, NY, a whistle alarm invented by Owen H. Rankin of Wilmington, 
NC, and a thermometer constructed by A. B. Quinby of Washington, DC.
52
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 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a Report of the Commissioners to Test 
Inventions to render safe the Boilers of Steam-engines, 25
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 Cong., 3
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 sess., Feb. 7, 1839, H. Doc. 170, 8 (Appendix 
B). 
52
 Appendix B: H. Doc. 170, 25
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rd
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concluded that none of the inventions, taken singly or in combination, could guarantee perfect security in using 
steam power.   
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A few years later, in 1842 the Senate passed a resolution and requested the Navy 
Department to evaluate a safety device designed by Thomas S. Easton.
53
  The Navy asked 
Professor Walter R. Johnson of the Franklin Institute to undertake the investigation.
54
  Like 
Renwick, Johnson was familiar to members of the government and had a history of serving as an 
outside expert on its behalf.  He had conducted a large portion of the Franklin Institute 
investigation, researched techniques of sheathing vessels with copper to protect their wooden 
hulls for the Navy, and conducted research on coals.
55
 
Johnson had become, along with Joseph Henry, Alexander Dallas Bache, and James P. 
Espy and others, one of a group of scientific experts who advised members of the government on 
questions relating to technology.
56
  He analyzed Easton’s devices by pursuing a careful set of 
experiments, took reams of data, and supported his conclusions by referencing his results.
57
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Johnson also provided a detailed critique and a list of suggestions for how to reconfigure 
the apparatus to make it more effective.
 58
  Easton submitted a second invention for Johnson to 
review, this one designed to function as both a safety valve and warning device that would let off 
excess steam when the pressure became too high in the boiler.  After experimenting with 
Easton’s second invention, Johnson indicated that he liked it better than the first.  He endorsed 
the mechanism and commented that it had “decided advantages over [the inventor’s] previously 
patented-invention” and that it deserved “the attention of the owners and managers of steam 
engines and steam-vessels.”59  Easton was pleased with the positive evaluation of his second 
device, but he was not quite satisfied.  Believing that his invention was superior to all others, he 
wanted a clear and universal recommendation that his device should be used by steamboat 
owners and deserved government backing.  He wrote to Congress that there “were numerous 
other persons who profess to have invented other methods for the accomplishment of the same 
object, and who are praying for the patronage of the government to their inventions.”  He asked 
Congress to establish a commission that would examine and compare all of the inventions to 
determine which one was the best in order to bring it into general use.
60
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 Appendix B: S. Doc. 336, 27th Cong., 2nd sess., 4, 6, 37.  Easton’s invention was one of several designed to 
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 Memorial of Thomas S. Easton (referred Jan. 13, 1843), Select Committee on Steam Boilers and Steamboats 
(HR27A-G25.5), 27
th
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Easton was not the only inventor who was disappointed with the outcome of government 
investigations.  Others, even some who had previously received favorable reviews, such as A. B. 
Quinby in 1838, were not pleased that the examiners could pick and choose which machines they 
tested.  Quinby protested that under the 1842 resolution to examine boiler safety devices (and 
test Samuel Colt’s submarine battery), the Secretary of the Navy did not take the opportunity to 
seek out and test additional inventions, as was permitted by the legislation, but instead only 
examined the ones specifically named in the resolution.
61
  Quinby proposed that Congress pass a 
new resolution requiring the Navy Department to test every invention submitted to it, 
presumably including his own, and that the testing take place where the members of Congress 
could readily observe the process.  Quinby also cautioned the Congressmen not to purchase the 
rights to any patent until every device had been tested and reported on.  The Chief Engineer of 
the Washington Navy Yard had apparently already examined Quinby’s “vaporimeter,” in 1842, 
as well as the Safety Guard by Cadwallader Evans.  Quinby thought that his invention came off 
favorably while Evans’s device, by contrast, had substantial problems.62 
Inventor Daniel Barnum also believed that he deserved a more positive evaluation than 
he received.  The 1843 steamboat law created another commission to test inventions and the 
group included both “scientific” and “practical” men.  Walter R. Johnson again led the inquiry.  
The other commissioners were Thomas P. Jones of Philadelphia, editor of the Journal of the 
Franklin Institute, who had served as a member of the Institute’s steam boiler committee in the 
                                                 
61
 5 Stat. L., 584. 
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 Quinby accused Evans of mixing the metal alloys for his safety guard so that they would only soften at a 
dangerously high pressure and temperature.
 
See Petition of A. B. Quinby, praying the adoption of measures to test 
inventions for preventing explosions of steam boilers, Feb. 9, 1843 (Referred  Feb. 13, 1843), 27
th
 Cong., Petitions 
and Memorials Referred to Committees, Committee on Naval Affairs, Jan. 25, 1843–Feb. 13, 1843 (Sen27A-
G11.1), Records of the Senate, RG 46, NA.  Quinby speculated that some innovations in boiler design were making 
explosions even more likely and asked if the boiler arrangements on the U.S. steamer Mississippi tended to create 
“surcharged” (highly heated) steam which brought on greater danger.   
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1830s, and Charles Reeder, a longtime manufacturer of steam engines from Baltimore.
63
  The 
commissioners conducted examinations and wrote a lengthy report, which they issued in 1844.  
Barnum had submitted an auxiliary pump designed to renew the water in a boiler when a float 
indicated the level was low.  The commissioners liked Barnum’s concept, but knew that many 
inventors had difficulty in devising dependable floats, and questioned whether Barnum’s float 
would reliably trigger the auxiliary pump if muddy waters, such as those of the Mississippi 
River, had fouled the mechanism.
64
  In 1845, Barnum protested that floats had already been 
employed effectively in these conditions, and asked for a chance to demonstrate that his float 
would work.
65
  Congress, however, did not give him another chance at the time. 
 
4. Dilemmas for Legislators and the Limits of Machinery 
There were other dilemmas associated with the Mechanical Option, and members of 
Congress discovered that mandating certain types of safety features could be counterproductive.  
The Franklin Institute committee had anticipated difficulties of this sort when they had warned in 
1836 that “ill directed interference” could create more problems in managing vessels than it 
solved.
66
  Their advice proved prophetic when parts of the 1838 steamboat act were unworkable, 
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and, in 1843, Congress reversed some of its requirements.  The fact that Congress found it 
necessary to withdraw and revise portions of the 1838 steamboat act suggests that it was difficult 
for legislators to be certain that requiring specific design attributes or equipment would not be 
counterproductive, causing problems that the members did not foresee. 
The 1838 steamboat act required vessels on the Great Lakes and on the sea to use iron 
rods or chains, rather than ropes, to attach the steering wheel to the rudder.
67
  The provision was 
intended to make sure a pilot could still guide the vessel toward safety when a fire might 
otherwise sever the connection between the helmsman and the rudder.
68
  This requirement for 
fireproof steering apparatus was well intentioned, but steamboat operators throughout the 
country complained when the law mandated this type of equipment.
69
  Vessel masters on the 
Great Lakes attested that iron rods and chains were not strong or flexible enough to control a 
vessel during a storm, and noted that several vessels with steering chains had already suffered 
accidents, had their steering fail, and were left to the mercy of the wind and the waves.
70
  
Steamboat owners also complained that government administrators were overreaching their 
authority.  The collector at the Port of New Orleans thought that this section of the act also 
                                                                                                                                                             
22/4 (Oct. 1836): 217. 
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 5 Stat. L. 304, Section 9. 
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applied to vessels on the Western rivers, and threatened to initiate legal proceedings against 
vessel masters who did not comply.  A group of steamboat owners and navigators protested 
against this interpretation, and argued that the provision did not apply to them.  They also cited a 
number of boats whose owners had tried to use iron rods and chains and been forced to abandon 
them.
71
  Others on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers claimed that iron rods and chains were “too 
unwieldy” for conditions on the rivers.72  Some observers also pointed out that steamboat 
operators generally ignored this portion of the 1838 law, risking fines rather than altering their 
arrangements.
73
  All of these petitioners asked for Congress to modify or repeal this provision of 
the 1838 act.  It took several years, but in 1843 Congress withdrew the requirement of using iron 
rods or chains, provided that the vessel had an alternative position from which a craft could be 
guided if the pilot were driven from the wheel by smoke and flames.
74
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 They wrote that steamboat operators had made sincere attempts to anticipate and obviate the danger, as well 
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27
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Aug. 22, 1842, H. Rept. 1033, 3-4.  See also the testimony in Report [To accompany S. 247] by 
the Committee on Commerce, 26
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., S. Rept. 241, 15. 
73
 Document on the subject of preventing the destruction of steamboats by fire, 26
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Feb. 4, 
1840, S. Doc. 151, 1. 
74
 Act of Mar. 3, 1843, 5 Stat. L., 626.  See also Safety of Passengers on Board of Steamboats. [To accompany 
bill H.R. 602], 27
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Aug. 22, 1842, H. Rept. 1033, 1 (Appendix B).  On the provisions for steering 
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The improvements of the age made it tempting to try to mandate using highly touted new 
safety items.  Attempting to identify better fireproof apparatus to connect the wheel to the rudder 
post, some congressional investigators were fascinated by wire ropes, which were rapidly 
coming into wider use.  According to Niles’ National Register, although they only became 
available eighteen months earlier, by 1840 two hundred and sixty four steamers were using wire 
cables in the West.
75
  This also served as a practical example that vessel owners, on their own 
initiative, were sometimes willing to adopt technological innovations without government 
mandates.  In 1840, members of a House Select Committee on Steam Boilers, headed by 
Pennsylvania Democrat David Petrikin and including Kentucky Whig Joseph Rogers 
Underwood, oversaw experiments to test the strength of Isaac McCord’s patented wire tiller 
rope.  McCord was a Pennsylvania native, then living in Cincinnati.  Advocates for the wire rope 
had sent a sample to Petrikin, claiming that it was stronger than hemp ropes, inflammable, and 
lighter and more flexible than chains.
76
  McCord also wrote to the committee, enclosing 
clippings from the Cincinnati Daily Republican in favor of his invention, along with the 
endorsements by pilots and commanders of vessels on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
77
  With 
the cooperation of officers at the Washington Navy Yard, the Committee tested the strength of 
McCord’s cable for use as a metallic tiller rope, heating it to try its resiliency at different 
                                                                                                                                                             
speed, distance and orientation.  If unshielded, the light might impede the night vision of the pilot.  Steamboat 
operators soon remonstrated that the law needed to be modified to address these flaws, and to provide “rules of the 
road” to direct how vessels should pass each other safely.  See Memorial of a Number of Citizens of Louisville, 
Kentucky, Praying the amendment of the act “to provide for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of 
vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam, 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., Dec. 13, 1838, S. Doc. 13, 4-5 (Appendix B). 
75
 NWR, Apr. 25, 1840, 128. 
76
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temperatures.  They were impressed with its durability to resist fire when an ordinary hemp rope 
would have burned through.
78
 
Another dilemma for legislators, one that they did not address when they sought to 
improve mechanical devices, was that machinery made up only part of the complex system of a 
steam vessel.  Without adequate training, especially for emergencies, human failings could 
undermine even the best safety measures and equipment.  The fate of the steamer Lexington, lost 
on Long Island Sound in the winter of 1840 with only four survivors of her 150 passengers and 
crew, is instructive.
79
 
The Lexington’s original problem came from its design: wooden parts of the vessel were 
too close to the heated metal of the engine and caught fire.
80
  The danger was compounded by 
the fact that the vessel was carrying a cargo that included bales of cotton.  The cotton ignited and 
contributed to the fire’s rapid spread.  The coroner’s jury inquiring into the disaster concluded 
that the Lexington was an excellent vessel, but that the officers and crew did not act effectively 
after the fire broke out and that the captain and pilot “sought their own safety” before attending 
to their craft and passengers.  The Lexington was equipped with firefighting apparatus, but when 
she caught fire, the crew could not use the water pump for a time, did not employ the water 
buckets effectively, or see to the safe launching of the lifeboats.  The pilot or other officers did 
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 Raub’s Safety Valves [To accompany bills H.R. 484, 485, and 486.], 26th Cong., 1st sess., Jul. 10, 1840, H. 
Rept. 651, 9-10, 13 (Appendix B).  The same committee wanted to provide apparatus to fight fires.  One of their 
witnesses claimed that, with a small appropriation, he could build an effective forcing pump to use as a firefighting 
engine, and the committee introduced a bill to allow him to construct and test it.  The committee introduced a bill to 
subsidize the pump, H.R. 485, but it did not pass the House. 
79
 Report [To accompany bill S. 247], 26
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 Cong., 1
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not rig the alternate steering apparatus, so that when the tiller ropes burned through, the vessel 
could not be steered to shore.
81
   
Commentators sometimes derided the incompetence or poor reactions of crew members 
and passengers when facing emergencies.
82
  If the Lexington’s engineers had stopped the vessel 
and used the fire engine pump and hose against the flames at an early point, the fire might have 
been put out or contained.  If buckets had been more accessible and kept filled with water and 
had been employed against the fire at its early stages, the vessel might have been saved, or at 
least run close enough to shore that more of the passengers and crew could have escaped.  If the 
pilot had moved to the aft section and rigged the emergency tiller, he might have been able to 
ground the vessel and fewer people would have died in the wintry waters.  With quick thinking 
and a disciplined response, the lifeboats might have been launched successfully and saved many 
of the people on board.
83
 
The outcome of the Lexington disaster suggests that crew members needed to be trained 
to react appropriately in emergencies, or all the safety devices in the world could not protect 
those on board.  This, however, was beyond the scope of what Congress proposed or even 
discussed at the time.  Aside from the effort to license pilots and engineers to assure their 
knowledge, competence, and sobriety, Congress did not introduce legislation to compel 
emergency exercises or to train crews to use the required safety equipment.  The legislators 
presumed that responsibility for using mechanical devices and for quick thinking in a crisis 
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resided with the people on the spot, the masters, and crews of the vessels.
84
  Their character 
would determine how they reacted when danger threatened their craft.  This also suggests why 
advocates for issuing licenses to  engineers and pilots stressed that people applying for licenses 
should provide evidence that they were of estimable moral fiber and had demonstrated sound and 
sober judgment before being put in charge of a vessel or an engine. 
Government officials tended to think of technology as mechanical devices, rather than as 
complex systems that depended on humans to operate them in both typical and emergency 
situations.
85
  More precisely, legislators were more concerned with optimizing the function of the 
mechanical part of the technological system than the human part.  The steamboat legislation in 
the antebellum era commanded the vessel to have a backup plan to steer the vessel and to carry 
lifeboats, but did not set standards to train the crew or require practice drills.  The assumption 
that captains would see to training their crews and that crew members would naturally step up to 
perform their duties probably contributed to the fact that Congress spent much more time trying 
to identify better inventions and equipment than to improve human performance in the face of 
danger. 
 
5. Conclusion: Testing Inventions and Mandating Equipment 
While testing of safety devices began inauspiciously in 1834, the government soon 
employed reputable experts to conduct its examinations and offer advice to inventors and 
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 Senator John Ruggles of Maine suggested that the passengers should be active participants in their own 
safety, that pressure and water gauges should be visible to passengers as well as crew, to enable them to  monitor the 
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steamboat operators.  Government tests of safety devices subsequently became more thorough, 
and many of the reports were of high quality.  Periodicals like Scientific American also reviewed 
these reports and echoed their recommendations of specific apparatus, including patented 
mechanisms.
86
  However, it is not clear that government endorsements alone could get steamboat 
operators to adopt expensive new equipment.
87
 
The rule of parsimony also handicapped the government-mandated investigations.  The 
Franklin Institute inquiry in the 1830s relied on the volunteer labor of the members of the 
Institute, along with a small subsidy from the Treasury Department.  Investigators Alexander 
Dallas Bache and Walter R. Johnson served without compensation and the committee members 
labored for over five years before they completed their work in 1836.  Bache gave up his own 
research to conduct the experiments and complained in early 1836 when the Secretary of the 
Treasury pressed him to complete the report.
88
  Johnson was similarly frustrated when he headed 
the investigation into safety devices that was mandated by the 1843 act.  Urged to complete his 
own report, Johnson wrote to the Secretary of the Navy in early 1844 that the commission had 
exhausted its appropriation and the members were completing the research with their personal 
funds.
89
  Given the widespread demand for frugal government, it is not surprising that these 
inquiries were not funded generously.  Still, because Congress was reluctant to dedicate ample 
resources, it likely delayed some of the investigations, and may have made the results less timely 
and influential as they became further removed from the impulse that had motivated the 
investigations.  The public-spiritedness of the investigators who were working without 
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compensation or government salaries is worthy of honorable mention, but it would probably 
have been more effective to hire experts, pay them salaries, and budget adequate resources to 
complete the jobs in a timely fashion.
90
 
Many members of Congress supported these inquiries even if they devoted limited funds 
to the projects.  The 1838 bills to test inventions (S. 73 & S. 389 - Appendix A) passed without 
roll call votes and with minimal debate or discussion, except for a disagreement between the two 
houses over an amendment that was resolved in favor of the Senate.
91
  The Senate passed an 
1842 request to examine the boiler safety invention of Thomas Easton by unanimous consent.
92
  
The section of the 1842 House Joint Resolution that authorized a $6,000 appropriation for the 
Navy to make test the of boiler safety inventions to U.S. steamships was added to another 
measure without major dispute or a roll call vote.  Though there was brief debate on the wording 
and the amount of the appropriation, no one in the House or Senate spoke on the floor to oppose 
the intent or substance of the bill.
93
  The Senate passed the joint resolution without a roll call 
vote and the House approved the resolution by a vote of 110 to 51, with more than 68% in 
favor.
94
  The 1843 act (H.R. 602) that authorized a commission to test boiler devices also passed 
quickly and without a roll call vote in either house.
95
  Without debate or dissent, the Senate 
agreed in 1848 to resolutions asking the Commissioner of Patents to report on whether 
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amendments to the patent laws were advisable to prevent steam boiler explosions, to give 
priority to applications for patents that would alleviate the danger, and to report back to the 
Senate concerning any promising inventions.
96
  Finally, in the debates on the Steamboat bill in 
1852, no one in the House or Senate challenged the provision that gave the Supervising 
Inspectors the responsibility to procure information about improvements in safety equipment.  
Authorizing inquiries and soliciting expert advice on technology, at least in this area, probably 
attracted as close to a favorable legislative consensus as the Congresses of this time would get on 
an issue that touched the lives of so many people. 
The reason that there was such widespread support for these measures within Congress 
was that the dangers of steam were so public, the tests relatively inexpensive, and the possible 
benefits from identifying effective safety mechanisms appeared to be immense.
97
  In 1838, 
Samuel Owens, Democratic representative from Georgia, argued on behalf of a House select 
committee that Congress should respond to the public excitement about steam engine disasters 
by assuming a broad responsibility to encourage the advance of technical solutions.  He wrote 
that 
In a country like ours, where traveling is so general, and the conveyance by steam 
so common, the welfare not only of the people, but the common feelings of 
humanity seem [sic] to require that a remedy should be applied, if one can be 
discovered, to prevent such calamities.  The committee believe [sic] it will be the 
inclination of the House, as they certainly deem it their duty, to make every effort 
and to encourage every attempt having a reasonable prospect of success, by which 
security may be obtained in the use of the steam-engine.  The personal safety of 
the citizen should be the first consideration of the legislature; without it, life has 
no enjoyment; and unless it is afforded, Government does but half its duty.
98
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As we shall see, Congress went beyond testing and recommending inventions and 
considered awarding monetary subsidies to inventors and mandating the use of their 
devices in order to do “its duty.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
make a practical test of Samuel Raub’s safety valve.    
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CHAPTER 4 
 
“SO GIVE ME THE MONEY” – INVENTORS AND THE QUEST FOR SUBSIDIES 
 
 
1. Subsidies for Innovation 
Members of Congress began to consider subsidizing steam safety mechanisms in the 
1830s.
1
  In 1832 the Louisiana legislature asked Congress to purchase the patent rights of J. O. 
Blair, who had asked the state to construct a 250-ton steamer, equip it with his machinery and 
test his mechanisms.
2
  Blair did not get a subsidy, but he and other inventors insisted that their 
mechanisms could prevent explosions and address other dangers.  Congress contemplated 
funding these proposals, driven in part by “the lure of technology– the faith that mechanical 
devices would solve problems of extraordinary complexity.”3  However, members of Congress 
were divided.  While some supported these policies, others blocked them and objected that they 
did not have the power to “prescribe the mode, manner, or form of construction” of vessels or the 
requisite wisdom to make choices on behalf of steamboat owners and operators.
4
  But even when 
the government did not give awards, the prospect of federal funding provided an incentive for 
inventors to experiment with steam safety devices. 
Inventors asked Congress for various types of aid, including purchasing their patent 
rights, requiring all vessels in the country to use their devices, or buying inventions to use on 
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steam engines owned by the United States.
5
  Congress ultimately only awarded monetary 
subsidies for steam safety devices by purchasing apparatus to use on engines owned by the 
national government.
6
  However, it nonetheless influenced technology and the market by 
requiring steam vessels to carry certain generic types of equipment such as safety valves, 
lifeboats, metal alloy boiler safety devices and metal lifeboats.  These mandates created 
competitive advantages for inventors who produced these mechanisms.
7
 
Inventors had been seeking government aid since before the Constitution was adopted.
8
  
They believed their work to make steamboats safer was an important national asset, saw that the 
government sometimes offered financial support, and cited precedents where the United States 
funded Eli Whitney’s project to manufacture firearms using interchangeable parts, the snag boat 
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Henry Shreve designed to clear obstructions from inland waterways and Edward Knight 
Collins’s transatlantic packets.9  Inventors asked the government for help with a variety of 
technological endeavors.
10
  In 1837 and 1838, for instance, they sent applications to Congress 
requesting aid for a ship ventilator, a boiler safety valve, discoveries in surgery, a machine for 
twisting and reeling silk, a vapor bath, a rifle, a safety steam engine, a plan to improve 
lighthouses, a process for making cement, meteorological investigations, a proposal to establish a 
research institution in the physical sciences, and help in manufacturing a magnetic device.
11
  By 
the mid nineteenth-century, typically “scores of inventive philosophers” regularly congregated in 
the national capital to request assistance when Congress was meeting.
12
 
By contemplating subsidies for equipment on steam vessels, the national government was 
continuing a long-running debate over how it could best encourage economic and technical 
development.  The Constitution did not explicitly prohibit subsidizing advances in the arts and 
manufactures, allowing legislators to argue that it was proper to provide aid to inventors under 
the right circumstances.  They were likely influenced by their confidence in the capabilities of 
their countrymen and the conviction that they were living in an age of material progress.
13
  
Though some people pushed to allow the government to offer regular support to science and 
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technology, Congress instead intervened intermittently, “based on specific needs rather than 
larger constitutional and philosophical arguments.”14 
Political leaders acknowledged that the nation’s expanding territory and growing 
population and commerce, combined with military threats from other countries, necessitated 
government outlays for mechanical innovations.
15
  Congress tended to invest in projects that 
would serve immediate needs within the federal establishment, such as advances in armaments, 
medicine and minting money.
16
  There were also extraordinary occasions when a technological 
advance seemed to offer the promise of serving national interests like coastal defense, 
instantaneous communication and improving transportation.  In the 1840s Congress appropriated 
money to Samuel Colt to develop and demonstrate his system of underwater mines for harbor 
defense and to test prototypes of Samuel F. B. Morse’s telegraph and Charles Grafton Page’s 
electrically-powered railway engine.
17
  Congress also endorsed retroactive rewards in certain 
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cases, paying over $75,000 in 1846 to the heirs of Robert Fulton to recognize their forebear’s 
role in furthering steam navigation.  In another prominent case, in the 1840s and ’50s a number 
of congressmen advocated compensating the discoverer of surgical anesthesia.
18
 
Steam disasters caught the attention of inventors, who responded by devising numerous 
plans to prevent accidents.
19
  They argued that the United States should support any device that 
could provide “complete protection against … fatal and disastrous … steam boiler explosions” 
and that such support would be justified by “considerations of humanity [and] the dearest 
interests of society ….”20  The fact that the United States was willing to reward technical 
innovations gave them reason to believe that the government might subsidize their ideas, and 
they sent flurries of petitions and memorials asking for aid.
21
  One inventor proposed that 
Congress set up a system to stimulate advances by funding a prize to be given “for the best plan 
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for constructing boilers so as to ensure their safety.”22  The applicants in turn fed the hopes of 
congressmen by claiming that they had constructed mechanisms that could assure perfect 
security, or at least mitigate the danger from boiler explosions and other accidents.
23
 
Since only a small number of inventors received subsidies, many of them were likely 
driven to apply as much by wishful aspirations as any realistic chance that they would get 
funding.
24
  They tended to share a firm belief in the value of their mechanical progeny, 
sometimes regardless of the actual efficacy of their inventions.  Most inventors functioned 
independently as entrepreneurs and were often “in the position of one against the world.”25  They 
needed to be dedicated to their occupation and exhibit a “a bold energy and enthusiasm, 
approximating monomania, which alone [could] carry the inventor through the labyrinth of 
difficulties that seem to be placed in his pathway, to test, as it were, the sincerity of his belief in 
the truth of his creation ….”26  Abraham Lincoln’s secretary, John Hay, remembered that the 
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inventors who sought subsidies were “men of some originality of character, not infrequently 
carried to eccentricity.”  Hay’s fellow, John Nicolay, was less generous, describing those who 
sought the President’s help as “lunatics and visionaries ….”27 
But in addition to whatever psychological qualities drove them to believe that they 
deserved funding, inventors also had practical reasons to pursue government largesse, because it 
was difficult to profit from their patents in the marketplace.
28
  Despite the fact that the patent 
laws granted a fourteen-year monopoly, even patenting a sought-after invention was no 
guarantee of success because imitators often infringed on successful patents.
29
  A class of patent 
solicitors and inventors were said to be more interested in stealing ideas by exploiting 
imperfections in patent applications than in producing and marketing their own inventions.
30
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Judges often lacked expertise in technical and scientific issues, while juries were criticized for 
ignoring evidence.
31
  With all this in mind, inventors needed to manage their business affairs 
skillfully to reap a return.
32
  To improve their chances to make a profit, they frequently preferred 
to assign the rights to their inventions or license them to others.
33
 
Inventors had to navigate a number of obstacles before winning government subsidies.  
For one, strict construction of the Constitution stood in their way.  During the 1787 Convention 
the framers rejected a system like that of France, where the government offered prizes and 
subsidies for scientific and technical advances.
34
  Instead, in Article One, Section Eight, the 
delegates more closely followed the English system by allowing Congress to guarantee exclusive 
rights for creative advances for a limited time.
35
  With this in mind, strict constructionists like 
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Democrat Jefferson Davis thought that appropriating money in aid of a particular inventor was 
beyond Congress’s delegated powers.  In 1850, for instance, the Mississippi senator charged that 
renewing a subsidy to Charles Grafton Page would make the government the “patron” of 
“authors and discoverers,” rather than their “guardian,” and this exceeded its authority.36 
Congressmen operated under additional constraints because many government officials 
believed that inventions should be produced and supported by “private enterprise.”  They noted 
that the patent system was already in place to help inventors secure the rights to their devices and 
that these inventions, when put before the people, would succeed according to their intrinsic 
worth.
37
  This objection was reinforced by Jacksonian era sentiments, held especially strongly by 
Democrats who bridled at the prospect of awarding peculiar privileges to anyone.
38
  Debating the 
1852 steamboat bill in the House of Representatives, the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, 
David Seymour, Democrat of New York, stated that requiring steamboat owners to use a 
patented article was fundamentally unfair.  Seymour urged that Congress “give every man a fair 
chance to present his invention before the public; because if we had legislated for it after having 
given the man a patent, we should give him the very worst kind of monopoly.”39 
These ideological objections were accompanied by a number of practical concerns.  
Operating under the rule of parsimony, Congressmen wanted to be frugal, a sentiment articulated 
by one inventor who wrote that the government should take care of the “public interest and not 
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squander the public money upon simple, and useless inventions.”40  In addition, legislators 
distrusted their ability to select the best machines.  In one instance, when asked to decide 
between various forms of equipment intended for steam vessels in the navy, some members 
stated that they did not have the expertise to make the right choice.  They preferred to leave the 
decision to departmental administrators, who they thought had a deeper understanding of the 
subject.
41
  Congressmen were also reluctant to select one invention over another when inventors 
were engaged in disputes over patent rights.  How could it be proper for them to promote or pay 
for a device when its authorship was uncertain and the matter had not been decided by the 
courts?
42
 
In addition, Congressmen hesitated to award subsidies because they feared that they 
would lock themselves and the country into using mechanisms that would soon be surpassed.  As 
Representative Willard Hall cautioned while Congress was considering subsidizing one 
invention: “with the continued improvements that are going on, who can tell that in a few years 
our most brilliant and useful discoveries may be wholly discarded for more recent and better 
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patents[?]”43  Senator Stephen Mallory noted in 1852 that advances in steam machinery were 
being developed all the time and he feared that steamboat legislation that mandated particular 
devices would tend to shackle future improvements rather than to unleash them.
44
  Finally, 
members of Congress were also wary that granting subsidies to one inventor would inspire a 
flood of unworthy entreaties for aid that would absorb too much of their time.
45
 
However, despite all of these barriers, some leaders thought that the national government 
should fund inventive advances.  The New York Daily Times praised federal officials who 
pledged to promote inventions that would be used in the public service.
46
  Members of Congress 
were inclined to be generous with public resources when they believed that the invention would 
serve the national interest, uphold national honor and attract support from the public.  Champions 
of Samuel F. B. Morse’s telegraph stressed the practical benefits of instantaneous 
communication for national defense and business, as well as upholding pride in American 
technical accomplishment versus a rival system being used in England.
47
  As Morse’s 
congressional backers wrote: “[we believe] that the American public is fully prepared, and even 
desirous, that every requisite effort be made on the part of Congress to consummate an object of 
so deep interest to the purposes of Government in peace and in war, and to the enterprise of the 
age.”48  Congressmen were more inclined to award subsidies to inventors who were their 
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constituents than to those who lived elsewhere.  In this environment, congressmen entertained 
the idea of subsidizing steam equipment and introduced proposals to purchase safety apparatus in 
1838, 1840 and 1845.
49
 
In 1848 the Senate approved a resolution asking Commissioner of Patents Edmund Burke 
how to prevent boiler explosions and to recommend ways to modify the patent laws to encourage 
better inventions in this area.  The Senate also requested that Burke give top priority to reviewing 
patent applications designed to prevent “steam explosions.”50  While Burke endorsed several 
inventions, including Cadwallader Evans’s Safety Guard, Daniel Barnum’s self-acting pump and 
Thomas Easton’s apparatus,51 he also cast doubt on the efficacy of the Mechanical Option as a 
way to prevent bursting boilers.  Like previous investigators, he found that many inventions 
could prove helpful, but there was no device that could guarantee perfect security.
52
  To be 
effective, intervention had to address the range of problems that led to accidents on steam 
vessels.  This assessment flew in the face of the hopes and claims of inventors who were trying 
to achieve the goal of perfect safety and to sell their inventions under that aegis.  They asserted 
that their mechanical progeny were up to the task of saving lives and property and continued to 
ask Congress to subsidize their work. 
Examining the efforts by three inventors, Edward D. Tippett, Samuel Raub, Jr. and 
Cadwallader Evans, to win subsidies for their steam safety devices in the 1830s, ’40s and ’50s 
illuminates the motives, techniques and frustrations of inventors and pulls back a curtain to see 
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the government’s response.  The government’s experimentation with fusible alloys demonstrates 
that it was capable of using federal resources to facilitate the adoption of safety mechanisms.  
The example of another entrepreneur and inventor, Joseph Francis, provides an instance where 
the government worked closely with an inventor who developed a useful innovation and 
provided him with a competitive boost. 
Tippett, Raub, and Evans have received little attention from historians.  None of them 
created a product that represented both a technological breakthrough and commercial success on 
the scale of inventors like Samuel Morse or Cyrus McCormick.  However, they were more 
representative of the many people who sought help from the national government than great 
inventors like Morse.  Despite their relative obscurity, the stories of these three can also be 
recovered because they left extensive records as they pursued subsidies.  Two of the three, Raub 
and Evans, produced inventions that had worthwhile features, were used on many steam engines 
and had supporters who advocated on their behalf.  Edward D. Tippett was a crank with 
delusions of grandeur, but his tale is nonetheless instructive because he serves as a stand-in for 
the many inventors who sought support for unsuccessful mechanisms.  His situation, motivations 
and lobbying tactics were consistent with those of other applicants, while his flawed grasp of 
physics and mechanics illustrates the idiosyncratic understanding common among many 
Americans, including inventors who worked with steam power. 
 
2. Edward D. Tippett 
Edward D. Tippett was born about 1789 in Maryland as the son of a Revolutionary 
soldier and later served during the war of 1812.  He moved to Washington, D.C. and earned his 
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living for 27 years as a schoolteacher at the Eastern Academy.
53
  He recorded that he had been 
given a vision in 1816 where the secrets of the natural world had been opened to him.  Tippett 
saw it as his mission to advance and share three great discoveries with the rest of the nation: how 
to generate perpetual motion, design a powered airship and construct a safety steam engine that 
would never explode.
54
  But Tippett’s airship design, which was a kind of steam-powered 
dirigible, was impossible given the technical capabilities of the time, his dream of perpetual 
motion was a fantasy that had been discredited among knowledgeable people and his safety 
steam engine was functional, but primitive and poorly designed.
55
  In the 1820s he began to ask 
the government to support his inventions and continued to press for subsidies for over forty 
years, petitioning Congress and the executive departments to have experts examine his work and 
asking for money so he could construct prototypes of his machines.
56
  With a fair hearing, he 
believed, legislators would recognize his accomplishments, he would get the support he needed 
and the country would reap the benefits.  He later cited the subsidy that Samuel Morse received 
for his electro-magnetic telegraph as a precedent and was confident that government backing 
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would enable him to achieve major advances.
57
  Tippett first memorialized the House of 
Representatives in 1823, claiming that he had 
invented a new and interesting machine, which gains power without losing time, 
which he believes will be of the utmost importance to the country, but that, from 
poverty, he is unable to make known its utility, by demonstrating its power upon a 
large scale; and praying that a committee of scientific gentlemen may be 
appointed to investigate its principles, and to make such report as they may deem 
it to deserve.
58
 
This appeal set the pattern for Tippett’s requests.  He would petition Congress, plead poverty and 
ask the government to examine his plans or give him a subsidy.  He would subsequently declare 
that, after additional thought and effort, he had discovered the secret to perfect his inventions.
59
  
At one point Tippett composed a poem as part of a broadside to Congress.  Perhaps he hoped that 
his lyricism would stir the hearts of the legislators when he asked Congress for a subsidy: 
Now surely our Senate, a committee can give 
As sound on the science, as when Newton did live, 
If this is not so, in every respect 
Its [sic] wrong in our people such men to elect 
 
So give me the money, I’ll honor this nation 
And enable America, to take a bold station 
The spirit of war, and bloodshed must end 
And the blessing of liberty, to all we must send.
60
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Tippett stated that he deserved a subsidy because the machine would confer benefits to 
the national community.
61
  He stressed that he was driven by “philanthropic” motives and deeply 
moved by the immense toll on lives taken by steam boiler explosions.
62
  To emphasize his public 
spiritedness, at one point Tippett even offered to grant his engine to the government without 
payment to himself, but on the condition that his investors received appropriate recompense.
63
 
Tippett did not depend solely on his own powers of persuasion and worked to get public 
support.  Unlike some other applicants, he could not get experts and professional users of steam 
to endorse his engine, but he managed to get some citizens to write to Congress and sign 
petitions in favor of his plans.
64
  However, despite Tippett’s efforts, over the years the House and 
Senate usually referred his requests to committees, where they died quiet deaths. 
Tippett came closest to earning government support in the late 1830s.  He memorialized 
the House and Senate about his safety steam engine in 1836.
65
  The House Committee on Patents 
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recommended appropriating two thousand dollars to test Tippett’s device, but Congress took no 
further action.
66
 
Like other applicants, Tippett believed that a successful experiment might change the minds 
of skeptics, garner publicity and convince the public to put pressure on Congress to grant a subsidy.  
Representatives might be persuaded to support the invention by witnessing the device in operation.  
Samuel Morse’s telegraphic demonstrations in the Capitol, for example, played an important role in 
impressing the members of Congress that his work was worthy of an appropriation.
67
  In the summer 
of 1842 Samuel Colt began a series of several demonstrations to build support for his method of 
triggering underwater mines.  He demolished a small vessel off of the Washington Arsenal in front 
of thousands of spectators, then destroyed the brig Volta in New York harbor in the fall and sank the 
barque Styx in Washington in 1844 “in the presence of the secretary of the navy and many officers, 
members of congress [sic], etc.”68   
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If inventors wanted to stir their audiences with public exhibitions, there was, of course, 
the chance that something would go wrong.  From the point of view of the legislators and 
administrators, even a failure might accomplish some good, since it could discredit an unworthy 
project and might be sufficiently embarrassing so as to discourage dilettantes from bothering 
them with ineffective inventions.  Tippett, however, was so certain of the efficacy of his 
mechanisms that it seems unlikely that the prospect of public embarrassment would have made 
him reluctant to apply--he touted the mere fact that his plans had been presented to members of 
the government as an indication of the merits of his work.
69
 
The late 1830s were a propitious time for Tippett and other inventors of steam safety 
mechanisms.  The Franklin Institute investigations had been completed and the results were 
available.  A number of high profile accidents renewed public attention to the problem of steam 
disasters and Congress appeared ready to act.   
In early 1837, responding to requests for subsidies by inventors A.B. Quinby and Samuel 
Raub, the Senate approved a bill which authorized the Navy to test boiler safety mechanisms.
70
  
The measure failed to become law, but the issue was still alive when the long session of the 25
th
 
Congress convened in December 1837, and President Martin Van Buren directed additional 
attention to the problem in his Annual Message.  Senator Felix Grundy introduced a 
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comprehensive bill (S.1) to address the problems of steamboat accidents and Senator John 
Ruggles introduced a bill (S.73) to create a commission to test safety mechanisms.
71
 
In March 1838 the Senate appointed a select committee to examine Tippett’s invention.72  
Tippett could have been overjoyed by the news, but instead he was concerned that his plan was 
in danger of being overshadowed by the work of other inventors.  In particular, Congress was 
interested in the request of Samuel Raub, Jr. who had asked for aid for his patented steam safety 
valve.  Unlike Tippett’s engine, a number of experts had written to Congress endorsing Raub’s 
invention.
73
  Members introduced bills into the House and Senate to help Raub.
74
  Trying to head 
off this rival, Tippett argued that safety valves could not prevent boiler explosions.
75
  They were 
inventions, he wrote, “calculated to deceive” the public and only offered “pretensions of safety” 
because they could not keep vessels and passengers out of danger.
76
  Further, Tippett believed 
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that no steam engine with boilers could ever be safe because of the basic design of boilers.  They 
were, he asserted, inherently likely to explode because the strength of the boiler deteriorated 
every time it was used.  Tippett had designed a steam engine without a boiler to avoid the 
problem of accumulating excess steam and the danger from weaknesses in the metal.
77
 
In 1838 and 1839 the commissioners, led by Professor James Renwick, examined plans 
and safety devices including Tippett’s machine.78  Their preliminary review inclined them to 
pass over Tippett’s engine, but his lobbying had persuaded Congress to pass a law that directed 
the commission to scrutinize his device.
79
  In addition, unlike some other inventors, Tippett 
could provide a working model and, living in Washington, he was available to consult with the 
Renwick and the other commissioners in person.
80
  Despite this, the commissioners rejected 
Tippett’s engine.  His design, for all intents and purposes, recreated an “ancient and ruder” form 
of the steam engine that had been surpassed years earlier.  While it had no boiler that could 
explode, much of the steam was lost into the atmosphere, which would make it inefficient and 
cause it to consume a tremendous amount of fuel.  They also observed that the small quantity of 
steam in the generator was at a high pressure, liable to explode and that “instead of affording 
security [from explosions], [the engine] would be the most dangerous which could possibly be 
adopted.”81 
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Tippett soldiered on despite the board’s rejection.  He petitioned Congress to examine 
and subsidize his engine in 1839, 1840, 1842, 1845, 1846, 1851, 1854 and 1856, but was 
unsuccessful.
82
  He became increasingly paranoid because, as he saw it, his success was being 
blocked by government employees determined to prevent him from getting a fair hearing and a 
subsidy.
83
  Discouraged, he wrote bitterly in 1860 that bureaucrats or officers in the military 
could get access to Senate committees.  He, on the other hand, struggled along outside and 
looked “like a fool.”84 
With the outbreak of the Civil War, Tippett saw another opportunity to get government 
aid.
85
  In tones alternatively plaintive, proud and paranoid, he wrote: “Will not the Government 
now, help their aged friend and benefactor who has spent a lifetime in doing good … Will this 
government see me longer persecuted by men in Washington[?]”86  In early 1865 he wrote to 
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President Lincoln, claiming that he had a vision that the war would not end until the secret of 
self-moving power was used by the United States.  The President did not show much sympathy 
for Tippett or confidence in his work, writing on the back of Tippett’s letter: “Tippett. Crazy. 
Man.”87 
Like Tippett, applicants for government subsidies commonly believed that they and their 
inventions would make a major contribution to the nation.  The commissioners who examined 
his steam engine in 1838 and 1839 noted that many inventors were not able to view their 
achievements dispassionately.  They may have had Tippett in mind when they wrote: 
It is but too frequently true that persons who have devoted years of their lives to 
inventions which they hope to render applicable to any useful purpose, are, by the 
long and undivided attention which they have devoted to some particular object, 
rendered incapable of discovering its defects, and, with pardonable feelings of 
gratified pride, overrate the importance of their discoveries.
88
 
 
 
3. Samuel Raub, Jr.: “Impossible to burst a boiler” 
 
Samuel Raub of Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania was a more successful inventor than 
Tippett, but he also overestimated the value of his mechanism.  Raub’s safety valve was already 
in commercial use when he applied for a subsidy in 1837.
89
  Unlike Tippett, Raub was able to 
persuade many members of Congress that he had devised a foolproof preventative for boiler 
explosions.  Over the next several years, he made a good enough case that the House and Senate 
introduced bills to evaluate his invention, purchase his patent to use on government-owned steam 
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engines, require it on all steamboats in the country, test it on U.S. vessels, or to require it on 
every steam engine in the nation.
90
   
If Tippett stubbornly clung to outmoded concepts in the face of criticism, Raub was 
somewhat more open to constructive suggestions to improve his design.  Similar to other safety 
valves, Raub’s “self-acting double safety valve” blew off excess steam, but it was designed to 
react to low water and also to sound an alarm to warn when dangerous conditions were 
developing.
91
  In 1835, after the Franklin Institute Committee on Science and the Arts negatively 
reviewed an early version of his safety valve, Raub heeded their suggestions, altered the device 
and soon earned more positive reviews in the Institute’s Journal.92  Raub claimed that, though he 
hoped to earn remuneration for his invention, he was motivated to serve the public good by 
preventing damage to life and property from steam disasters.
93
  He declared that if Congress 
would pass a law requiring his invention on all vessels, “they would effectually secure the safety 
of the lives and property of the many thousands that are now exposed to so much danger.”94 
At first glance, Raub’s invention met many of the criteria for an ideal safety mechanism.  
It warned when dangerous conditions were developing, responded immediately to those dangers, 
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was “certain in its action,” and sounded an alarm.  The alarm alerted passengers to hazards so 
that they could provide an additional check on reckless activity by the crew.  The valve reset 
itself automatically and was of relatively simple construction, so as to be affordable and to 
minimize the chances of breakage or derangement that afflicted complex mechanisms in 
uncertain environments.
95
 
Because it was widely believed that steamboat engineers caused accidents because they 
were reckless, inebriated, or both, legislators were very interested in having an automatic device 
that took the responsibility to monitor the water level and regulate the steam pressure out of the 
hands of the crew.  The fact that Raub’s safety valve purportedly operated without human 
intervention was therefore a feature that made it especially attractive to Congress.
96
 
Raub petitioned Congress to subsidize his valve and exhibited drawings and an operative 
model to members in early 1837, earning a strong endorsement from the Senate Committee on 
Roads and Canals.
97
  His valve was already in use in a glass factory in Philadelphia, where it 
earned positive reviews from the managers and engineers.
 98
 
Raub asked Congress to apply his device to all steam engines owned and operated by the 
United States, including on vessels and the steam engines at the navy yards and the Mint.  The 
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Army’s Topographical Chief Engineer, Charles Gratiot, reviewed the device and found it 
promising.  It operated on well-known natural principles and should, he concluded, lower the 
dangers from explosion.  Gratiot asked that several U.S. steamers be fitted with the valve so that 
it could be tested.  The committee recommended appropriating $5,000 for this purpose.
99
  These 
events occurred, however, during the short, lame duck session of Congress held after the 1836 
elections.  The committee made its report two months into the session, there was little time to 
act, and the House adjourned without taking further steps. 
Raub petitioned the 25
th
 Congress for a subsidy in late 1837.
100
  In a campaign that must 
have worried Edward D. Tippett as he was lobbying for his own subsidy, Raub demonstrated the 
valve to steam vessel travelers onboard the Philadelphia and Charleston steam packet.  He also 
circulated Gratiot’s letter, along with the endorsements that he had received from the Senate 
Roads and Canals Committee.  Several hundred people journeying on steamboats signed 
petitions in his favor and sent them to Congress, urging the government to use Raub’s valve on 
all steamers or install and test it on the steam engines owned by the United States.
101
 
In early 1838 the Senate Committee on Roads and Canals once again reported favorably 
on Raub’s valve.  They were impressed by the petitions and cited public support as one of the 
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reasons to recommend the device.  The committee also noted that professional users of steam had 
endorsed the valve and were employing it themselves.  They extolled its design and especially 
lauded the “self-acting power” of the mechanism and the fact that it did not depend on the 
“continual attention and skill of an engineer.”  The committee asked the Navy’s chief engineer to 
evaluate and test the valve and introduced a bill (S. 119) to appropriate $5,000 to pay Raub and 
fit the invention onto several U.S. steamers.
102
 
Contemporaneously, the House of Representatives formed a select committee at the end 
of 1837 to consider Raub’s application.103  The chairman, Democrat David Petrikin, who 
represented Raub’s home district in Pennsylvania, had received a petition from Raub.104  During 
that winter Raub exhibited a small boiler in the Capitol and provided “a practical demonstration” 
for committee members and others.
105
  The members were favorably inclined toward Raub’s 
request after they had seen his model and cited the valve’s self-regulating feature as a major 
virtue.  They proposed appropriating $3,000 to test his device.
106
  The committee also argued that 
the extensive use of steam power for travel and its dangers to the public justified government 
intervention in the form of subsidies for safety devices, and they were encouraged by the 
evidence that Raub’s invention would contribute to the safety of citizens.107  Four Democrats and 
                                                 
102
 Report by the Committee on Roads and Canals [To accompany Senate bill 119], 25
th
 Congress, 2
nd
 sess., 
January 3, 1838, S. Rept. 69, 1, 2 (Appendix B).  See also SJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 Sess. Jan. 3, 1838, 104. 
103
 HJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Dec. 29, 1837, 159-60. 
104
 Petrikin represented the 15
th
 Pennsylvania congressional district.  He introduced bills to purchase Raub’s 
safety valve in both the 25
th
 and 26
th
 Congresses. The bills were H.R. 365 in the 25
th
 Congress, 2
nd
 sess. and H.R. 
484 of the 26
th
 Congress, 1
st
 sess.  See Appendix A.   
105
 Appendix B: H. Rept. 323, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 Sess., 1. Inventors also opportunistically took advantage of 
public circumstances when they lobbied Congress.  Raub used the occasion of the fire that destroyed the U.S.S. 
Missouri in Gibraltar harbor to ask Congress to subsidize his invention to extinguish fires.  Appendix B: H. Rept. 
115, 28
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 4.  
106
 Appendix A: H.R. 365, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess. 
107
 Report on Samuel Raub, Jr., In Relation to Steam-Engines [To accompany bill H.R. No. 365] by the Select 
Committee, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., January 9, 1838, H. Rept. 323, 1 (Appendix B). 
 160 
one Whig sat on the committee and the lone southern Democrat, George Welshman Owens of 
Georgia, introduced the report.   
In this instance, the Democrats were willing to set aside their typical commitment to 
small and frugal government and non-interference with individual enterprise in order to 
recommend intervention.
108
  While the report of one committee cannot be taken as reflecting the 
convictions of all of the members of Congress, the fact that it was endorsed by members whose 
partisan and sectional affiliations tended to make them leery of energetic government suggests 
that congressmen were open to an expansive interpretation of federal powers and responsibilities 
in the field of interstate transportation and the case of steamboat safety. 
However, in this instance the whole Congress was not as broad-minded as the committee, 
and rather than approving a subsidy for Raub, Congress passed bills (S. 73 & S. 389) which 
formed the investigative commission headed by Professor Renwick.  The commissioners began 
to examine and test steam safety inventions in October 1838 and continued their work into 1839.  
They gave Raub’s device a better evaluation than they gave Edward D. Tippett’s steam engine, 
but the commissioners also criticized Raub’s valve.  For one, though Raub claimed that his 
invention was new and original, the commissioners had received a similar plan from a 
Philadelphia inventor and they thought that Raub’s was the inferior of the two.109  In addition, 
while the commissioners were confident that Raub’s safety valve would perform as advertised, 
they were not sure that opening the valve was the safest course when confronted by low water in 
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the boiler, since there were instances where it appeared that explosions took place shortly after 
safety valves had been opened.
110
 
Raub was dismayed by the commission’s conclusions and wrote to defend his invention.  
However, he did not address the criticisms of his design or the questions about his valve’s 
originality, but focused on several unrelated issues.  First, he complained that the commissioners 
tested his apparatus without allowing him to oversee its installation and, as a result, the valve had 
not worked as well as it ought.  Second, Raub realized that just as the government had the power 
to promote his invention through positive reviews, negative publicity could damage its 
commercial prospects.
111
  He protested that the commission’s report would tend to undermine 
public confidence in his mechanism.  Raub asked that Congress appoint another commission 
composed of “some competent practical person or persons” and engineers. He then questioned 
the credentials of the commissioners, claiming that it was “well-known that the mere theorist 
seldom possesses that mechanical knowledge which would lead to a fair judgment on an 
invention ….”112  This was apparently a swipe at two members of the commission and an attempt 
to invoke popular prejudices that denigrated people who lacked extensive hands-on experience.  
                                                 
110
 Perhaps, they wrote, this happened because the water foamed on the heated and uncovered sides of the 
boiler generating steam all but instantaneously, and perhaps because the engine continued to create steam more 
quickly than the valve could release it.  Both Raub’s and Bailey’s devices were liable to this criticism and, as a 
result, the committee declined to recommend them.  Appendix B: H. Doc. 170, 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 6-7. Three years 
earlier, the Franklin Institute had suggested in their general report that when water in the boilers was discovered to 
be low, the most prudent response was to bank the fires so as to slow and stop the generation of steam.  Jerry L. 
Mashaw, “Administration and ‘The Democracy’: Administrative Law from Jackson to Lincoln, 1829-1861,” Yale 
Law Journal 117/8 (June 2008): 1636. 
111
 Even inventors who had received government munificence could find their chances damaged by expert 
reviews.  Samuel Colt’s attempt at gaining additional appropriations for his submarine battery was practically sunk 
in 1844 by lukewarm and negative notices provided by physicist Joseph Henry, chemist Robert Hare of the 
University of Pennsylvania, and Colonel Joseph Totten of the Army Corps of Engineers.  Despite his initial 1842 
appropriation, Colt never sold the United States on his submarine battery, though he did eventually get substantial 
government contracts for his repeating firearms.  Lundeberg, Samuel Colt’s Submarine Battery, 49-52, 56. 
112
 Raub wrote that the commissioners had had used one of his safety valves calibrated for a low pressure 
engine instead of a high pressure one.  Petition of Samuel Raub, Jr. Praying for a Re-examination of his Invention of 
the Double Self-acting Safety-valve, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., February 18, 1838, H. Doc. 204, 1-2 (Appendix B). 
 162 
These commissioners, Professors Renwick of Columbia and Benjamin Silliman of Yale, could 
both be characterized as “mere theorists” because, despite their extensive knowledge, they did 
not operate steam machinery on a regular basis.
113
 
Raub also drew Pittsburgh inventor Cadwallader Evans into the debate.  Evans joined the 
voices against Raub, complaining to Petrikin’s select committee that Raub was warning 
members of the public that anyone who used Evans’s invention would be infringing on Raub’s 
patent and was thus liable to legal action.  Evans published a reply in the National Intelligencer 
stating that these claims were without merit.  In addition, Evans implied that Raub’s patent was 
invalid because Raub’s valve was not an original design and did not make use of any new 
principles.
114
 
Raub tried again in1840.  Ignoring the criticisms and questions that Renwick and the 
commission had raised about the effectiveness of his valve, Raub petitioned the 26
th
 Congress to 
apply his valve to all public vessels and to pay him for his invention.  Representative Petrikin 
was again appointed to head a select committee on the subject.
115
  Beyond considering Raub’s 
safety valve, the committee took up a wide variety of issues regarding steam vessel safety.  It 
intended to review the 1838 steamboat law and, if necessary, to craft a substantial revision.  The 
members were also interested in purchasing Raub’s valve and asked him his price to sell the 
patent rights to the United States.  Raub declined to name a figure, declaring that he was certain 
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the committee was aware of the thousands of lives and millions of dollars in property that had 
been lost in steamboat accidents, that he had labored hard to perfect his invention for the last five 
or six years, and he was sure that the committee would “do right” by him and recommend a fair 
offer.
116
  In July, a week and a half before the close of the session, Kentucky Whig Joseph 
Rogers Underwood issued an extensive report on behalf of the committee and introduced three 
bills, including one (H.R. 484) to purchase Raub’s safety valve for $25,000.117  The committee 
based the proposed legislation on the testimony of “experienced practical men” and noted that 
the mere fact of the “appalling destruction of life and property” from “steamboat disasters” 
justified government intervention, while arguing that Raub’s safety valve would provide an 
infallible warning and response in the case of danger.
118
  As part of a proposal to revise the 1838 
steamboat act, they also introduced a bill (H.R. 486) that required all steam vessels to carry 
Raub’s valves.119 
With little time left before Congress adjourned, it was difficult to get bills on the calendar 
to be considered for passage, though during the final night of the session members sometimes 
passed measures that slipped through without substantive review.
120
  However, the three bills, 
including Raub’s subsidy, were not destined to pass as such midnight legislation.  The committee 
report was ordered printed, but time ran out before the House took further action.  Raub would 
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have to wait until the second session of the 26
th
 Congress began in December 1840.  In the 
interim, he circulated petitions asking Congress to act favorably on his invention and got 
hundreds of people in Pittsburgh, New York, Washington, Baltimore and Ohio to sign them.
121
 
There were some tactical problems that weighed against H.R. 484 and H.R. 486.  First, 
they were being considered in the short session of the 26
th
 Congress, and thus had to compete 
with all the other usual business during the three-and-a-half months while the House and Senate 
met.  This was not necessarily a fatal handicap; Samuel Morse’s telegraph subsidy, for instance, 
would be authorized during the short session of the 27
th
 Congress.  However, it meant that there 
would be little time to consider the measures and that the legislation could more easily be pushed 
aside for priorities such as the time-consuming appropriations bills.  Second, because three 
steamboat-related bills were introduced together, their sponsors attempted to call them up and 
consider them as a package.  The massive overhaul of the 1838 steamboat law (H.R. 486) might 
engender extensive debate and discussion.  Raub’s subsidy was thus unlikely to slip through 
unobtrusively.  If it made it through the House, the bill’s prospects in the Senate were unclear.  
While the general issue of steamboat safety was on the Senate agenda and Maine’s John Ruggles 
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had introduced a bill (S. 148) to revise and expand the 1838 steamboat law, the Senators had not 
weighed in on a subsidy for Raub.
122
 
Another problem for Raub was he was competing with rivals like Tippett and 
Cadwallader Evans who were also memorializing the House and Senate.  The House had, in fact, 
constituted an additional select committee during the 26
th
 Congress to consider Cadwallader 
Evans’s application.123  Evans’s supporters in Pittsburgh opposed subsidies for Raub.  They 
claimed that Evans’ invention was superior and was already in use on seventeen vessels on the 
western waters.  They wrote to Congress that they had barely heard of Raub’s mechanism and, 
preying on Congressmen’s inclination not to award peculiar privileges, asked them not to 
mandate “exclusive use of the invention of any particular inventor” or to award an advantage to 
any “one machine or contrivance over another.”124 
Rhode Island steam engine manufacturer and textile industry promoter Charles T. James 
weighed in with additional objections.  He wrote that Raub’s device and theory were based on 
incorrect, or, at best, incomplete information and criticized the Petrikin committee for 
disseminating fallacious conjectures about the causes of steam explosions.  James, who later 
served as a Democratic senator and chairman of the Committee on Patents, argued, in tune with 
the Franklin Institute investigation, that the greatest danger which led to bursting boilers came 
from gradual increases of pressure, rather than from low water.  He contended that many boilers 
had exploded and flues collapsed even when there was a full supply of water in the boiler and 
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that Raub’s “safety valve could not have prevented” these. 125  James further argued that the fact 
that Raub’s valve operated without needing attention from the engineer was a weakness rather 
than a strength.  He charged that anything that made the engineer focus less on the engine could 
contribute to disaster by imbuing him with a false sense of confidence that would diminish the 
concentration that was necessary to operate the engine safely.
126
 
Raub responded to James and his other critics, asserting a combination of the low water 
and steam flashing from hot metal explanations and insisted that it was “now a well established 
fact” that almost every explosion was caused by low water.127  Most of the people who testified 
to the Petrikin committee agreed.
128
  Underwood and the other members were partial toward the 
testimony they had gathered themselves, rather than that from the Franklin Institute report or 
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Various Subjects, folder 2 of 3, Committee on Commerce (HR30A-G4.7), Records of the House of Representatives, 
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investigations by scientific experts like Renwick, while the vast majority of witnesses sided with 
Raub and endorsed his safety valve.
129
  The House made the steamboat bills a priority, but 
despite attempts by the members of the committee, the bills were repeatedly postponed, the 
session ended and Congress adjourned before the House took further action.
130
 
Raub memorialized Congress again in February 1841, urging it to purchase his invention 
and to make it public property while mandating its use on all steam engines in the United States.  
He reiterated that low water was the major cause of explosions and cited a recent disaster where 
this had been the culprit.  Raub stated that his critics’ claims had no factual support and that, if 
Charles James’ views were adopted, it would lead to many more explosions and fatalities.  He 
pointed out that the recent explosion of the steamer Cherokee took place even though it was 
equipped with Cadwallader Evans’ Safety Guard as well as gauges to measure steam 
temperature, pressure and the height of water.  His own safety valve, he noted, had not been 
installed on the doomed steamer.  The obvious implication was that Evans’ device and the other 
inventions were inferior, comparatively ineffectual, and boilers would not be safe unless they 
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carried Raub’s valve.  Raub again claimed that it was “impossible to burst a boiler or collapse a 
flue” with his valve in use.131 
Raub continued to apply for aid over the next few years.
132
  In 1845 he wrote that the 
valve was being used by steamboats in New York harbor and elsewhere and the New York 
Tribune reprinted many of his testimonials while asserting that his valves provided security 
against explosions.
133
  Though the House Naval Affairs Committee recommended purchasing his 
valve in 1845, Congress never again showed the degree of interest and support that it had in 1839 
and 1840.
134
  For one thing, Raub’s ally in the House, David Petrikin, was no longer in Congress.  
Raub did not realize it, but his best chance for a subsidy passed him by when the 26
th
 Congress 
adjourned.  By 1848 Raub was dead and his son was requesting a subsidy on behalf of himself 
and Raub’s other heirs.135 
 
4. Cadwallader Evans 
Like both Raub and Tippett, Cadwallader Evans applied to Congress for assistance for 
many years.
136
  Since Evans’ father was Oliver Evans, the American developer of the high 
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pressure steam engine, he had an inventive pedigree that Tippett and Raub could not match.  In 
addition to being an inventor, Evans and his brothers operated several manufacturing businesses, 
including a steam engine works, and he made use of the Franklin Institute’s Committee on 
Science and the Arts to critique his inventions while he was developing them.
137
 Evans served as 
an engine inspector under the 1838 Steamboat Act, and thus, in addition to his experience as a 
manufacturer, had opportunities to observe steamboats in operation on the Western river 
system.
138
 
Evans entered the contest in January 1839.  He may have been drawn into the fray before 
he was ready; he had not yet been issued a patent for his “Safety Guard” and one of his first 
moves was to respond to Samuel Raub’s criticism and launch a counterattack.139  Evans asked 
Congress to study his safety improvements and, invoking his famous father, declared that he had 
studied the principles of steam power and been manufacturing steam engines since his youth.  He 
added that for five or six years he had worked to develop an invention that would prevent steam 
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boiler explosions and had finally achieved his goal.
140
  A group of supporters in Pittsburgh also 
sent a petition expressing confidence in Evans and his mechanism.
141
 
Evans’ application arrived too late to be considered by the Renwick commission, but he 
tried again in 1840.
142
  In response, the House organized a select committee in the 26
th
 Congress 
to consider Evans’s invention.  While it was not as active as the Petrikin-led committee 
investigating Raub’s valve, its chairman and Evans’ hometown legislator, Representative 
Richard Biddle of Pennsylvania, wrote that Evans made a strong case for his Safety Guard, had 
received a positive evaluation from Professor Renwick in the past, and had presented certificates 
from people in Pittsburgh attesting to his character and accomplishments.
143
  Applying to 
Congress two years later, Evans claimed that his Safety Guard provided a “sure method” of 
preventing steam boiler explosions, had given “entire satisfaction in every instance” to the 
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steamers to which it had been applied and noted that demand for the device was “rapidly 
increasing.”  Evans asked the government to examine his invention and to adopt it on steamers 
belonging to the United States and those that carried the mail.
144
 
Like Raub, Evans claimed that it was impossible to produce an explosion with his 
invention attached to boilers, even if an engineer tried to do so “using all his talent and ingenuity 
….”145  He declared that his Safety Guard provided such flawless protection that he was willing 
to put money on it.  “Five to ten thousand dollars is now offered,” he stated in an advertisement, 
“in the form of a bet, to any man, that he cannot explode a steam boiler with my Safety Guard 
attached.”146 
Privately, Evans admitted that his Safety Guard was not as foolproof as he claimed.  He 
explained to Joseph Henry in 1845 that several vessels had experienced boiler accidents even 
with the Guard attached.  However, Evans said that the fault lay not with the mechanism, but 
with the people who oversaw it.  He asserted that in every accident the Guard had been tampered 
with so as to thwart its function.  He believed that engineers were prejudiced against the device 
because it undermined their pretensions to expertise – even people of limited knowledge and 
experience could operate an engine safely with the Safety Guard.
147
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As with Raub, Evans arranged a campaign to gain public support for his cause.
148
  His 
backers wrote to Congress, called him a “public benefactor,” and urged the House and Senate to 
use his mechanism on the steamboats in the public service.
149
  Sympathetic steamboat owners 
helped him circulate petitions, while Pittsburgh citizens and river travelers sent endorsements 
that arrived in concert with Evans’s memorials.150  In 1848 his supporters pointed out that the 
French requirement for fusible alloy safety mechanisms had brought an excellent safety record 
for more than twenty years, but that Evans’s mechanism was superior to the French design.  The 
petitioners went on to lament the recent loss of life due to explosions and urged passage of a law 
to require all steam engines, both on land and water, to use the Safety Guard.
151
 
                                                 
148
 Pennsylvania – Two Petitions of the Citizens of the City of Pittsburgh in favor of a law applying Evans’s 
Safety Guard to engines belonging to the Government of the United States, Ref’d Feb. 5, 1845, Petitions and 
Memorials referred to Committees, Committee on Patents, folder - C. Evans (HR28A-G13.3), 28
th
 Congress, 
Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, NA.  Two memorials: Memorial of Washington Miller and 171 
other passengers on the Steam Boat Yorktown, Mississippi River, Dec. 16, 1844 and A Memorial of Travelers on 
the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers for the passage of a law compelling the use of Evans Safety Guard to prevent 
explosions onboard steam vessels (Referred Feb. 20, 1845) Committee on Commerce, folder – Evans’s Safety 
Guard (HR28A-G13.3), 28
th
 Congress, Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, NA.  Memorial of 
Passengers on board Steam Boat Yorktown, that all steam vessels may be compelled to use “Evans’ Safety Guard,” 
March 17, 1848, Petitions and Memorials Referred to Committees, Committee on Commerce, folder March 6, 1848, 
to April 7, 1848 (Sen30A-H3.2), 30
th
 Congress, Records of the Senate, RG 46, NA. 
149
 Two petitions regarding Cadwallader Evans - Inhabitants of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, in favour of 
paying him for the use of his invention – safety guard for steam boats, referred Jan. 9, 1843 and Jan. 24, 1843, 
Petitions and Memorials referred to Committees, Various Subjects, Committee on Naval Affairs (HR27A-G14.3), 
27
th
 Congress, Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, NA. 
150
 Evans usually let his supporters make part of the case for him.  They called for Congress to grant him a 
subsidy while he usually limited himself to asking the government to evaluate the invention or to install the Safety 
Guard on engines belonging to the United States.  In 1842 Evans stated that his invention had been available for 
three years and was being used by about sixty steam boats on the western waters “giving entire satisfaction in all 
cases.”  He also sent an advertising flyer to Congress describing the Guard, along with charts documenting the 
proper proportions of metals to be used in the device with guidelines for the maximum temperatures and pressures.  
Petition of C. Evans, praying to have his invention for preventing explosions of steam boilers applied to the Steam 
Engines in the service of the U.S., Dec. 16, 1842, Referred Dec. 19, 1842, Committee on Naval Affairs, Petitions 
and Memorials Referred to Committees, Dec. 12, 1842 – Dec. 28, 1842 (Sen27A-G11.1), 27th Congress, Records of 
the Senate, RG 46, NA.   
By 1850, and by contrast to Samuel Raub’s tactics, Evans publicly disavowed that he was seeking to compel 
steamboat owners to adopt his Safety Guard, though he noted that many of his supporters, of their own free will, had 
requested that the government require its use and that some of them had asked the government to purchase the 
invention and then make it available to everyone.  Evans, “A Treatise on the Causes of Explosions,” 65.  For an 
exception where Evans requested a subsidy directly, see SA, March 25, 1848, 210. 
151
 Memorial of Passengers on board Steam Boat Yorktown, that all steam vessels may be compelled to use 
 173 
Evans also lined up expert endorsements as part his campaign.  In 1841 he sent a working 
model of his Safety Guard to Joseph Henry at Princeton and asked Henry to evaluate it.  Evans 
complained to Henry that inventors could rarely profit from their devices because patents 
typically expired before inventors could get “a reasonable compensation.”  Even though Evans 
persuaded some vessel owners in Pittsburgh to install his device, he needed to spread the word 
outside of the vicinity and believed that Henry’s support would help him gain the attention of 
Congress and the public.
152
   
Professor Henry thought that government patronage for inventions was justified when a 
device was based on valid and well-understood scientific principles, combined with a design to 
put it “into practical operation.”153  He had traveled extensively on steam vessels and so had 
more than an academic interest in steamboat safety.
154
  He was frequently asked for his opinion 
on technological innovations, considered it a duty to share his expertise and, as one of the most 
prominent scientists in the country, his backing could carry weight with elected officials.  Henry 
endorsed Samuel Morse’s telegraph in 1842, while his lukewarm review of Samuel Colt’s 
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submarine battery in 1844 counted against renewing Colt’s subsidy.155 After studying Evans’ 
device, in 1842 Henry wrote a favorable evaluation of the Safety Guard.  The Journal of the 
Franklin Institute later published his recommendation and Evans used the letter in his efforts to 
sell the Guard and lobby for a subsidy.
156
 
Publicizing positive reviews was a standard advertising technique,
157
 and Evans 
assembled an impressive list of people who endorsed his invention.  He wrote to Congress in late 
1842 that his Safety Guard had “received the unqualified approbation of all scientific men and 
practical engineers” who had examined it, as well as the Chief Engineer of the Navy.158  In 1850 
Evans published a pamphlet on steam engineering, which doubled as an advertisement for the 
Guard, filling more than half its pages with testimonials.
159
 
Evans had some success in getting his invention adopted even without a government 
subsidy.  By the end of 1842 he wrote that the Guard was used in about sixty vessels on the 
western waters, as well as at a steam engine establishment in Baltimore and on a boiler at the 
Washington Navy Yard.
160
  In late 1845 he claimed that his device was being used on over 150 
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vessels.
161
  Even so, Evans was disappointed that the Guard was not more popular and 
complained that steamboat owners and the public appeared apathetic about a device that would 
protect so many lives.  He was also disgusted by the fact that many engineers opposed the 
mechanism.  Still, he kept working to improve its effectiveness.  In 1845 he abandoned using 
fusible alloys in favor of a design that relied on the expansion of heated metal to trigger his 
device, then patented and marketed it as the “Improved Safety Guard.”162  With the 
modifications, Evans wrote that his invention was “now perfect and will undoubtedly prevent 
explosions which I think is manifest to every reflecting mind.”163 
Some observers provided positive, though measured, assessments of the Guard.  The 
Pittsburgh Board of Trade memorialized Congress in 1848 that a number of boats had adopted 
the invention and the Board thought it could prove beneficial, even if it was not infallible.
164
  
William W. Guthrie, who was later appointed as a local steamboat inspector in Cincinnati under 
the 1852 Steamboat Act, also wrote to Congress to praise the Safety Guard.  He asked Congress 
to purchase Evans’ patent and require its use in all steam vessels.  Guthrie wrote that while the 
device was not flawless, it was still exceptionally good at preventing explosions where undue 
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heat built up in the boilers.  Guthrie, however, believed that Evans’s supporters had raised 
expectations too high by making extreme claims on behalf of the Guard.  Despite its virtues, 
reflected Guthrie, the Guard could not prevent every possible calamity.  Guthrie wrote that it was 
unfortunate that a few explosions had happened aboard boats on which it was installed and that 
this had tended to damage the device’s reputation, despite the enthusiasm that had accompanied 
it when it was introduced.
165
 
Evans’s effort to get his Safety Guard installed on more engines was only partially 
successful, and not very profitable.  Over the years he spent perhaps $20,000 to develop and 
market it, but only earned about $800 profit.  Many vessel owners and engineers were reluctant 
to use it.  Observers thought that steamboat owners had reacted against what they believed was 
Evans’ excessive zeal to force the use of his device on the community.  Others cited its relatively 
high price as a reason that it was not more popular.
166
 
By the time Congress passed the 1852 Steamboat Act, members had been considering the 
use of fusible alloys for some time.  In 1823 the French government had become the first country 
to regulate the operation of steam vessels, and their law required every boiler to carry two fusible 
metal discs and two safety valves.
167
  Drafting the Steamboat Act in 1852, Senator John Davis 
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had included a provision to require fusible metal devices on steam boilers.  He later said that he 
had little confidence in these mechanisms, but some Western steamboat owners and their 
representatives had urged Davis to add them to the legislation.
168
  While the United States did 
not grant Evans a subsidy, the 1852 Steamboat Act nonetheless gave him a competitive 
advantage because he already had a fusible metal design in use.
169
 
This must have appeared as a great gift to Evans.  It was a virtual invitation to resume 
manufacturing and selling his original Safety Guard, which relied on a fusible metal and would 
meet the law’s requirements.  Evans still held a patent on the fusible alloy version of the Guard, 
though it had been issued in 1839 and would expire in 1853.  To take advantage of this, Evans 
applied to have this patent renewed and his request was granted a few months after the 
Steamboat Act of 1852 was enacted.
170
  With over one thousand steam vessels in the United 
States and multiple boilers on most of them, Evans stood to make thousands of dollars if he 
could persuade vessel owners to purchase and install his invention, which was already used by 
numerous vessels. 
The Steamboat Act was due to go into effect in early 1853, but it became apparent by late 
1852 that there was not enough fusible alloy available to allow steamboat owners to meet the 
law’s requirements.171  The government responded in two ways: the administration began to 
                                                                                                                                                             
would conduct heat without exposing the alloy to pressure, it would activate at the right temperature with a high 
degree of certainty the first time it was needed, and for a number of times thereafter. 
168
 The French, after they had used alloy devices for many years, had eventually abandoned them while the 
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 Cong., 2
nd
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produce the metals, while Congress gave owners extra time to comply with the requirements.
172
  
Starting in late 1852 the Navy Department began to manufacture the material at the navy yards.  
When the quality was unsatisfactory, however, in 1853 Treasury Secretary James Guthrie 
directed James C. Booth, a chemist and the head of melting and refining at the Mint in 
Philadelphia, to put together a large batch of the fusible alloy.
173
  He also asked Booth to study 
Cadwallader Evans’s Safety Guard and devise an improved version that would not violate 
Evans’ patent.174  By the summer of 1855, Booth had designed a new apparatus, prepared several 
hundred pounds of fusible metals and began to ship them to steamboat inspectors across the 
country to provide to steamboat owners at cost.
175
 
By providing an additional source of alloy, Booth’s work undermined the competitive 
edge that Evans had gained from the 1852 law while Evans was trying to use the law to increase 
the demand for his invention.  The Steamboat Act had established a Board of Supervising 
Inspectors who met to establish regulations to enforce the law.  Evans attended the Supervisors’ 
general meeting in April 1854.  There, the Inspectors clarified what type of fusible alloy devices 
they would accept as meeting the requirements of the Act.  Evans contended that their 
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interpretation mandated the use of the alloys in a way that he had already patented with his 
Safety Guard.  This would have meant that regulations required his Safety Guard be installed on 
all steam vessels subject to the 1852 Steamboat Act.
176
 
Treasury Secretary James Guthrie denied that the Supervising Inspectors had the power 
to prescribe the manner of applying the fusible alloys and insisted that they did not have the 
authority to dictate that steamboat owners use Evans’ patented article.177  While it is clear that 
Evans wanted to construe the Board’s instructions as a requirement for vessel owners to install 
his device or pay him a fee for use of a patented article, it is not clear that this was the Board’s 
intent, since they probably knew (as should have Evans) that the idea of using fusible metals had 
been described and used before Evans patented his first safety guard and that the law seemed to 
require a generic application of materials based on physical principles, rather than a particular 
patented device.  Secretary Guthrie wrote to Attorney General Caleb Cushing in 1855 for his 
opinion as to whether the inspectors could mandate that fusible alloys be applied without 
infringing on Evans’ patent.  Cushing replied that Evans was making a common and overbroad 
claim of patent rights and that he only had the right to “one particular and specific variety” of the 
many forms of fusible alloy receptacles, not to every possible version.
178
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In the meantime, Evans’ allies and supporters, engine builders and manufacturers in 
Pittsburgh, steamboat officers and engineers at Cincinnati, as well as the government steamboat 
inspectors serving in Pittsburgh and Cincinnati, petitioned Congress in 1854, asking the 
government to purchase his patent.
179
  Secretary of the Treasury Guthrie recommended against 
the purchase.  He thought that although there were plausible reasons to acquire the patent, 
obtaining it would bring temporary advantages that were far from guaranteed, as well as 
establishing a precedent that would create an “appetite for government patronage” that would 
have negative consequences.  Guthrie also noted that “if this patent is purchased, I see no reason 
why Congress should not especially favor other great interests.”180 
Evans proposed another way that he could earn money from the government.  He had 
examined the alloys that the U.S. had produced in the navy yards and found them to be of poor 
quality.
181
  Citing his years of experience making the alloys, he offered to manufacture them for 
the government in return for compensation.  Alternatively, he proposed that he be hired for 
                                                 
179
 Petition of the Steamboat Inspectors, Engine Builders and other citizens of Pittsburgh, Pa., 101 in number – 
stating the public importance of Evans’ Safety Guards for preventing explosions, and asking Congress to pass a law 
for the purchase of the Patent, etc., March 1854 (Referred April 19, 1854), Committee on Commerce, Various 
Subjects, March 20, 1854 – July 11, 1854; Petition dated at Cincinnati, of 42 Steamboat Captains and practical 
Engineers, Navigating the Ohio River, etc., asserting the great value & importance of Evans’s Safety Guards for 
preventing explosions of boilers, and asking Congress to pass a law opening the same to public use by purchase of 
the Patent or Otherwise; March 1854, Committee on Commerce, Evans’s Safety Guard; Petition of the Steamboat 
Inspectors of Cincinnati, and 38 licensed & practical engineers stating the public importance of Evans’ Safety 
Guards, for preventing explosions & praying that the invention may be thrown open to the public, by purchase or 
otherwise, March 28, 1854;  Petitions and Memorials Referred to Committees (HR33A-G4.8), 33
rd
 Congress, 
Records of the House of Representatives, RG 233, NA. 
180
 James Guthrie, Secretary of the Treasury, to Hannibal Hamlin, U.S. Senator, Washington, May 27, 1854, 
Letters Sent by the Secretary of the Treasury, 1852-1862; Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation; Steamboat 
Inspection Service, RG 41, NA. 
181
 Evans claimed in 1854 that the government-produced alloys did not, even in the most favorable 
circumstances, melt at their designated temperatures.  Evans also noted that if the government did not require the 
alloys to be applied so that they were protected from pressure it would, in effect, quickly render them ineffectual as 
their metallic components were forced apart.  This often happened to the alloys that were simply inserted into the 
boilers as fusible “plugs.”  Cadwallader Evans, “A Statement of Experiments upon the Temperature of Steam, the 
Operations of the Common Safety Valve, and upon Government Alloys: with a Description of a Newly Invented 
Safety Valve, Etc.” (Pittsburgh, PA: Keenan & Hopkins, 1854), 12-21. 
 181 
$10,000 to instruct government employees in making the alloys.
182
  Congress did not grant either 
of these requests. 
Steamboat captains and engineers who were hostile to the Steamboat Act’s requirement 
of fusible metal devices persistently resisted Evans’s Safety Guard.  Many were skeptical about 
the alloys in general and Evans’ Guard in particular.  There had always been technical concerns 
about fusible alloy devices.
183
  Experience had shown, steamboat captains later wrote, “that the 
fusible alloys change their nature and grow harder and harder every time they are melted, and are 
liable to lead engineers astray if they place dependence on this kind of safety guard.”184  
Questions about the efficacy of these mechanisms were great enough that the Senate Commerce 
Committee reported a bill in 1854 to amend the Steamboat Act which suspended the fusible 
metal requirement.
185
   
Captains also balked at the cost. They protested that the requirement could only be met 
by installing Evans’s patented device, that it failed to prevent boiler explosions and that the 
price, twenty-eight dollars for each boiler, was outrageously expensive for something they 
thought could be “profitably manufactured and put in for four dollars and fifty cents a boiler.”  
The instances where boilers equipped with the original Safety Guard had burst tended to 
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discredit it in the eyes of steamboat operators, and they wrote that the Guard was “altogether 
useless” because steamboats had exploded even with the Guard installed.186 
Cadwallader Evans himself was dead by late 1856, but his widow, Jane B. Evans, 
struggled to make profits from his invention.  The Evans’s had overseen the manufacture of 
thousands of Safety Guards, which they intended to sell at twenty-five dollars each.  However, it 
was not clear that they readily available.  One of the supervising inspectors noted in 1856 that, 
though the Guards were the best device to fulfill the Steamboat Act’s requirements for fusible 
metal apparatus, there were large portions of the country where they could not be obtained to 
fulfill the demand.  Unauthorized people were also manufacturing versions of the Guard, which 
Jane Evans claimed were of inferior quality and violated the patent.
187
 
Even with these problems, some people in the Pittsburgh steamboat and manufacturing 
communities continued to champion the Safety Guard into the 1860s.  They petitioned Congress 
to purchase the device and warned against modifying and weakening the requirement for fusible 
alloy devices.
188
  Evans’s renewed patent was due to expire in 1860, and Jane Evans applied to 
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renew it for a second time.
189
  In response, Congress introduced several bills to award Evans 
another patent extension.  The Senate Committee on Patents reported favorably, and the Senate 
passed a measure in 1862.  However, it ran into substantial opposition on the House floor, and 
the House rejected the measure despite a favorable recommendation by the House Committee on 
Patents.
190
  Jane Evans, “the poor lone woman,” as one congressman referred to her, was unable 
to persuade Congress to grant another extension for her husband’s patent.191 
 
5. Joseph Francis 
Inventors of engine mechanisms were the most persistent applicants for steam safety 
subsidies, but the inventor who probably benefited the most from the 1852 Steamboat Act was 
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Joseph Francis of New York who invented and manufactured a metallic lifeboat and saw the 
demand for his product increase after Congress passed the law. 
Francis was born in Massachusetts, but became well known as an innovative boat builder 
while working at the Novelty Iron Works in New York City.
192
  He invented a metal lifeboat in 
1816 and made improvements to it in 1837.  Francis had a good reputation in maritime circles 
and later founded his own company.
193
  His boats were constructed with airtight cylinders and 
were difficult to capsize and easy to right.
194
  The American Institute awarded Francis a gold 
medal in 1839 in recognition of the quality of his design, and his boats were carried aboard 
vessels of the Revenue Marine, the Navy, and Army.
195
  By the time Congress considered the 
1852 steamboat bill, Francis had also received a contract to construct the surfboats for the early 
national lifesaving service.
196
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In authoring the 1852 Steamboat bill (S. 223), Senator John Davis wanted steamers to 
carry at least one lifeboat made of metal because they were durable and resistant to fire.
197
  There 
was some sentiment that vessels running on the interior waters did not need lifeboats at all, since 
they were usually close to at least one bank of the river.  Davis thought this was misguided--that, 
in fact, substantial numbers of lives had been lost on steamers because, in emergencies, they 
lacked the means of transporting people short distances to the shore.  Senator Hannibal Hamlin 
of Maine, the Chairman of the Commerce Committee, supported Davis, arguing that as many as 
half of the lives that had been lost in vessel fires had occurred because they were not equipped 
with “fire-proof boats.”198 
Davis thought that Francis’ boat was the best small craft available, far superior to wooden 
boats.
199
  Former Senator John A. Dix of New York, a past chairman of the Commerce 
Committee, owned several of the craft.  Dix wrote that their galvanized iron did not rust and that 
“you can neither burn nor sink them.”200  Hannibal Hamlin later recalled that when they were 
first drafting the 1852 bill, the members of the committee had provided that steamers must be 
equipped with Francis’s lifeboat, but witnesses had testified to the committee that there were 
other metallic lifeboats available, and the senators had removed the requirement.
201
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The 1852 legislation required that steam vessels carry a metallic lifeboat and life 
preservers, but left it up to the judgment of the owners which equipment to purchase and to the 
inspectors to determine if it was of acceptable quality.  Davis stated that Joseph Francis had 
assured him that his patent was not for a generic metallic lifeboat, but for making one out of 
corrugated iron in a unique manner, and Davis told the Senate that if he thought the language of 
the measure mandated a patented article that he would “abandon it at once.”202  Opponents of the 
measure, however, were not satisfied.  Senator John P. Hale of New Hampshire charged that the 
bill favored Francis’s lifeboat by description, if not by name, and tried to have the provision for a 
metallic lifeboat removed.
203
  Davis eventually agreed to a proviso that stated that the act did not 
require the purchase of any patented lifeboat, though the House removed this provision and it did 
not make it into the law.
204
 
According to some senators, Francis was getting a considerable amount of business as a 
result of the lifeboat requirement and could not build the boats fast enough to keep up with the 
demand.  When the act was passed in August 1852, owners of over a thousand steam vessels 
needed to acquire the boats within five months.  Francis’ enterprise was based in New York, and 
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 CG, 32
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 Cong., 1
st
 sess., July 9, 1852, 1704. 
203
 Senator Hale pointed out that requiring lifeboats on many small vessels would be cumbersome and 
inconvenient.  CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jul. 12, 1852, 1739. Davis responded that the inspectors could exempt tow 
boats and ferry boats from the requirement, as well as from smaller vessels and those traveling on interior waters, 
which were only required to carry one lifeboat, not multiple ones. 
204
 Senator Hale, however, continued to oppose the bill even after this proviso.  Since Francis’ metallic lifeboat 
was the only metal craft that was readily available, even though the law would not mandate its use, the legislation 
specified the standard dimensions of Francis’ craft, twenty-five feet long and six feet, six inches wide, as the 
minimum size of a lifeboat required by the law.  In effect, as Hale pointed out, they were legislating in its favor.  
Davis replied that he had obtained the dimensions of an appropriate lifeboat, not from Joseph Francis, but from a 
naval officer whom he had consulted on the subject. CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Jul. 12, 1852, 1740-41.  The bill’s 
supporters later appeared to acknowledge that there was some validity to Hale’s argument.  Hamlin noted in 1853 
that Francis’ boat was “superior” and the “one in common use” and Senator William H. Seward of New York added 
that “there is no adequate and sufficient metallic life-boat, except Francis’s life-boat” and that Francis was “the only 
manufacturer of them in the United States.”  CG, 32nd Cong., 2nd sess., Feb. 22, 1853, 764.  Thomas Rusk of Texas, 
said that he had seen other manufacturers advertising their own metallic lifeboats and thought that Francis was not 
the only builder of such craft.   
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western owners complained that they had to come east in order to acquire the boats or have them 
shipped.  Francis was also setting up a manufacturing facility in Louisville, Kentucky that would 
service the needs of westerners.
205
  Vessel owners petitioned Congress, stating that they could 
not acquire metallic lifeboats quickly enough to comply with the law and asked for an 
extension.
206
  In response, Congress passed joint resolutions (SJR 67 and SJR 79) which allowed 
the inspectors to grant additional time to comply with the requirements and waive the mandates 
for metallic lifeboats if the owners were unable to acquire them.
207
  Still, the metallic lifeboat 
provision appears to have provided Francis with an excellent business opportunity to sell his 
products. 
 
6. Congress, Inventors and the Mechanical Option 
Under certain circumstances, members of Congress and the Executive considered 
awarding cash subsidies to inventors.  As the stories of Tippett, Raub, Evans and Francis 
suggest, these conditions included a widespread belief that particular mechanisms would address 
a public need; the perception that the technology represented an advance over current practice; 
the fact that the inventor had a good reputation and endorsements from people of scientific and 
technical background; the fact that members of the public and interest groups offered their 
support; that credible witnesses saw the invention in operation; and the fact that, within 
Congress, there were legislators who were willing to advocate on behalf of the inventor and his 
machine. 
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 See, for example, SJ, 32
nd
 Cong., 2
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 sess., Dec. 14, 1852, 35. 
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 Cong., 2
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nd
 Cong., 2
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nd
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Feb. 22, 1853, 765 & March 3, 1853, 1158. 
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For members of Congress the Mechanical Option, the process of subsidizing and 
mandating safety equipment, was a balancing act where they had to manage multiple 
inclinations.  Influenced by concern about disasters, ideological predilections, expert testimony, 
pressures from constituents, regional concerns and enthusiasm for various devices, they wanted 
to promote safety through technological advances, but resisted favoring particular inventors and 
their patented articles. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the government was more inclined to test inventions than 
it was to subsidize them with cash awards or by requiring people to use them.  Senator John 
Davis of Massachusetts was cautious about supporting subsidies because he had observed highly 
touted inventions which, after investigation, were shown to be “of so equivocal and doubtful a 
character” that any money that the government allocated would have been wasted.  He also 
believed that in most cases businessmen could themselves determine which inventions had 
“utility” and then bring them into “general use.”208  However, he thought that the government 
should supply facilities and experts to test mechanisms that had been endorsed by reputable 
mechanics or scientific men.
209
  It should avoid awarding monopoly rights that would unduly 
favor any inventor or business, but remain open to purchasing devices for government use where 
appropriate.
210
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 CG, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Feb. 23, 1838, 198.  Davis’s senate colleague, Democrat John A. Dix of New 
York, also thought that it was better to leave it to private enterprise to introduce and oversee inventions.  See 
Appendix B, S. Rpt. 135, 30
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1. 
209
 Edward D. Tippett believed that the government should only grant appropriations to test or subsidize 
inventions when the mechanisms were based on a sound understanding of science.  Memorial of Edward D. Tippett 
upon the subject of his Balloon asking to be presented with former papers presented to the Committee on Patents at 
last session to be in connection for consideration this Session, April 21, 1856, Committee on Patents and the Patent 
Office, Petitions and Memorials, April 15-May 2, 1856 (Sen34A-H14); 34
th
 Congress; Records of the Senate, RG 
46, NA.  There was more than a little irony in Tippett’s views, since his own inventions were based on incomplete 
or incorrect notions of physical principles. 
210
 Appendix B: S. Rpt. 159, 24
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess.,  1.  Though Scientific American often advocated 
energetically on behalf of inventors, the editor also feared “despotic and unjust grants of monopoly …” and urged 
his readers to mobilize and petition against extending a particular patent, William Woodworth’s lathe.  “Extension 
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Scientific American endorsed government efforts to “make prudent and unextravagant 
appropriations to test reasonable and plausible inventions … that would prove beneficial to the 
country,” while also urging caution to make sure that “unworthy” inventions did not receive 
grants based on clever marketing campaigns or the assertion of inappropriate influence.  The 
editor went on to note:  
We sympathize with an inventor of moderate means who has an apparently good 
and useful invention, but which requires an amount of capital far beyond his 
ability to test it fairly; in such a case we commend the inventor who has faith in 
his project, in soliciting Congress to test it fairly, and demonstrate its usefulness 
to benefit man.  But we are opposed to Congress voting money either to purchase 
an untried patent, or testing the merits of any new invention when the owners of 
the one or the author of the other has capital at his command, and abundant ability 
to introduce it into public use.
211
 
Phrased this way, the editor left open the possibility that it could be appropriate for 
Congress to buy a proven patent that was “a good and useful invention.” 
In general, Whigs were more likely than Democrats to support subsidies for technology, 
though enough Democrats supported this form of aid to suggest that partisanship was not the 
primary determinant.
212
  Samuel Colt’s subsidy in 1842, for example, was combined with a 
                                                                                                                                                             
of the Woodworth Patent,” SA 7/20 (Jan. 31, 1852): 157.  Hindle and Lubar, Engines of Change, 92.  For more on 
the extension of Woodworth’s patent see Cooper, “A Patent Transformation,” 312-16. 
211
 “Money Paid by Government for Inventions,” SA 8/28 (March 26, 1853): 221. 
212
 Samuel Morse and Samuel Colt received their subsidies from the 27
th
 Congress, which had Whig majorities 
in both houses.  In the House of Representatives, more Whigs than Democrats supported Morse’s subsidy.  Israel, 
From Machine Shop to Industrial Laboratory, 39.  National pride, specifically the desire not to be outdone by 
British scientific advances and enterprise, was one motivation of supporters of Morse’s telegraph.  Report of the 
Committee on Commerce on Electro-Magnetic Telegraphs, to accompany bill H.R. No. 641, 27
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 
Dec. 30, 1842, H. Rept. 17, 1.  Democrats F.O.J. Smith of Maine and New Yorker Charles Ferris, as well as Whig 
William Boardman of Connecticut, advocated on behalf of Morse in the House of Representatives.  Kenneth 
Silverman, Lightning Man: The Accursed Life of Samuel F. B. Morse (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 217-18.  
While presumably Smith saw some value for the country in Morse’s telegraph, he also had a financial interest in 
Morse’s success.  Ferris and Boardman were excited about the invention and believed it represented a worthwhile 
advance, which the government ought to encourage.  The 30
th
 Congress, which had a Whig majority in the House, 
also voted in favor of a subsidy for Charles Grafton Page’s experimental railway engine.  Missouri Democratic 
Senator Thomas Hart Benton served as Page’s foremost champion in the Capitol.  Benton thought that Page’s 
machine would contribute to western development, as the mining industry would benefit from an increased demand 
for the zinc in Page’s batteries.  Post, “The Page Locomotive,” 147, 151-52.  The appropriations for Morse and Page 
were approved by Whig presidents John Tyler and Zachary Taylor.  Even a political and fiscal conservative like 
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measure to test steam safety devices and supported by seventy-four percent of Whigs and fifty-
eight percent of Democrats in the House, while the Senate passed the measure without a roll call 
vote.
213
 
Because there was little recorded debate and no roll call votes on subsidizing steam safety 
devices, there is limited information from which to draw conclusions, but it is clear that members 
from both major parties introduced and endorsed appropriations for these mechanisms.
214
  
Democratic Senator John Tipton of Indiana remarked that “Congress could do nothing better 
than to patronize an invention which scientific and practical men had recommended.”215  By 
favoring the purchase of safety inventions, western Democrats like Tipton may have reflected the 
concerns of their constituents, since steam vessel accidents were more common on the western 
rivers and lakes than elsewhere.
216
  In addition to regional concerns, local boosterism played a 
role.  The congressman from inventor Samuel Raub’s district in Pennsylvania chaired the 
committee that introduced two of the bills to subsidize Raub’s safety valve, while congressmen 
from Cadwallader Evans’ district spoke in favor of his Safety Guard.  In the cases of both Raub 
and Evans, groups of local citizens wrote to Congress to support their fellow Pennsylvanians.
217
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Tyler could advocate for government intervention to foster technical advances when he thought it would address 
issues of national defense and when national pride was at stake.  Tyler observed in a message to Congress in 1841 
that the United States ought not to be left behind other nations that were developing modern steam navies and that 
the U.S. could keep up if “our fellow-citizens receive proper encouragement and direction from Government.” SJ, 
27
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., June 1, 1841, 14.   
213
 Appendix C: H.J.R. 19, 27
th
 Cong., 1
st 
sess.   
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 See Appendix A.  Democrats David Petrikin of Pennsylvania and George W. Owens of Georgia sponsored 
H.R. 365, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess.  Petrikin and Whig Joseph Rogers Underwood of Kentucky sponsored H.R. 484, 26
th
 
Cong., 1
st
 sess., while Democrat Richard Franklin Simpson of South Carolina sponsored H.R. 594, 28
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 
sess. 
215
 CG, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Feb. 23, 1838, 198. 
216
 Western Democrats like Tipton were also more inclined to support a greater degree of government 
intervention than their southern co-partisans and evolved a history of splitting with their party by supporting federal 
financing for internal improvements in the west.  Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of Party: Congressional Voting 
Behavior, 1841-1852 (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 56-57, 69, 83-84. 
217
 See Appendix A.  Representative David Petrikin of Pennsylvania championed a subsidy for Samuel Raub, 
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Inventors touted their inventions.  A committee of the Wheeling, Virginia Board of Trade 
noted:  
Scarcely a year has passed without some invention, deemed by the inventor and 
his friends the great desideratum, being presented to the public; and we now find 
upwards of four hundred different models have been placed in the Patent Office 
designed for that purpose, many of which have been more or less used, and others 
have died on the hands of the inventors, because deemed unworthy of a trial by 
those who had charge of steam navigation.
218
 
The possibility of receiving government support, along with the prospect of alleviating the 
dangers to life and property, served as a stimulus for inventors.
219
  Considering the number of 
inventors in the United States, it is likely that many of them would have dedicated time and 
effort to work on safety apparatus even without the prospect of a subsidy.
220
  However, since 
many inventors asked the government for aid, it is also logical to conclude that the prospect of 
federal rewards gave them an additional incentive to experiment in this area and drew inventive 
talent to work on the problems of steam safety. 
Inventors submitted a broad range of plans to improve steamboat safety, many to prevent 
boiler explosions.  Some mechanisms, like Edward D. Tippett’s safety steam engine, were 
primitive or poorly designed.
221
  Tippett did not have the inventive ability, lobbying skill or 
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 “Report of the Committee of the Board of Trade of the City of Wheeling, Appointed to Inquire into the 
cause of Steamboat Disasters and Explosions … Appointed by the Board, January 4, 1848” in Appendix B: S. Doc. 
4, 31
st
 Cong., Special sess. 
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 Report of the Commissioner of Patents showing the operations of the Patent Office during the year 1843, 
28
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1844, S. Doc. 150, 276. 
220
 Later in the nineteenth century, “numerous skilled mechanics and other creative technicians … inevitably 
clustered around the industry,” to devise technical innovations for the railroad industry.  Steven W. Usselman, 
Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840-1920 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 99. 
221
 “Spheroidal State of Water,” SA 5/34 (May 11, 1850): 272. 
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public support to receive serious consideration from Congress.
222
  However, his financial needs 
and his belief in his plans led him to continue asking for aid even after numerous rejections. 
Samuel Raub, on the other hand, came close to earning a subsidy.  Raub’s adept lobbying 
campaign, combined with favorable testimony and advocacy within Congress helped convince 
several representatives to introduce legislation in his favor.  Raub’s Safety Valve had some 
clever features, but he believed that by focusing on one factor that contributed to explosions, the 
problem of low water in boilers, he was solving all of them.  Still, Raub’s best chance for a 
subsidy was spoiled, not by the technical limitations of his device, but by the vagaries of the 
legislative process which left his bills unaddressed as Congress adjourned in 1840.  Among 
inventors, persistence was a virtue, but not a guarantee of success.  They had to wait while 
committees reported, bills were introduced or Congress acted upon them.
223
 
Cadwallader Evans was in a position to profit from a competitive advantage he derived 
from the 1852 Steamboat Act but proved himself a better inventor than a businessman.  Evans’ 
Safety Guard showed remarkable ingenuity and was based on sound physical principles, but it 
was not infallible.  His quest for government support led him to abandon one form of it to pursue 
an earlier version with features that made it less reliable with extended use.  Some steamboat 
owners and operators were also prejudiced against the Guard, in part because of its high cost.  
Evans could not counter the fact that many potential customers mistrusted his mechanism or the 
fact that the government offered alternative means to fulfill the requirements of the legislation. 
                                                 
222
 Historian Joel Mokyr has noted that some resistance to technological change was both inevitable and 
appropriate, since it would be both inefficient and tremendously expensive to try and implement every “hare-brained 
technological idea.”  Joel Mokyr, “Technological Inertia in Economic History,” Journal of Economic History 52/2 
(June 1992): 328.  Some inventions, like Tippett’s, deserved to fail. 
223
 Samuel Morse labored for four years to get a subsidy and was nearly destitute before Congress granted it in 
1843.  Carleton Mabee, The American Leonardo: A Life of Samuel F. B. Morse (1943; reprint New York, NY: 
Octagon Books, 1969), chapter 20. 
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Inventors, the public and representatives of the government were all liable to the 
seductive promise that one perfect invention could prevent boiler explosions in all cases.  
Perhaps, as Alexis de Tocqueville observed, Americans were naturally inclined to seek technical 
fixes for their problems because, eager to improve their condition, they thought that “every new 
method that leads by a shorter road to wealth, every machine that spares labor, every instrument 
that diminishes the cost of production, every discovery that facilitates pleasures or augments 
them, seems to be the grandest effort of the human intellect.”224 
Playing before such an audience, inventors overstated the effectiveness of their 
mechanisms by claiming they offered foolproof protection against explosions.  This attracted 
government interest and supporters.  However, when the devices failed to meet these 
expectations, this could engender a more general cynicism as to whether any mechanical device 
could prevent or alleviate steam vessel disasters.
225
  Some skepticism was appropriate because 
there were limits on what mechanical devices could accomplish.  Patent Examiner Charles 
Keller, for one, concluded that “no apparatus of safety can ever dispense with the services of an 
intelligent, skilful, and prudent engineer, thoroughly versed in the theory and practice of the 
steam engine, the properties of steam, and the metals of which boilers are constructed, and the 
nature of combustion.”226  The 1849 Patent Office report emphasized the fact that machinery 
could not do everything in a world where humans were an important part of technological 
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systems.
227
   James C. Booth at the U.S. Mint came to a similar conclusion.  “It appears to me,” 
he wrote, “that the universal search after a never failing specific remedy leads men to overlook 
the more general efficacy of combined remedies for an evil.”228  With the Steamboat Act of 
1852, Congress acknowledged the notion that “combined remedies” were an appropriate method 
to address the problem of steam vessel accidents, and it integrated four different types of 
legislative policies—informational, mechanical, penal and regulatory—into a hybrid form of 
protective legislation.  
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Miscellaneous Correspondence Received by the Secretary of the Treasury, 1852-1862 (Bound Volume), Bureau of 
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CHAPTER 5 
“TO REGULATE AND IMPROVE” 
 
1. Introduction 
Astonishingly, in the years up to 1849, about 44% of the steamboats built in the 
Mississippi Valley and Gulf of Mexico were destroyed by accidents that killed over 2,500 
people.1  Legislators were personally familiar with the dangers of steamboat travel.  As one 
committee noted in 1845, “of the 275 members of Congress, coming, as they do, from every 
district in the United States, not one gets to his post without traveling some of the route by 
steam.”2  Other legislative bodies were aware of the problem.  While Congress was considering a 
steamboat bill in 1838, the Mississippi state legislature passed a resolution noting that “the great 
public, national, and universal advantages resulting to individuals and to States, to commerce and 
to intercourse from the use of steamboat navigation, seem to be greatly diminished by the risk 
and waste of life” on American waters.  The legislators thought that the operators of the vessels 
were reckless and that their “inexperience, carelessness, and incapacity” went unchecked 
because of their “immunity from punishment and responsibility.”  They wrote that it was beyond 
the capability of Mississippi or any individual state to address the problem and asked Congress 
to pass a law “to regulate and improve the steamboat navigation of the rivers in the western 
                                                 
1
 According to government estimates, 1,656 steamers had been built in the Mississippi Valley and the Gulf of 
Mexico up to 1849.  Of these, 736 had been destroyed: 419 were sunk, the largest portion by snags, while 104 were 
destroyed by fire, 168 by explosions and 45 by collisions.  The total loss of property, including the vessels and 
cargoes, was estimated at $18.3 million.  The total number of lives lost, up to December 1848, was estimated at 
2,563, with 2,097 injured.  CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., July 7, 1852, 1667. 
2
 Appendix B: H. Rep. 115, 28
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., 1.  See also Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in 
Administrative History, 1829-1861 (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1954), 442-3.  During debate on the 
1852 steamboat bill, Senator Thomas Rusk of Texas stated that "The perils accompanying steamboat navigation … 
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thousand miles from this place to my home." CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Aug. 28, 1852, 2426. 
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portion of the United States.”3  The fact that a legislature in the Deep South requested 
congressional action on this subject despite its tendency to be wary of central government 
intervention indicates the broad support that developed in favor of a national policy. 
Congress regulated steamboats in response to repeated disasters, as well as demands by 
constituents and interest groups.4  Catastrophes drew public attention to the dangers of travel and 
acted as catalysts for change by conveying a sense of urgency in favor of remedial action and 
mobilized support for government intervention.
5
  As early as 1832 one congressional committee 
noted that “many of our fellow citizens … unite in their demands … that Government, 
possessing the competent power and authority, throw around the lives and fortunes of those thus 
exposed [to the dangers from steamboat boiler explosions], all the safeguards which a wise and 
prudent legislation can give.”6  The general sentiment among members of Congress was, as one 
observer expressed it in late 1837, that the “public feeling demands some legislation on the 
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Rhetoric in the Steamboat Bill of 1838 (Amityville, NY: Baywood Publishing Company, Inc., 2002), 51.  In 1838, 
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Representative Preston King, Democrat of New York, who reminded the House of the destruction of the steamer 
Henry Clay while the 1852 bill (S. 223) was awaiting action. CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
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 sess., Aug. 7, 1852, 2127.  For 
similar comments, see Aug. 25, 1852, 2345 and Aug. 28, 1852, 2427.  In a parallel vein the following decade, 
disasters sparked the passage of a federal law that forbade shipping explosives on vessels carrying passengers in 
1866.  Mark Aldrich, “Regulating Transportation of Hazardous Substances: Railroads and Reform, 1883-1930, 
Business History Review 76/2 (Summer 2002): 270. 
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 Kathleen Kemp noted that similar circumstances led Congress to create the Federal Aviation Administration 
in 1958 after three aircraft collisions.  After the agency was established, Congress responded to subsequent accidents 
by increasing the FAA’s appropriations while members from both major parties supported the increases.  Kemp 
surmises that intervening was attractive to legislators because they could reap political benefits by showing that they 
were “doing something for both constituents and the larger public.”  Kathleen A. Kemp, Accidents, Scandals and 
Political Support for Regulatory Agencies,” Journal of Politics, v. 46, no. 2 (May 1984): 402, 404-6, 420-21.  The 
quotation is from 406. 
6
 Appendix B: H. Rept. 478, 22
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess., 1. 
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subject and it must be given.”7  They were certain Congress had the power to act by using the 
commerce clause and the “police power” to “prescribe the mode and manner of using [private 
property] … to prevent its abuse, to the injury or annoyance of others, or of the public.”8  In 
1838 and 1852 Congress required that steam vessels be inspected and set standards for safe 
operation.9  It passed these laws with overwhelming support in both the House and Senate. 
Just because a broad spectrum of Americans backed federal intervention did not 
guarantee that Congress would act in any given year.  Steamboat bills were introduced most 
years from 1830 to 1852, but only in 1838, 1843 and 1852, did legislators push them to passage 
at times when they and the public were particularly distressed about accidents.10  Passing a law 
was a contingency-laden process: sponsors held bills in committee as they gathered information; 
opportunities to consider measures slipped by as Congress debated other issues.  The bicameral 
system made it challenging because the two houses often did not coordinate their actions. 
Successful bills needed advocates in both houses to report them and guide them through the floor 
proceedings, and this usually depended on a member of a responsible committee taking the 
initiative to push for the measure.  Even when a bill passed one house with widespread support, 
it often came to a standstill in the other.11 
                                                 
7
 George Curtis to Sen. Nehemiah Rice Knight, Dec. 23, 1837, Committee Reports and Papers, Various Select 
Committees, Dec. 29, 1837, S. 1 (Sen29A-D19), Records of the Senate, RG 46, NA.   
8
 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 12th ed., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., ed. 4 vols. (Boston, MA: 
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Even when a bill was passed, there was no guarantee that it would include the extensive 
regulatory features that Congress eventually enacted in 1852.  The Democratic sponsors of the 
1838 steamboat law pushed for legislation that emphasized a Penalty Option, which was 
supposed to work by threatening steamboat operators with lawsuits and prosecution when 
accidents occurred. 
Critics quickly observed that the inspections established by the 1838 law were ineffectual 
and called for stronger action in response to ongoing disasters.  Members of Congress proposed 
changes almost every year.12  More than a decade later, on February 18, 1852, Senator John 
Davis of Massachusetts unveiled a proposal that comprehensively overhauled the 1838 law.13  
His bill, S. 223, became the Steamboat Act of 1852.14  Davis’s proposals reflected his Whiggish 
comfort with using government power to improve society,15 but also showed his talents as a 
legislative craftsman as he integrated features from earlier plans with innovative regulatory 
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sufficient appropriations to assure safe water transportation in interior portions of the nation. 
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provisions for administrative oversight.16  Davis was able, to a greater extent than previous bill 
drafters, to compose legislation that anticipated the difficulties of administering a national 
system that would oversee the construction and operation of more than a thousand vessels. 
Steamboat legislation was not as politically divisive as many other topics.  In the 1830s, 
prominent leaders from both parties, such as Andrew Jackson and Daniel Webster, endorsed 
government intervention in steamboat operation.17  The parties did not mention the issue in their 
national platforms and newspaper coverage from the time does not suggest that it became a 
campaign issue.  It also did not attract the same kind of partisan rancor as measures like the 
national bank, protective tariff and federal land policy.  Despite partisan-tinged differences 
between the 1838 and 1852 laws, in the 1830s, 40s and 50s Democratic sponsors set aside their 
ideological preferences for small government to draft legislation which included extensive 
regulatory features.18  Democratic presidents also believed in the constitutionality and 
appropriateness of steamboat regulation, as James K. Polk and Franklin Pierce, both of whom 
vetoed rivers and harbors bills and questioned their constitutionality, nonetheless assumed that 
Congress had the authority to regulate steamboats “for the better security of passengers” and 
dictate “the proper construction and arrangement of steam vessels and all passenger ships.”19 
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2. From “The Spirit of Intelligent Enterprise” to “Suitable Penalties in Case of Disasters” 
William C. Redfield, a steamboat builder and Agent of the Steam Navigation Company 
of New York, wrote in 1831 that having the government conduct inspections and prescribe 
uniform standards for equipment and operations would do more harm than good.20  Many 
steamboat operators shared his view and wanted no interference from Congress.21  They 
attributed their success to their own “inventive and discriminative powers, prudent foresight, and 
persevering spirit … [driven by the] spirit of intelligent enterprise, [and] producing results which 
have … been more and more favorable to the security and advantage of the public.”22  Some 
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members of the government shared this outlook, believing that intervention would be 
counterproductive.  James Monroe’s Secretary of the Treasury, William Crawford, discouraged 
Congressional action in 1825, writing that, in cases like this, “legislative enactments are 
calculated to do mischief, rather than to prevent it.”23 
Laissez-faire attitudes were somewhat more justified in the East, where steam travel was 
safer, than in the West.24  Owners and masters of western boats drove them hard and wanted to 
get their money’s worth.  Recalling common practices, Riverman Emerson W. Gould criticized 
steamboat overseers as callous and careless, writing that accidents were 
almost wholly the result of bad management, were set down by [owners] as 
among the unavoidable chances of navigation, and instead of adopting measures 
to prevent them, they were deliberately subtracted from the supposed profits, as 
matters of course.  As the boat was not expected to last more than five or six 
years, at best, and would probably be burned up, or sunk within that period, it was 
considered good economy to reduce the expenditures, and to make money by any 
means, during the brief existence of the vessel.  Boats were hastily and slightly 
built, furnished with cheap engines, and placed under the charge of wholly 
incompetent persons ... the most criminal indifference to the safety of the boat and 
those on board [was] observable during the trip.25 
These factors created a recipe for danger and editors like Hezekiah Niles responded by 
vilifying masters and owners for “criminal carelessness or fool-hardiness.”26  Others blamed the 
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greed of proprietors, decried the “legalized murders,” urged relatives of those killed to sue 
companies for damages and dreamed of avenging the slain and wounded.27  The only thing that 
would change the behavior of captains and engineers and prevent disasters, wrote the editor of 
Scientific American, was the “certain fear of punishment.”28  Support for a Penalty Option grew 
from these emotional responses, but also from the belief that tough criminal and monetary 
penalties would improve future conduct.  According to Niles, “prudence must be taught through 
the pockets of proprietors – and feeling will follow the infliction of adequate damages, until it 
shall be so arranged that capital punishments are awarded for foolhardiness or base neglect.”29  If 
“prompt punishment” was meted out, wrote Scientific American, “fear would act as a restraint,” 
on the owners and crew,30 and if consequences were severe enough, wrote the New York Daily 
Times, including forfeiting corporate charters when accidents resulted in loss of life, steamboat 
operators might provide the protection that their passengers deserved.31 
Some policy makers agreed.  Though, as stated earlier, Treasury Secretary Crawford had 
discouraged government intervention in 1825, he also argued that steamboatmen would become 
more cautious and responsible if they were punished when they misbehaved, and it would 
therefore be appropriate to “subject the owners and managers of those boats to suitable penalties 
in case of disasters, which cannot fail to render the masters and engineers more attentive, and the 
owners more particular in the selection of those officers.”32  Jacksonian Democrats appreciated 
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this argument.  While Democrats sometimes supported government intervention favoring 
economic growth and accepted that certain forms of commercial regulation could be both 
constitutional and appropriate, they were uncomfortable having the government exercise control 
over private businesses.33  Also leery of putting power in the hands of unelected administrators, 
they tended to favor legislation which relied more on penalties than regulation and depended on 
informers to bring violations to the attention of the courts, prosecution by United States 
Attorneys, lawsuits by injured parties, and enforcement by the judiciary.34 
If they were to use the Penalty Option as a tactic to prevent accidents, lawmakers 
assumed that steamboat operators understood the reasons that boilers exploded and other 
disasters occurred, and that captains, owners and crews simply needed to be persuaded, or 
intimidated, to avoid practices that created undue risks.  When Representative Charles Wickliffe 
introduced a steamboat bill in 1832, he included provisions to have boats inspected and boilers 
tested, but raised doubts whether these features were worthwhile by urging the government not 
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to interfere with managing the vessel, instead urging “rewards and punishments” to guard against 
misconduct.35  President Andrew Jackson pursued a similar line of reasoning, contending in his 
1833 Annual Message that, since steam machinery was improving and science was gaining a 
better understanding of steam power, the only reason that disasters kept occurring must be “the 
result of criminal negligence.”  Jackson thought that the government ought to pass some 
“precautionary and penal legislation” in response.36  In 1836 Jackson’s Secretary of the Treasury, 
Levi Woodbury, argued for “subjecting [steamboat] commanders, and … their owners, to … 
severe penalties in cases of carelessness or neglect [that were] destructive to property or life.”37 
Like Jackson, President Martin Van Buren also called for Congress to intervene.  Van 
Buren focused congressional attention on the issue in his Annual Message of 1837 at a time 
when concern was at a high level in response to recent disasters.38  Treasury Secretary Woodbury 
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offered additional guidance and, at the opening of the long session of the Twenty-fifth Congress 
in December, asked the House and Senate to assure that boiler metal was strong, vessels were 
properly constructed, and that the government punish steamboat owners who did not adopt “all 
approved safeguards [i.e. technical improvements] against the calamities of explosions, 
conflagrations and wrecks.”39 
But Woodbury was not the key player in 1837 and 1838.  Senator Felix Grundy of 
Tennessee assumed the lead role when he was appointed chairman of a Select Committee on 
Steam.40  A Democrat and ally of former President Jackson, Grundy, like Jackson, favored 
legislating through the Penalty Option.  Democrats made up a majority of Grundy’s committee 
and he reported a bill that required steamboat owners to have their boats inspected, but deleted 
regulatory requirements to have inspectors designate the maximum safe pressure for the boilers 
and test them with a hydraulic pump.41  Grundy told the Senate that the committee had not 
provided for testing the boilers because steamboat “masters and engineers” opposed it.42  Neither 
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did the committee provide for a program to inspect boiler metal and assure safe construction of 
hulls, though these had been recommended by the Franklin Institute and by Woodbury.  
Grundy’s committee also declined to mandate examining and licensing pilots and engineers 
because they were not certain how to set it up.43 
While Grundy may have believed that testing boilers was a bad idea and that the 
committee was not prepared to devise a system to examine and license steamboat personnel, the 
evidence indicates that he and the other members preferred a law which emphasized retribution 
over regulation.  The committee had access to earlier bills which provided examples of how a 
system of licensing could be framed and could also have turned to the Franklin Institute report 
for suggestions.44  The committee papers show they had even outlined some procedures for 
inspections, designating safe maximum working pressures for boilers, mandating various 
practices of operation, spelling out requirements for training and assessing engineers, as well as 
requiring safety devices.  However, they included none of these provisions in the bill they 
reported.45  Instead, Grundy later said that he “deemed it probably sufficient to punish … neglect 
and misconduct, when disaster should actually occur.”46  By leaving most of the regulatory 
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features out of the bill, S. 1 reflected Grundy’s priorities, providing that when “misconduct, 
negligence or inattention” by masters or crew members resulted in the loss of life, they would be 
charged with manslaughter and, if convicted, could serve from two to ten years at hard labor.47  
One of Grundy’s allies, Senator Robert Strange of North Carolina, agreed that these penalty 
provisions would assure the safety of passengers.48 
In addition to playing a crucial role in shaping S. 1 in committee, Grundy functioned as 
floor manager to oversee the amendment process and push his version of the bill through the 
Senate in January 1838.  He directed the defeat of amendments that would have required more 
safety equipment, including life preservers and multiple navigation lights.49  He also opposed 
efforts, supported by Whigs, to increase the bill’s regulatory requirements.50  Senator Oliver 
Smith, for one, thought that many accidents happened because of “ignorance or want of skill,” 
rather than recklessness, and offered to draft a provision to examine and license personnel if 
                                                                                                                                                             
same may be said of pilots, by whose acts of positive carelessness boats, with their cargoes and passengers, pilots 
and crew are sunk, and totally and forever lost.”  Appendix B: William C. Anderson to George M. Dallas, March 13, 
1848 in S. Doc. 4, 31
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 sess., Jan. 22, 1838, 124.  In the House, David Petrikin (D, PA) made a similar point that 
“he preferred leaving the captains to their responsibility: prosecute them in case of accident, and let them guard 
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as “prima facie evidence of … misconduct” in S. 1 because it would otherwise be difficult to prove that such 
misconduct occurred.  Senator Oliver Smith moved an amendment to that effect, which did not succeed at the time.  
NWR, Jan. 27, 1838, 347.  The prima facie provision was later added and became part of the law.  5, Stat L., 304, 
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th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Jan. 22, 1838, 124-5 and Jan. 24, 1838, 128-9.  NR, Jan. 27, 1838, 346 and 347.  
Hunter, Steamboats, 533. 
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 See Burke, "Bursting Boilers," 16: "The Whigs," writes Burke, "appear to have seen the situation as one in 
which the federal government should use its powers and interpose firmly."  However, the congressional Democratic 
majority "hewed to the doctrine that enlightened self-interest should motivate owners to provide safe operation." 
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Grundy and the committee members would not.51  Smith also proposed an amendment which 
forbade steamboat racing, which was widely believed to lead to recklessness.  As he explained it, 
he wanted to engage in “preventative justice,” rather than prosecuting “crimes after they had 
been committed.”  Smith stated, “[I] would rather be the means of saving the lives of the crew 
and passengers of one boat, than of punishing, by incarceration in the walls of a prison, all the 
surviving officers of boats that may be blown up in the world.”52  Grundy, however, opposed the 
amendment and two-thirds of the Democrats lined up with him to defeat it by a vote of 21 to 
15.53  In general, the Senate followed Grundy’s lead and preserved the essence of the 
committee’s version of S. 1.  Though Senate Whigs would have preferred additional regulatory 
requirements in the bill, they ultimately supported the final version that was favored by Grundy 
and the Democrats, and the senators passed S. 1 without a contested roll call vote.54 
 Grundy had guided S.1 through the Senate in less than two months, but the House of 
Representatives acted more slowly.  Forwarded to the House in January 1838, the bill was 
referred to the Judiciary Committee, which made a few minor changes and sent it to the 
Committee of the Whole in April, where it sat on the table.55  Steamboat owners and captains 
objected to S. 1, and this, along with a busy calendar as Congress grappled with the problems in 
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th
 Cong., 2
nd
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 SJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
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 HJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Jan. 25, 1838, 316-17.  The Judiciary Committee does not appear to have dealt with 
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naturalization laws.  HJ, 25
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Feb. 19, 1838, 465. 
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the economy, may have slowed its consideration.56  The fact that a measure, which later enjoyed 
wide support, could gather dust on the table, illustrates a pitfall of the legislative process.  While 
the Committee of the Whole allowed members to review and amend legislation in an informal 
manner, bills were considered in a regular order and could wait for an extended period before 
they were considered.  It could be a place of indefinite delay and was derided as the “tomb of the 
Capulets,” where legislation was sent to expire.57  To jump a bill to the head of the line, 
advocates needed to push for expedited consideration, and no one in the House took the bill in 
his charge as Grundy had in the Senate.  As the House waited, the explosions of the Moselle and 
Oronoko in April renewed national attention to the problem.58  However, it was not until after the 
explosion of the steamer Pulaski off the Carolina coast that Samuel Cushman of New Hampshire 
and Richard Biddle of Pennsylvania called up S. 1 on June 16, 1838.59  Biddle reminded the 
House that this was a vital issue “affecting the lives of all who traveled by steam,” and majorities 
from both major parties, including 64% of Democrats and 72% of Whigs, agreed to consider it 
by a vote of 121 to 57.60  Because this was a procedural vote, it is not clear that the members 
who opposed suspending the rules were fighting against the bill itself.  They may have simply 
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preferred to continue with the regular order of business.  In any case, those who voted “nay” did 
not later demand a roll call vote on passage and the fact that the House passed the bill without a 
contested vote indicates that opponents were not deeply committed to defeating the measure. 
 The House’s deliberations on S. 1 resembled those in the Senate.  Chairman of the 
Judiciary Committee Francis Thomas mirrored Grundy’s role as floor manager and the majority 
tended to defer to his recommendations and those of other members of the committee.61  Backers 
like Representative David Petrikin, a Pennsylvania Democrat and champion of Samuel Raub’s 
safety valve, cited recent disasters as reasons to act and Petrikin pleaded that “the voice of 
humanity … called loudly for some legislation to guard the lives of our citizens from the 
recklessness of persons intrusted [sic] with the command of steamboats.”62 
Overall, the House made few changes to S. 1 and defeated attempts by some members to 
increase the bill’s regulatory attributes.63  The House passed the measure without a roll call vote 
and sent it back to the Senate, which amended it by adding Daniel Webster’s proviso to make 
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233, NA.  One minor regulatory addition provided for inflammable steering apparatus.  This resulted in problems 
which are examined in Chapter 3.  Some versions of S. 1 and its proposed amendments are available in digital 
format: Library of Congress, American Memory, Lawmaking, Senate Bills and Resolutions, 25
th
 Congress, S.1, 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsb&fileName=019/llsb019.db&recNum=125. 
 211 
explosions “prima facie evidence of negligence,” then passed it, also without a roll call vote.  
The House approved the final version.64  President Van Buren signed it into law on July 7, 1838. 
Effective in October, the 1838 law required steamboat owners to make a new enrollment 
with the Customs Service and subjected them to fines if they did not comply.  The law provided 
for inspections, but did not specify how these were to be conducted, and did not spell out 
qualifications for the inspectors, or indicate what safety standards the vessels needed to meet, 
save that the inspectors certify that the boilers were “sound and fit for use” and the hull of the 
vessel was “in all respects seaworthy.”  The law mandated that boats employ skilled engineers, 
but did not stipulate what qualifications were needed.  It also contained a few brief requirements 
for safety equipment.65   
The center of the 1838 steamboat act was the manslaughter provision, which stated that 
captains and crew members could be prosecuted if their “misconduct, negligence or inattention” 
resulted in the loss of life.  A clause made the injurious escape of steam prima facie evidence of 
negligence, so that the owner or crew members would be presumed guilty and would have to 
demonstrate their innocence, and was intended to lend further weight to the penalties by making 
it easier to convict wrongdoers.66  Though the regulatory features in the 1838 law were vague 
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and undeveloped, the threat of punishment in the case of explosions represented a fist ready to 
strike at owners and crews who transgressed.67 
 
3. “Existing Laws of the United States Are Insufficient” 
Detractors criticized the 1838 act while it was under consideration and called for changes 
after it was passed.68  Some thought the law was “totally inadequate” because it would do little to 
assure the construction of “vessels and machinery of suitable strength,” or “secure a competent 
number of skilful and prudent officers.”69  Some wanted to reinstate and expand the regulatory 
features in S. 1 that had been discarded in committee or defeated on the floor.70  A number also 
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objected that it was unjust to force operators to prove their innocence in the case of an explosion 
and unfair that the law seemed to allow steamboat operators to be prosecuted for the actions of 
their crews.71 
A massive 1838 report compiled by the Treasury Department showcased the differences 
over whether or how to alter the law.72  Printed shortly after the law went into effect, it included 
hundreds of pages of testimony on the practices aboard steamboats, and many of the 
correspondents asked for an increase in government regulation.73  Interested parties weighed in 
over the next several years, including the Massachusetts legislature, which in 1840 charged that 
the “existing laws of the United States are insufficient, and not properly enforced.”74   
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Commentators asked Congress for additional intervention into the 1850s.75  Critics of the 
1838 act differed as to the path the government should take.  Some policy makers wanted to 
continue working within the framework of a penalty-centered law using “enhanced civil and 
criminal liability to promote steamboat safety.”76  Representatives and officials who supported 
this approach included Whigs who defended the property rights of businesses and were 
sympathetic to commercial interests, like Daniel Webster, as well as Democrats who doubted 
that regulation could be effective.77  Among the latter was Commissioner of Patents Edmund 
Burke.78  A former Congressman from New Hampshire, Burke questioned the logic behind 
government regulations.  Why would they succeed in altering the behavior of engineers and 
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other members of the crew, he wondered?  The steamboat operators were already willing to risk 
their own lives.  How could a few inspectors make a stronger impression?79 
Despite the fact that some members of Congress doubted the efficacy of stricter 
regulations, the 1838 Act made intervention increasingly palatable.80  While some officials had 
suggested provisions for more extensive government oversight even before 1838, others 
converted, including Treasury Secretary Levi Woodbury, who, from 1836 through 1838 became 
increasingly attracted to regulatory intervention as he learned more about the issue.81  By the 
mid-to-late 1840s, congressmen were also tiring of their flirtation with a Technical Option.  As 
we saw in chapter 4, they had grown skeptical that technological advances alone would prevent 
explosions and were looking for alternate ways to address the problem.82  However, probably the 
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government salaries.  Appendix B: H. Doc. 21, 25
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., 6-8. 
82
 The New Orleans Chamber of Commerce stated that “ingenuity may exhaust itself in devising contrivances 
for safety, but her teachings will meet with little favor, unless they point to present gain.”  Report and Resolutions 
adopted by the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce at their meeting on the 10
th
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most important factor was that the 1838 law appeared stunningly ineffective despite its severe 
penalty provisions: explosions and other accidents continued, accompanied by deaths and 
injuries.83 
As Senator John Ruggles commented in 1840 while proposing changes to the 1838 law, 
supporters of a penalty-centered law believed that steamboat operators would look out for the 
safety of the public, both because their own lives were at stake and because endangering the 
passengers would damage their own business interests.  But Ruggles noted that owners often did 
not operate their vessels in person and therefore did not identify with the perils experienced by 
passengers and crews.  He also thought that owner’s pursuit of profit led them to “underrate the 
dangers which constantly surround the unwary traveler.”84  Ultimately, Ruggles observed that 
“we have had too many proofs of the futility of relying alone on the self-interest of proprietors, 
or the sense of personal hazard of engineers against steamboat disasters.  Legislative regulations 
and penalties must, therefore, interpose their protection.”85  Senator John Davis reasoned 
similarly when he renewed the call for regulation in 1852.  The Penalty Option had proven 
deficient; he noted that even before the 1838 law, steamboat operators and owners who were 
                                                                                                                                                             
causes of the Explosion of Steam Boilers, and the measures deemed necessary for the prevention, Ref’d Jan. 22, 
1852, Petitions and Memorials Ref’d to Committees, Committee on Commerce, Jan. 22, 1852 – Feb. 17, 1853 
(Sen32A-H3.3) Records of the Senate, RG 46, NA, 6.  See also Mashaw, “Administration and ‘The Democracy:’” 
1635. 
83
 For a discussion of the failings of the 1838 Act, the problems with enforcing it and ways to evade some of its 
provisions, see Hunter, Steamboats, 532-5, Burke, “Bursting Boilers” in LaFollette and Stine, 59-61 and Mashaw, 
“Administration and ‘The Democracy:’” 1633-36. 
84
 Ruggles was a Democrat from Maine who introduced several detailed steamboat bills into the 25th and 26th 
Congresses.  He contended that steamboat engineers became numb to hazards over time, and also that if they were 
“ignorant of their duties, or [were] of reckless character” they would show little “regard for their own personal 
safety.”  Report of the Committee on Commerce [To accompany bill S. 247] [and] to inquire if the law regulating 
vessels propelled in whole or in part by steam does not require amendment …, 26th Cong., March 2, 1840, S. Rept. 
241, 1.  See also Report and Resolutions adopted by the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce at their meeting on the 
10
th
 of April, 1851, relative to the causes of the Explosion of Steam Boilers, and the measures deemed necessary for 
the prevention, Ref’d Jan. 22, 1852, Petitions and Memorials Ref’d to Committees, Committee on Commerce, Jan. 
22, 1852 – Feb. 17, 1853 (Sen32A-H3.3) Records of the Senate, RG 46, NA, 3 and Hunter, Steamboats, 528-9. 
85
 Appendix B: S. Rept. 241, 26
th
 Cong., 1
st
 Sess., 1. 
 217 
negligent or careless had been subject to lawsuits and liable for damages under the common law, 
yet the accidents occurred, regardless.86  In addition, United States Attorneys had not 
energetically pursued prosecutions under the 1838 law and this undercut its value as a 
deterrent.87 
Critics called the administrative provisions of the 1838 law inadequate, particularly the 
inspections, because the inspectors did not have the ability, authority or incentive to assure 
public safety.88  Tales multiplied of how, eager to earn their fees and move on, inspectors only 
conducted perfunctory examinations of vessels and, without concrete ways to measure the 
strength of boilers, such as pressure tests, were in no position to judge if the machinery was 
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safe.89  As Representative Elihu Washburne later stated, “the inspection required by the law of 
1838 is a mere farce, and ineffectual for the objects contemplated.”90 
 
4. “Much Good will result from Legislation on the Subject” 
Two years after the 1838 law was passed, Whig Congressman (and later Senator) Joseph 
Rogers Underwood wrote that government intervention was justified by “the appalling 
destruction of life and property resulting from steamboat disasters,” was convinced that Congress 
could do more and stated “that much good will result from legislation on the subject.”91  
Lawmakers introduced 26 bills and joint resolutions dealing with steamboat safety from 1839 
through 1852.  Eleven of the bills centered on new regulations, seven proposed minor alterations 
in the existing law, and nine focused on testing or purchasing safety equipment.92   
By the early 1850s, a wide array of individuals and groups wanted to change the 1838 
law, including concerned steamboatmen, marine insurers, lifesaving societies, newspaper editors, 
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citizens in ports and river towns, travelers, and immigrant protection organizations.93  
Contemporary maritime dangers of other sorts probably made the public and legislators 
sympathetic to calls for more government intervention.  Stories of poor conditions aboard ships 
headed to California during the gold rush likely increased the general aura of concern.
94
  
Growing immigration also called attention to the problem and led the Mayor and City Council of 
St. Louis to ask Congress in 1850 to regulate carriage of emigrant passengers on Mississippi 
River steamers to prevent the overcrowding which increased both the number of casualties from 
exploding boilers and contributed to the spread of disease.
95
   
Marine insurers had both commercial and charitable concerns when they organized a 
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petitioning campaign to change the law in 1852.
96
  They were already in the habit of asking 
Congress to fund lighthouses and other aids to navigation
97
 and were looking to expand their 
businesses as markets for marine insurance grew in the 1840s and 50s while foreign trade 
expanded and passenger traffic to California increased during the gold rush.
98
  One leading 
figure, Walter Restored Jones, the head of Atlantic Mutual Insurance, had already established his 
humanitarian bona fides by founding the Life-Saving Benevolent Association of New York, 
which sought to recue shipwreck victims along the approaches to New York harbor.
99
   
Even with widespread and diverse support, bill drafters were challenged to devise a law 
that, in the words of the North American Review, could be “intelligently adopted, systematically 
pursued, and rigidly enforced.”100  To formulate it they drew information from European nations, 
technical experts, state and local governments, professional associations of steamboat engineers, 
and other sources.101  Though the specifics varied, the regulatory proposals typically included 
five types of provisions: 1) government inspectors would test boilers and approve other aspects 
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of design and materials, including boiler metal; 2) members of the crew, such as pilots and 
engineers, would be tested and licensed; 3) the inspectors should ensure that vessels had certain 
types of safety equipment, including safety valves, fire engines, lifeboats, and life jackets; 4) the 
government should set standards for operation, such as maximum pressures for boilers and rules 
indicating how to pass other vessels; and 5) those who refused to comply with these provisions 
should be fined or otherwise punished, including having their licenses suspended or revoked.102  
While there was a general consensus that regulatory intervention, if pursued, would include some 
version or subset of these five categories, observers were less certain of how to implement them 
effectively.  The editor of Scientific American, for instance, was not confident that regulations 
could be enforced.103 
Louis Hunter credits passage of the 1852 Steamboat Act to the disasters that increased the 
pressure for change which overwhelmed the status quo, while he attributes the specific 
characteristics of the law to a process as members of Congress learned how to regulate.104  John 
Burke concludes that the “scientific and technologically knowledgeable members of society,” 
like members of the Franklin Institute, played a special role in formulating the act and supporting 
its passage.105  Jerry Mashaw has noted that Steamboat Act introduced the major innovation by 
creating the first example of a bureaucratically “modern” administrative structure.106 
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Despite the virtues of these histories, Hunter, Burke and Mashaw have not provided an 
adequate account of how the form and passage of the 1852 Act was contingent on the actions of 
a small number of legislators in the House and Senate who played indispensible rolls in drafting 
the bill and guiding it to passage.  Given the ongoing disasters, widespread support for 
government action, and the fact that members introduced a number of bills that passed at least 
one house of Congress during the 31
st
 and 32
nd
 Congresses, they were likely to revise the 1838 
law in some way.  But calls for change from the public and interest groups did not automatically 
translate into congressional action and did not dictate the specific features of any new law.  
Congress could have continued to make minor adjustments, as it did in 1843, 1847 and 1849, 
rather than creating a new regulatory system.107  It could also have enhanced the Penalty Option 
in the vein suggested by Commissioner of Patents Edmund Burke and others.108 
Another possible scenario could have entailed passage of a law that included all or some 
of the five major regulatory features, but without the administrative provisions designed to make 
them effective.  Though members proposed various bills that fit this profile, legislation of this 
sort came close to passing the 31
st
 Congress after Robert M. McLane, Chairman of the House 
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Commerce Committee, introduced H.R. 386 in September 1850.
109
  McLane’s bill was slightly 
more than seven pages long, mandated inspections and standards for construction, and directed 
steamboats to carry firefighting equipment and other safety devices.110  McLane shepherded it 
through the House in less than a month and it passed without a roll call vote.111  John Davis 
assumed charge of the measure and reported it out of the Senate Commerce Committee without 
amendment, but the Senate took no further action as the session ended shortly thereafter.112  In 
the second session, Davis held the bill in committee while amending it extensively, reporting it 
in February 1851 with two weeks left in the session.  The bill expired when the 31
st
 Congress 
concluded in March.113 
Despite the fact that the measure was not enacted, Davis’s amendments to H.R. 386 
marked a significant step toward a more modern set of standards for regulatory oversight.  One 
of the biggest challenges for Davis, or for anyone who revised the system, was to address the 
flawed provisions for administering the 1838 act.114  Doing so necessitated creating “formal 
legality in administration,” with “rules, routines, and organizational checks and balances that 
promoted bureaucratic adherence to effective and consistent implementation of statutory 
mandates” overseen by “officials who were detached, objective, expert and legally 
accountable.”115  To this end Davis developed more detailed specifications than had been found 
in any previous bill.  For example, in one lengthy section he divided the tasks of the inspectors 
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into subspecialties and outlined the types of practical experience that would qualify them to 
serve.  He elaborated on the duties of the inspectors and laid out the criteria for boats to pass 
inspection.  Davis also listed the prerequisites for engineers and pilots to earn their licenses, as 
well as circumstances that would justify revoking them.116 
Davis, a lawyer and experienced legislator, enjoyed latitude to amend H.R. 386 because 
he had become the de facto point person on the Senate Committee on Commerce at a time when 
the commerce committees of the two houses were the main venues for considering the issue of 
steamboat safety.117  He had been looking into the problems of the 1838 steamboat act since 
1847, reviewing reports on steam vessel accidents, composing bills and taking charge of ones 
that originated in the House.118  Davis had received a 94-page compilation of government reports 
on steamboat disasters in March 1849 which indicated that representatives of steamboat 
engineers were willing to come to Washington to help frame a bill, endorsed the establishment of 
boards to examine and license engineers as in Britain and France, noted the limits of the Penalty 
Option, requested better inspections, and asked for more extensive requirements for safety 
devices.
119
   
With the amendments Davis made to H.R. 386 during the winter of 1850-51, he 
composed bureaucratic specifications that he eventually included in the 1852 Steamboat Act, 
however, he also likely undermined the bill’s chances for passing the 31st Congress because he 
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completed his amendments late in the second and final session.  Had Davis begun pushing for 
the House’s version of the bill rather than keeping it in committee, or had some other senator 
been in charge of advancing it, H.R. 386 might have become law.120  This measure would have 
put in place more extensive regulations than the 1838 act, but would still have been less 
sophisticated than the bill Davis eventually proposed in 1852. 
Davis was more responsible than any other lawmaker for shaping the 1852 Steamboat 
Act.  Like many Americans, he embraced the ways that steam power was transforming the 
country.121  Originally a Federalist, then a National Republican opposing Andrew Jackson, he 
later joined the Whig Party.  Nicknamed “Honest John,” he was well liked and respected in 
Massachusetts.122  Elected to the House in 1824 from the Worcester area, he served from 1825 to 
1834, and was then elected governor, serving for 14 months in 1834-35.  He was a senator from 
1835 to 1841, Massachusetts’s governor again from 1841-1843, and then returned to the Senate 
in 1845, where he remained until he retired in March 1853.  He died the following year. 
 Davis served most of his professional life in the shadow of his colleague, Daniel 
Webster.  He did not have Webster’s transcendent skills as an orator, but his thoughtful speeches, 
weighty with evidence, reflected his particular strengths and interests.123  Of the two, Davis was 
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almost certainly the better legislator.  Webster never shepherded a prominent piece of legislation 
through Congress despite his rhetorical skills, fame, and long service.124  Davis, by contrast, was 
a Senate workhorse.125  Though he was remembered for his authorship of the Steamboat Act, his 
greatest interest through his career was the protective tariff.  He excelled at committee work and 
devoted substantial labor to issues like tariffs and supporting the New England fishing industry.  
The fact that he crafted a Steamboat Act that was both “disinterested in its aims, and politically 
unconspicuous [sic]” was typical of the man.126 
Davis’s attention to detail helped him compose complex legislation, and he had the 
patience and ability to work with colleagues to guide it through Congress.  A fellow Whig, 
Charles Hudson of Massachusetts, recalled that Davis would quietly cultivate members of the 
House Ways and Means Committee to shape pending tariff bills and also buttonhole senators to 
prepare the way for a “favorable reception” in the upper chamber.127  Davis had been a member 
of the Commerce Committee in the House and later served on the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, including a stint as chairman during the 24
th
 Congress.  As a member he worked on 
various issues related to maritime safety.  In 1837 he introduced bills to test boiler safety 
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inventions and allow U.S. vessels to cruise the coast during the winter to aid distressed vessels.  
He had been in charge of lighthouse appropriations in the Senate, oversaw bills to improve 
passenger safety on ocean voyages and was interested in supporting marine hospitals for aged 
seamen.
128
   
After the 31
st
 Congress ended, Davis requested a study of the country’s steam marine 
from the Treasury Department.129  He and the Whigs were in the minority when the 32
nd
 
Congress opened in December 1851, but this did not substantially affect his role in drafting 
steamboat legislation.130  Davis was reappointed to the Commerce Committee,131 and Chairman 
Hannibal Hamlin designated him as a one-person “subcommittee” to work on the issue.132  In the 
winter of 1852, Davis explained that the subject was “so complicated that a great deal of 
information is necessary to frame a bill.  That information has come in, some of it more slowly 
than I could wish. …  The whole subject ... will be brought under the consideration of the Senate, 
with the design of giving the most ample protection to life and property which it is in the power 
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of Congress to afford.”133  Using his amended version of H.R. 386 from the previous Congress as 
a starting point, Davis added standards for boiler construction, procedures for compensating 
inspectors, and requirements for record-keeping.134   
Davis reported a bill, S. 223, out of the Commerce Committee in February 1852.135  In it, 
he integrated and elaborated on many of the proposals that had reached Congress over the years.  
For example, he included provisions to pay inspectors government salaries in order to end the 
scandalous and widely criticized fee structure of the 1838 act.136  Davis tried to keep these 
salaries modest because he did not want applicants to chase the positions exclusively for political 
patronage.137  The law depended on the inspectors to enforce it, and there was some concern that 
they would not “feel the responsibility of their position, and faithfully and fearlessly discharge 
the duties imposed on them.”138  Davis composed a lengthy and elaborate section, section nine, 
which included 15 subsections spelling out the duties of the inspectors, as well as procedures and 
standards for inspection and penalties for inspectors who failed to fulfill their responsibilities.  
Even after reporting S. 223, Davis continued to receive information on it while the bill awaited 
Senate action, including visits from representatives of steamboat interests.139 Though the topic 
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came up for discussion in the Senate a few times and senators introduced two other steamboat 
measures, members and the media were anticipating that Davis’s bill would be the key measure 
to address the topic.140   
As ongoing disasters built support for the legislation during the winter and spring of 1852 
and opened Congress up to criticism for delay,141 Davis composed a long list of amendments and 
did not push for action until he was ready.  Though Davis’s ongoing work held up consideration 
of S. 223 until July, his efforts enhanced his reputation with colleagues.142  Several of them noted 
that they were grateful for Davis’s investigation and labors, and Arkansas Democrat Solon 
Borland’s statement is worth highlighting: 
I defer more to the judgment of the Senator from Massachusetts than to any one 
else upon this subject, because I know that for the last year or two he has devoted 
himself to it with a fidelity, an earnestness, and an energy which I have never seen 
equaled in the legislation of this body; and which … reflects the highest credit 
upon his head and upon his heart, and for which I, as one of the representatives of 
the valley of the Mississippi, tender him the gratitude of the people of the whole 
of that vast region of the country.143 
Senator Stephen Mallory, who was not a supporter of Davis’s bill, later commented that one 
reason the Steamboat Act had passed was that “the utmost confidence [was] placed in the 
judgment of the honorable Senator [John Davis] who had devoted his time to it.”144  Davis’s 
credibility was also bolstered by Commerce Committee Chairman Hamlin, who praised Davis’s 
work, supported S. 223 on the floor and said that the other members of the committee were 
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supporting the measure and would back additional provisions as necessary.145  Advocates also 
preyed on the emotions of the colleagues; Davis and Solomon Downs of Louisiana reminded the 
Senate of the terrible cost of steamboat accidents and that they needed to be curbed as quickly as 
possible because many people had been killed even as the bill was being considered.
146
   
Guiding the bill through the process of amendment required constant attention, but Davis 
held an additional advantage: senators were inclined to look to committee members for guidance 
concerning certain complex pieces of legislation.  David Rice Atchison compared S. 223 to other 
lengthy bills, such as recent legislation on rivers and harbors, and noted that  
not half a dozen gentlemen beyond those who reported the bills, knew the effect of 
a single amendment.  We knew something about the general provisions, but nothing 
about the details of those bills.  What could I, who have never been on the lakes, 
know about the appropriations for the harbors situated there?  I never saw the 
estimates and surveys upon which those appropriations were recommended, but 
was obliged to confide in those gentlemen who took the subject in hand.  We have 
to take these things on trust, and I am prepared to swallow this steamboat bill on 
trust, just as we have done many others.147 
Senators Borland and John Weller remarked that they did not have the knowledge that would 
allow them to evaluate the technical requirements of the bill, but were relying on the Commerce 
Committee and the experts whom it had consulted to assure them that the bill was the best that 
could be offered.148  When S. 223 came to the floor on July 8, Davis recommended a large 
number of amendments, many of them minor changes in wording, which the Senate adopted.149  
The following day, a Friday, Davis made a motion to suspend the rule setting aside Fridays for 
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the consideration of private bills.  Two senators objected, but the majority wanted to continue 
work on the measure and sustained Davis’s motion by a margin of 29 to 4.150  Davis was 
becoming concerned that the House would not have time to review the bill unless the Senate 
passed it soon.  He exercised considerable control over the process as the Senate adopted 
numerous amendments that Davis proposed over the next several days.  Other senators offered 
their own amendments, some of which the Senate approved, but only one of them was passed 
over Davis’s objections.151  The Senate endorsed the bill on July 13 without a contested roll call 
vote.152 
The deference that the legislators showed to Davis and the Senate Commerce Committee 
did not transfer to the House of Representatives along with S. 223.  The House Commerce 
Committee considered the bill and its chairman, David Seymour, and committee member 
Thomas J. D. Fuller, sponsored and managed it on the floor.153  Seymour and the committee 
accepted the bill’s basic structure but made some important changes, including a crucial one that 
limited the reach of the law.  Desiring to make sure that it did not apply to vessels operating 
exclusively within one state, and wanting to limit its application to protect passengers and not 
crews, the committee amended S. 223 to make the law inapplicable to tugboats, canal boats, 
ferry boats, towboats, and some small steamers.154  These changes kept the 1838 law in effect for 
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these vessels.  The practical effect was that in subsequent years barely-regulated freight and 
towboats created hazards for other vessels, and the Board of Supervising Inspectors and 
Congress sought to bring them under the 1852 system until the law was revised in 1864.
155
 
While they were altering some features of the Senate’s bill, members of the House 
followed similar patterns in their process of considering the legislation.  The representatives 
followed the lead of their Commerce Committee, endorsing the amendments recommended by 
Seymour and Fuller and defeating attempts to delay the bill or replace it with a substitute.156  The 
House voted down an attempt to consider S. 223 in the Committee of the Whole, 122 to 54, 
which might have sidetracked it.
157
  On August 25, 1852, they voted to pass it, 147 to 27, with 
84.5% in favor and 15.5% opposed.  About 94% of Whigs, 78% of Democrats, 93% of free state 
representatives and 71% of congressmen from slave states supported the measure.158 
When the House sent the amended version of S. 223 back to the Senate, senators 
opposing it made a final effort against the bill on August 28, moving to delay it by calling for a 
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special committee to consider it over the recess, and then attempted to table the measure.  
Supporters protested that the moves to delay the bill were in reality attempts to defeat the 
legislation.
159
  Senator Rusk claimed that an attempt to set S. 223 aside was solely to gratify the 
steamboat owners so they could continue to recklessly sacrifice human lives.
160
 
On August 28 John Davis reviewed the changes made by the House and stated that these 
had weakened the measure.  Nonetheless, he urged the Senate to endorse it.161  It is unknowable 
what would have happened if Davis had asked the Senate to insist on its version of S. 223 and 
how hard Seymour, Fuller and the other representatives would have fought for their version.  
What is known, however, is that Davis recommended that the Senate should accept the House’s 
version rather than risk having the session conclude before the two houses could come to an 
agreement, and the Senate approved the measure shortly thereafter.
162
   
 The Senate majority defeated a motion to table the bill by a vote of 43 to 8.  The 
percentage of support was very similar to that in the House, as 84.3% of the senators voted not to 
delay the bill and only 15.7% voted to table it.  Supermajorities of both parties and sections 
endorsed the measure, including 94% of Whigs (16 of 17), 80% of Democrats (24 of 30), 89% of 
free state senators and 79% of senators from slave states.163  The Senate then passed the bill 
without an additional roll call vote.
164
  Whigs were more likely to vote for the 1852 law than 
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Democrats, and legislators from free states were more supportive than those from slave states.  
However, this should not distract from the fact that the representatives and senators throughout 
the country and from the major parties and sections endorsed S. 223 by impressive margins, 
which indicated the widespread support for federal action.  On August 30, 1852, President 
Millard Fillmore signed the Steamboat Act into law. 
Despite the broad support for the law, some members of Congress opposed S. 223 
because they represented steamboat interests that objected to government intervention.  As they 
had since the 1830s, many Eastern steamboat interests resisted federal regulation.
165
  Of the eight 
senators who voted to table the bill, seven, with the exception of Jeremiah Clemens (D) of 
Alabama, were located in Atlantic states.
166
  Two years earlier, Senator Thomas Pratt had 
received a memorial from Baltimore merchants asking that a bill intended to protect the lives of 
steamboat passengers not become law,
167
 and he supported the wishes of Maryland’s steamboat 
interests in 1852, declaring before he voted to table the bill that  
I hold in my hand a representation from the steamboat interests of the State of 
Maryland, in direct opposition to this bill; and I believe that feeling is shared by 
the same interest along the whole of the Atlantic sea-board.  They state, that if the 
bill should pass, it will break up the steamers they have now running; that the bill 
is unnecessarily severe, so far as they are concerned; and that it would be 
completely ruinous to their interests.  As I represent those interests on this floor, I 
cannot permit this motion to pass without making a solemn protest against it.
168
 
 
Virginia’s Senator Robert M. T. Hunter (D) similarly justified his opposition by stating that 
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nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Aug., 28, 1852, 2425.  Emphasis added.  Senator Pratt said he would agree to the 
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steamboat owners told him that the bill would be "ruinous to their interests and especially in its 
operation on the Atlantic sea-board."
169
 
 Democrats were more likely to oppose S. 223 than Whigs, and made up six of the eight 
who voted to table the bill.
170
  Some Democrats remained more attached to the Penalty Option 
than Whigs.  Stephen Mallory and Robert F. Stockton of New Jersey argued that they should 
avoid setting up a regulatory system and instead try to punish steamboat owners when accidents 
occurred.
171
  Stockton was one of the few senators who spoke out strongly against passing the 
bill.  He affirmed the traditional Democratic support for individual liberty, limited government, 
and property rights.  He protested that the legislation was too intrusive, that instead it was 
our duty to consider what is due to the protection of steamboat owners, as well as 
what is due to steamboat travelers.  They are our fellow-citizens, equally entitled 
to our consideration.  But ... there is a principle in my judgment, involved in this 
bill far beyond, in importance, either of those questions.  It is this--how far the 
Federal Government through the instrumentality of the two Houses of Congress, 
shall be permitted to interfere with the rights of personal property--or the private 
business of any citizen ... When you are about adopting measures to save human 
life from destruction on board of steam-boats, I would have you consider the 
value of a man's life compared with his happiness and liberty, with the freedom 
and happiness of our race.  Life is transient and evanescent, but liberty and equal 
rights, I hope, will endure as long as truth shall endure.
172
 
 
Most senators, however, were not persuaded and only 20% of the Democrats joined with 
Stockton to try to table the bill.
173
  Democrat Solomon Downs of Louisiana rebuked Stockton.  
He was frustrated by the ongoing disasters and voted with the majority, declaring 
the argument against the bill just delivered by the Senator from New Jersey [Mr. 
Stockton], is the most extraordinary I have ever listened to .... This bill is to 
punish murder, and nothing else ... I consider that the only question involved in 
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this bill is this: Whether we shall permit a legalized, unquestioned, unchecked and 
peculiar class in the community [steamboat owners], to go on committing murder 
at will, or whether we shall make such enactments as will compel them to pay 
some attention to the value of life?
174
 
 
 Southerners in both houses were more inclined to oppose S. 223 than Northerners, and 
this probably reflects Southern sensitivity to the assertion of national power.  The roll call 
results, and the fact that Southerners like Downs and Thomas Rusk of Texas spoke out strongly 
in favor of the measure, indicate that this was not a universal sentiment in the South.  Editor and 
spokesman for Southern interests J. B. D. Debow also came out in favor of John Davis’s bill.  
Debow noted that steam disasters had claimed nearly five hundred lives in the previous six 
months, including 80 people killed in the fire of the steamer Henry Clay on the Hudson River 
and about 40 who were killed by the boiler explosion of the steamboat St. James near New 
Orleans.  Debow praised Davis’s effort as a “stringent” bill which would “secure the lives of 
passengers from the perils of human cupidity, human recklessness, and … iron and steam.”175   
Southern resistance to the measure also becomes less apparent, at least in the House of 
Representatives, when we examine the voting patterns in the individual states.
176
  In every state, 
a majority of House members voted in favor of S. 223, with the exception of South Carolina.
177
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follows: Alabama: 3rd, William R. Smith (Union); 6th, Williamson R. W. Cobb (D); Florida: 6th, Elijah W. 
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The roll call vote is from HJ, 32nd Cong. 1st Sess., Aug. 25, 1852, 1072.  The legislative districts and 
affiliations are from Martis, Historical Atlas, 104.   
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 The South Carolinians who voted against S. 223 in the House were all Democrats: William Aiken, William 
F. Colcock, John McQueen, James L. Orr, Daniel Wallace, and Joseph A. Woodward.  The remaining representative 
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The state has often been an outlier and the nay votes by six of South Carolina’s seven 
representatives tend to make Southern opposition appear deeper than it was.  However, even with 
the opposition of the South Carolinians, a large majority of slave state representatives, more than 
71%, voted for the bill.
178
   
Despite the high degree of overall support for the measures, the majorities in favor of S. 
223 become somewhat less impressive when we consider that many legislators did not vote in 
the roll calls: 59 abstained or were absent in the House and 11 in the Senate.  It is difficult to 
know why they did not vote, but a few of them expressed conflicted feelings about the measure.  
One of the abstainers in the House, Richard H. Stanton of Kentucky, stated that he was not 
prepared to oppose the bill, but had received a memorial from river pilots who opposed its 
licensing provisions.
179
  In the Senate, Democratic abstainers Stephen Mallory of Florida and 
William Gwin of California said they believed that some sort of legislation was necessary.
180
  
They also both expressed misgivings, though not absolute opposition to the measure, and 
Mallory objected to imposing safety regulations on the masters and owners of steam vessels and 
voiced his continuing support for legislation built around a Penalty Option.
181
   
When it was approved, S. 223 was 55 pages long, with 44 separate sections.182  Congress 
established an extensive bureaucracy of inspectors, specified their duties and set standards of 
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professional conduct.  The law created offices for nine supervising inspectors of steamboats, 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, at annual salaries of $1,500 each.  They 
were to be men of “knowledge, skill, and experience in the uses of steam for navigation” and 
would oversee local inspectors in 30 collection districts throughout the country.  There would be 
60 local inspectors, two in each district: an inspector of hulls and an inspector of boilers.  The 
local inspectors would perform most of the inspections, but the supervisors would inspect vessels 
in customs districts that did not have local inspectors.  The supervising inspectors would also 
meet as a board to make administrative rules to oversee the system, inquire into technical 
improvements, report on the operation of the system to the Secretary of the Treasury and 
Congress, and, if necessary, recommend changes.  The law included elaborate provisions for 
testing boilers and boiler metal, licensing pilots and engineers, and mandating safety equipment, 
along with requirements for operating vessels and penalties for infractions.183 
 
5. Conclusion: “A Stronger Arm” 
In early 1852, Alfred Guthrie, engineer at the Chicago Waterworks, wrote to Congress 
that the 1838 steamboat act had proven ineffective.  Guthrie, who would later be appointed a 
supervising inspector under the 1852 Steamboat Act, stated that Congress needed to do more to 
prevent disasters and that this required “a stronger arm, a higher power, than individual effort or 
individual example.”184  Officials considered new options in the 1830s as they became 
increasingly concerned about steamboat accidents, and the fact that the actions of private 
individuals were not improving the situation.  However, facilitating technical improvements, 
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combined with the threat of penalties in the 1838 act, did not appear to alleviate the danger.  The 
public and interest groups pressured Congress for action.  Senator John Davis stated in 1852 that, 
although people had varying opinions about the causes and solutions of steamboat disasters, 
every individual with whom he had communicated believed that “something should be done by 
Congress--that something may be usefully done to suppress the calamities, or at least the dangers 
which now exist.”185  Others in Congress shared Davis’s impression; as documented in Appendix 
A, members from different parties and regions introduced legislation on the subject from 1824 to 
1860.  As we can see in Appendix C, at the time of decision, large bipartisan majorities tended to 
support congressional intervention.  The fact that bills, such as the 1838 act and the 1843 
revisions, were approved by a general consensus and that large majorities in both the House and 
Senate supported the 1852 act in the final roll call votes gives an indication of the widespread 
support for these measures. 
However, even popular legislation was subject to the rhythms and idiosyncrasies of 
Congress.  Bills that lacked the driving forces of partisan machinery and sectional advocacy 
depended on the actions of individual committee members to introduce, sponsor and guide them 
through both houses.  In 1838, the committee system gave great autonomy to Felix Grundy to 
compose a bill.  He determined its provisions and the Democratic majority supported him by 
passing a law that tried to shape behavior by threatening to penalize steamboat operators for 
recklessness.  The measure was also ultimately endorsed by Whigs and others who supported 
some type of government intervention, even if they would have preferred more aggressive 
regulatory provisions. 
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Steamboat legislation was also affected by the inclinations and talents of key legislators.  
Rapid turnover in Congress meant that few senators and representatives focused on legislation 
for more than one or two Congresses in succession.186  This short tenure made them less 
knowledgeable and impeded their abilities as bill drafters.  Many of the proposals members 
introduced in the 1830s and 1840s used previous bills as templates, rather than synthesizing new 
and more comprehensive proposals from the available information.187  In this situation, John 
Davis stands out for his talents as a bill drafter.  In 1850 and 1851 Davis tried to add 
administrative muscle to the bones of a steamboat bill drawn up in the House of Representatives, 
but ran out of time.  He might have had more leeway had the 31
st
 Congress not been spending so 
much time dealing with a sectional crisis during its first session.  The work was complex and, 
without a professional staff, Davis had to devise a new type of organization out of a vast array of 
plans and testimony.  He was better prepared to undertake the task in the 32
nd
 Congress than he 
had been the previous year.  He also got an earlier start and had time to review and refine his 
proposal in the winter and spring of 1852.  A particularly destructive set of accidents made 
Congress amenable, even eager, to endorse a new law, and Davis’s expertise and position on the 
Commerce Committee leant him authority within the Senate.  Davis established the basic 
features for S. 223, but accepted significant alterations from the House of Representatives.  He 
had intended to entirely supplant the 1838 law with a new national regulatory system.  Instead, 
because the inclinations of the key actors in the House differed from those in the Senate, they left 
the 1838 law in place for ferries and cargo vessels.188 
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Both the 1838 and 1852 laws serve as examples of the complex set of factors that 
influenced the composition and passage of legislation on steamboat safety.  The particular 
circumstances of leading actors, the policy-related inclinations of the drafters of the legislation, 
the legislative environment at the time, and the peculiar workings of Congress, were as important 
in determining how proposals were shaped and when laws were passed as outside pressures, such 
as those from interest groups and the public. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Americans celebrated the ways that steam transportation was transforming their country 
during the first half of 19
th
 century.  Editor Hezekiah Niles exulted that it enabled astonishing 
feats where “every river is penetrated, mountain passed or valley crossed … as with the flight of 
a bird! … Science has conquered space.  The people of places 1,000 miles apart, are near 
neighbors.  How wonderful!”1  But naturalist Louis Agassiz recognized that American’s 
compelling need to travel rapidly could be dangerous.  “There is something infernal in the 
irresistible power of steam,” he wrote, “carrying such heavy masses along with the swiftness of 
lightning …  If here and there something goes to pieces, no one is astonished; never mind!  We 
go fast—we gain time—that is the essential thing."2  Thousands of Americans died from the 
power of steam in the years before the Civil War.  People feared the sudden violence from boiler 
explosions, but the public also demanded government action to tackle dangers from fires, 
collisions and other accidents.
3
  It was a challenge to deal with these problems because even if 
their causes were well understood, it was not clear that they were preventable through 
legislation.
4
  In early 1850, editor J. B. D. Debow listed casualties from steamboat accidents, 
including the recent explosion of the steamboat Louisiana in New Orleans, and asked “can no 
remedy be devised?”5 
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Rather than being resigned to the danger as an inevitable cost of technical progress and 
hazard of transport, members of Congress felt responsible for the safety of travelers and 
experimented to curtail the deaths and destruction.  This was consistent with the manifest intent 
to protect life on American waters and the open seas.
6
  By 1852 Congress had also used federal 
power and money to preserve the lives of travelers by funding aids to navigation, removing 
hazards from waterways and saving victims of shipwrecks.  The fact that members were aware of 
the dangers of navigation, knew that they were widely covered in the media and feared for their 
own safety imbued them with a sense of urgency to address the problem.   
This study fits into the category of policy history that Julian Zelizer has labeled “process 
evolution,”7 and has mapped the national government policies designed to influence the 
operation of steam vessels from the 1820s through 1860, as well as examined the process by 
which they were enacted to delineate some of Congress’s “complex internal mechanisms … that 
affect the way things turn out.”8   
Steamboat legislation resembled a slot machine where the external and internal factors 
needed to line up before members of Congress could overcome their hesitancy to intervene 
aggressively.  Developments in the larger society, including demands by the public and press for 
congressional intervention, lobbying by constituents and other citizens, and interest groups 
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calling for action pushed items onto the legislative agenda.  As Congress responded to these 
outside pressures, its internal structure and workings guided members in a crucial “negotiation 
over power, resources, and relationships” before it took action.9  Some forms of intervention, 
such as the Information Option of investigating steamboat accidents and publishing reports, 
required only a few slot machine reels to align, so Congress did this repeatedly from 1824 to 
1860.  Congress embarked on more intrusive forms of intervention, such as the experiments with 
penal and regulatory intervention in 1838 and 1852, only when a host of factors lined up 
favorably. 
While scholars have studied steamboat legislation, they have not emphasized that 
Congress responded to the problem with multiple policies.  Some of these, such as the 
Information Option and the Mechanical Option of testing safety equipment, were in sync with 
typical forms of 19
th
 century policy.  Members of Congress were more cautious about 
implementing other forms of intervention, such as the version of the Mechanical Option where 
the government required safety devices and subsidized inventors, but these were also parts of the 
legislative repertoire.   
The major scholarly accounts of steamboat legislation have focused on the Regulatory 
Option as Congress put in place a system to oversee steamboat design, equipment, and operation.  
This is not surprising as scholars of Congress and the growth of the national state have been 
searching for the origins and apparatus of the modern state and measuring its power by “the 
existence of formal, coercive and administrative power lodged within public bureaucracies.”10  
One problem with this, however, is that it sets unrealistic standards for what qualifies as 
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government activism because it measures the nineteenth-century government by what it failed to 
do, rather than by what it did.
11
  By this standard, only the regulations propagated by the 
Steamboat Act of 1852 and, to a lesser extent, the 1838 law qualify as evidence of state power.  
However, as Richard John and Brian Balogh have noted, indirect or unobtrusive government 
activities have often had a more significant impact than direct regulatory oversight.
12
  
Congress’s efforts to gather and print information were among these unobtrusive, but 
common, activities.
13
  The documents about steamboat accidents that Congress produced were 
part of a larger “print statism” project to inform the public about their country, the actions of its 
government, and give them tools to improve their lives.
14
  The government sponsored some 
exemplary investigations into the causes of accidents, including one in the 1830s by the 
country’s foremost technical organization, the Franklin Institute of Philadelphia.15  These 
inquiries yielded important insights about steamboat operations and understandings of physical 
and mechanical processes.   However, Congress employed flawed processes for vetting and 
disseminating data and could not control the fact that many steamboat owners and operators 
declined to accept guidance as to how they could improve their practices.  We have seen that, 
despite their limitations as instruments of policy, government publications facilitated the spread 
of knowledge and inspired discussions about steam power and transportation among a range of 
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scientists, engineers, mechanics, and professional users of steam.
16
 
The government began evaluating the effectiveness of steam safety devices in 1834.  
Other scholarly accounts have said little about this process, despite the fact that inventors hungry 
for publicity and government assistance embraced the opportunity to have their devices critiqued 
by experts and demonstrated to public officials.  Members of Congress endorsed these versions 
of the Mechanical Option with minimal dissent and believed that this was a reasonable 
application of federal resources and expertise.  Assessments by government employees and 
outside experts continued until Congress delegated this responsibility to the Supervising 
Inspectors of Steamboats in 1852.
17
  Government specialists examined steam safety mechanisms, 
helped inventors improve them, and later assisted steamboat owners in complying with the 
technical requirements of the 1852 Steamboat Act.  Further research is needed on the processes 
of technological development and diffusion to measure how much influence the government had 
on the practices of steamboat builders and inventors.  How extensively and effectively did they 
use government resources to design mechanisms and construct vessels? 
As with the project to evaluate safety devices, scholars of steamboat legislation have not 
extensively scrutinized the requirements for safety equipment that Congress instituted in 1838 
and 1852, or the government’s interactions with inventors who were seeking subsidies.  Some 
legislators championed subsidizing inventions, often in response to demands from local 
constituents.
18
  However, members resisted the entreaties by inventors.  Many shared a liberal 
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belief that the government should play a limited role and that private enterprise would develop 
and adopt technical advances according to their merits.
19
  Inventors opposed government support 
for their rivals, while legislators wanted to avoid awarding unfair advantages, and had a number 
of other practical concerns.  They knew they lived in an age of fraudulent mechanisms as well as 
technological wonders, and did not want to endorse or pay for inventions that users of steam 
would resist or were less effective than their advocates claimed.  Lawmakers distrusted their own 
ability to choose the best inventions and feared impeding the march of technological progress by 
mandating equipment that could soon become obsolete.  Thus they were willing to require 
generic categories of inventions, such as boiler safety valves, lifeboats, and lifejackets, but 
avoided mandating patented devices.  Despite members’ stated desire not to play favorites, these 
requirements provided advantages to some inventors and suppliers, such as lifeboat manufacturer 
Joseph Francis. 
We know that the government issued more patents as the century progressed, that 
inventors continued to seek government aid for their projects, and that the United States 
purchased some inventions or held out the prospect for subsidies to inventors.  We do not, 
however, have a clear idea how much time and energy inventors directed toward fulfilling public 
needs.  Future research could provide a fuller picture of how the inventive community in this 
area responded to the prospect of federal subsidies. 
Policies to spread information and sponsor safety devices challenge the misconception 
that the United States government focused almost exclusively on distributive rather than 
regulatory policies until the late nineteenth century.  Instead, in these instances “the line between 
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promotion and regulation [was] thin,”20 and there was not always a clear “functional distinction” 
between the two.
21
  Together, the Information Option and Mechanical Option resembled other 
government activities that were motivated by the dual desires to promote economic growth and 
protect public safety.
22
  The government forged partnerships with steamboat operators and 
worked “through links to society,” attempting to mobilize “private actors to participate in 
functions that are usually considered public.”23   
During this period, Congress rarely implemented regulatory requirements to the degree 
that it later did in the twentieth century.  However, members believed that regulatory intervention 
in the area of maritime safety was constitutional.  Because they had examples where Congress 
had already used its power to regulate commerce for sailing vessels, the regulations in the 1852 
Steamboat Act were innovative in instituting more extensive requirements than other passenger 
laws, along with a new bureaucracy, rather than putting in place an entirely new form of national 
government intervention.  
Scholars who have examined steamboat legislation have focused most of their attention 
on government regulation, because it was both “innovative” and “modern.”  A recent treatment 
concludes that the 1852 Act “pioneered regulation … [that was] based on new scientific 
understandings” and served as a precursor to twentieth century forms of “governance” by 
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creating “[the] …prototype of an independent regulatory commission.”24  Members introduced 
bills with regulatory features as early as the 1820s, and passed some minimal requirements in 
1838, but did not pass a law until 1852 with modern safety regulations dictating the use of 
equipment, setting up a system for licensing pilots and engineers, and creating a corps of 
professional inspectors to examine vessels and oversee the arrangement. 
Students of regulation have described a standard path for how it is implemented.  First, a 
tragedy or crisis takes place.
25
  Events illustrate that market forces and private actions do not 
protect the public interest, and the public demands that elected officials respond.  The 
government then steps in to guide or control the operation of businesses.
26
  This describes the 
pattern of how the national government implemented a law in 1819 to protect passengers on 
international voyages in sailing ships.  To justify restricting the number of passengers and 
directing that ships carry sufficient provisions, the main sponsor cited instances where hundreds 
of passengers had died on overcrowded vessels bound for the United States and many who 
arrived “in a very emaciated state from the want of water and food.”27  He believed that Congress 
had a right, responsibility, and moral duty to respond. 
Previous accounts of steamboat legislation have framed the regulatory process in this 
                                                 
24
 Mashaw, Ibid. 
25
 Daniel Carpenter and Gisela Sin, “Policy Tragedy and the Emergence of Regulation: The Food and 
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 Annals of Congress, 15
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 Cong. 2
nd
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way.
28
  While there is some merit to this outline, it is incomplete because does not provide an 
adequate description of the process by which Congress devised and implemented its policies.  
This study has attempted to add to our understanding of steamboat regulation by looking at how 
Congress acted and delineating contingent factors that influenced legislative outcomes.
29
   
The actions and abilities of individual legislators were one of the important 
contingencies.  A small number senators and representatives, such as Felix Grundy, John Davis 
and David Seymour, had a great deal of say over regulatory legislation.  They could not pass 
bills by fiat, but their positions on key committees gave them substantial influence and entitled 
them to some deference from their colleagues.  Sponsors had to clear the path for their 
legislation, moving it out of committee and calling it up.  Even when majorities in Congress 
favored acting, sponsors needed to pilot bills ahead of competing items, often by mobilizing 
supporters who had a nascent desire to respond to the public outcry for intervention.  They also 
guided proposals over procedural hurdles and had to counteract efforts by opponents to delay and 
defeat them.  
The members of Congress lived in a partisan world and partisanship affected their actions 
in several ways.  Partisan competition helped motivate members of Congress to establish an 
                                                 
28
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infrastructure of government printing that made the Information Option viable by creating 
incentives to publish huge numbers of documents so the parties could award patronage to 
publishers, use publications for electioneering, and help legislators foster relations with 
constituents.  Partisanship also influenced the features of legislation.  Part of chapter five built on 
an insight by John G. Burke to discuss how Democrats in Congress in 1838, led by Felix Grundy 
and eventually supported by the Whig minority, constructed a law around a Penalty Option. The 
1838 law was supposed to modify the behavior of steamboat operators by threatening them with 
lawsuits and prosecution.  This approach was in tune with legislator’s preferences to depend on 
steamboat operators and passengers to police themselves and use the court system, rather than 
government administration, to enforce the law.  The fact that it did not curb accidents led to the 
1852 Steamboat Act, where Congress made more muscular use of its power to regulate 
commerce in ways that were usually limited to the exercise of the “police power” by the 
“states.”30 
Partisan divisions were evident when members of Congress considered penalty and 
regulatory policies.  Whigs were enthusiastic about exercising national authority and more eager 
than Democrats to impose regulations on private businesses.
31
  Roll call votes show that more 
Whigs than Democrats supported the 1838 and 1852 laws.
32
  As we saw in chapter five, in 1838 
Democrats, led by Senator Felix Grundy, pushed for a Penalty Option and blocked regulatory 
provisions preferred by many Whigs that would have licensed engineers, required boilers to be 
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tested regularly, limited their working pressures, and outlawed steamboat racing.  
 
 
Even so, the history of steamboat legislation provides exceptions to the “party period” 
framework and deviates “from the pattern” where legislative activity during the era was 
characterized by deep and persistent partisan divisions in roll call votes.
33
  Partisanship in this 
area of policy ought to be understood as more of a partisan preference than a partisan imperative.  
At a time when the Whig and Democratic parties had profound differences about public policy, 
representatives of the parties tended to agree on some aspects of steamboat policy and disagree 
on others.  We have seen that members from both parties supported investigating the causes of 
disasters and publishing the results.  Legislators from both sides of the aisle also advocated 
examining safety devices and passed acts to test them without demanding roll call votes in 1834, 
1838 and 1843.  The differences between the parties were sometimes visible, but did not 
predominate, as in 1842 when 75% of Whigs and more than 57% of Democrats in the House 
favored a joint resolution authorizing the government to examine boiler safety inventions.
34
   
On the issue of steamboat safety, partisan affiliations were sometimes useful, but 
imperfect indicators of the policies members of Congress composed and advocated.  Ronald 
Formisano notes that the claims that “party organizations” were the primary conduits for 
policymaking during the nineteenth century have frequently lacked direct supportive evidence.
35
  
In our story, other factors were often more important than partisan loyalties and ideological 
predilections in influencing the opinions and shaping the actions of individual congressmen.  The 
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desire to support local constituents could sway legislators, as when David Petrikin of 
Pennsylvania sponsored bills on behalf of inventor Samuel Raub, Jr., or Thomas Pratt of 
Maryland opposed the 1852 Steamboat Act at the behest of steamboat interests in his state.  
Many Democrats, like Hannibal Hamlin and David Seymour in 1852, sponsored or supported 
regulatory legislation that was sophisticated and intrusive, even when it was inconsistent with 
Democratic ideological predilections for a small and unobtrusive government.
 36
   
Steamboat legislation was usually drafted by a member of a responsible committee in 
either house, often a select committee or the Commerce Committee.  We can see in Appendix A 
that Whigs, Democrats and Republicans all served as prime authors and sponsors of these bills.  
Democratic sponsors, such as Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky in the 1830s and John Ruggles of 
Maine in the early 1840s, shaped bills with provisions similar to those introduced by Whigs such 
as Samuel Southard of New Jersey in the 1830s and Joseph Rogers Underwood of Kentucky in 
the early 1840s.  In these instances, their individual inclinations, the expertise they developed on 
the issue, and their positions on responsible committees probably exercised a stronger influence 
on their views than their partisan affiliation.     
Despite the contentious nature of politics at the time, members of Congress usually 
exhibited a high degree of consensus in supporting steamboat penal and regulatory legislation, as 
when they passed laws without contested roll call votes in 1838 and 1843.
37
  This resembled the 
process by which other laws regarding maritime safety were enacted, such as the 1818, 1848, 
1849, 1855 and 1860 laws where Congress approved bills regulating carriage of passengers in 
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ocean vessels without roll call votes.
38
  This situation draws attention to Margaret Susan 
Thompson’s observation that studying legislatures by focusing on roll call votes can divert 
attention from instances of consensus by emphasizing divisive issues, and that it can also shift 
the focus away from activities, such as consideration of bills in committee, that have a significant 
impact on legislation before proposals come to the floor.
39
 
When final votes were held, as in 1852, huge majorities of both parties supported 
steamboat laws, regardless of their provisions.
40
  Even partisans who disagreed with particular 
aspects of steamboat proposals tended to support or acquiesce in passing them.  Few were 
prepared to fight to the finish for their own versions of legislation.
41
  The extent of cooperation 
raises questions about how far the southern advocates of states’ rights, in alliance with 
Democrats, “constrict[ed] nation-state development” before the Civil War.42  In this area, at 
least, Democrats appear to have shaped the government response, but not blocked it, as in the 
1838 law, and either supported, or at least acquiesced, to a significant instance of governmental 
activism with the 1852 Steamboat Act.   
While these observations do not overthrow the notion of a “party period” for public 
policy during the 19
th
 century, scholars should be alert to exceptions and watchful for other 
factors that influenced legislative decision-making and outcomes.  Partisan impulses were 
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present, but researchers ought to be careful to demonstrate how partisanship affected policy, 
rather than to assume its influence.
43
   
The study of steamboat legislation offers insights into the internal operations of 
Congress.  Most bills did not win through.  Less than one in seven measures were enacted and 
just two-thirds of these represented significant changes.
44
  Of the sixty-two bills and joint 
resolutions on the subject of steam vessel safety that were introduced from 1824 to 1860, only 
nine passed both houses to become law, and three of these were supplemental measures that 
made minor changes in previous legislation.  Over the years a shifting number of congressmen, 
Democrats, Whigs and Republicans, acted as both gatekeepers and advocates, usually because of 
their positions on relevant committees.  Sponsors had to deal with the fact that their proposals 
could easily be stopped at numerous choke points, even when many members supported 
congressional intervention.   
Individual legislators in key positions exercised a great deal of influence because of their 
positions on committees and their individual expertise.  The intricate and somewhat novel nature 
of steamboat regulation inclined senators to follow the lead of committee members like Senator 
John Davis who were charged with studying the issue and drafting the bills.  In both the House 
and Senate, the committee members in charge of the legislation were usually able to shape the 
bills to their liking and keep control of them during the amendment process.  On several 
occasions in 1852, members indicated that they were deferring to the expertise of their 
colleagues in order to endorse legislation that they themselves did not fully understand.  Further 
research could explore if other congressional actions to preserve public health and safety during 
the period, including authorizing public vessels to patrol for ships in distress, attempting to 
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curtail illness among transatlantic passengers, establishing lifesaving stations, funding 
lighthouses and other aids to navigation, and creating the Lighthouse Board, followed similar 
patterns.  Further investigation is also warranted as to the effectiveness of the 1852 Steamboat 
Act.  Louis Hunter believed that the administrative entity it created oversaw steamboat 
operations effectively and reduced the number of accidents, whereas more recent scholarship has 
questioned this claim.
45
 
Through this study I have sought to call attention to an undeservedly obscure piece of 
public policy, expand our understanding of governmental activism and provide insight into the 
operations of the 19
th
-century Congress.  Scholars have long been interested in the history of the 
American state, and especially in how large the government was and what powers and influence 
it wielded.
46
  They undermined the myth of nineteenth-century laissez faire by documenting the 
role that state and local governments and the courts played in encouraging economic growth.
47
  
An influential group of historically minded social scientists has worked to “bring the state back 
in,” insisting that the state apparatus has exercised a degree of autonomy and been an essential 
actor that shaped American life.
48
  Others have argued that energetic military and foreign 
policies challenge the myth that the United States had a weak national state.
49
  William Novak 
contends that students of the nineteenth century need to move beyond the traditional dichotomy 
of strong vs. weak states, and he and Richard John, in particular, have called on scholars to 
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reevaluate the actions of the national and state governments during the nineteenth century.
50
 
This investigation furthers our understanding of how governmental institutions impacted 
the lives of Americans.  Stephen Skowronek has argued that United States in the 19
th
-century 
had “a highly developed democratic politics without a concentrated governing capacity.”51  This 
view posits that the national government had little taste for directly supervising the economy 
and, even if it had the desire, it lacked the administrative capacity to oversee it effectively.
52
  If 
Skowronek’s framework applied in this case, steamboat legislation might not have been enacted 
at all or, if passed, it would resemble the 1838 law with its emphasis on penalties, undeveloped 
administrative provisions, and dependence on the court system.  Instead, Congress pursued a 
multi-track policy to protect travelers and enacted a modern and sophisticated regulatory plan in 
1852.  As with subsequent instances where Congress expanded governmental authority, the laws 
were the product of deliberations by legislators trying to address societal problems in a practical 
manner.
53
  Through the 1852 Steamboat Act, and the other policies we have examined, the vast 
majority of the members of Congress showed a substantial commitment to, in the words of 
Senator John Davis, “interpose and prevent [the] reckless [and] unnecessary sacrifice of human 
beings.”54   
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 61 
 
All 
1-2 
(May 3, 
1790) 
 
 
Regulation of 
Seamen in 
Merchant 
Service 
Select Committee 
(Thomas 
Fitzsimons, Pro-
Administration-
PA) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
July 20, 1790 
 
1 Stat. L. 131 
 
First mate can 
insist on vessel 
safety inspection.  
Ships must carry 
medicine & 
adequate provisions 
4 
5, b, p 
H.R. 128 
 
All 
15-1 
(March 
10, 1818) 
 
 
Regulating 
Passenger 
Ships and 
Vessels 
House Commerce 
& Manufactures 
(Thomas Newton, 
Jr., Republican – 
VA); 
Senate Commerce 
& Manufactures 
Committee 
(Nathan Sanford, 
Democratic 
Republican-NY) 
 
 
 No Becomes 
Law  
March 2, 
1819 
 
 
3 Stat. L. 488 
 
Ships cannot exceed 
2 passengers per 5 
tons.  Must carry 
adequate provisions 
mandated for 
passengers and 
crew.  Sec’y of State 
to compile an 
annual report on 
passengers arriving 
in the U.S. 
4 
5, a, b 
H.R. 238 
 
Steam 
18-1 
(May 22, 
1824) 
Regulating 
Steam Boats 
and for the 
Security of 
Passengers 
House Commerce 
Committee (Thomas 
Newton, Jr., 
Adams-Clay 
Republican – VA) 
H. Rept. 
125 
No Does not pass 
House 
 4, a 
5, c, d, f, i  
H.J.R. 10 
 
Steam 
18-1  
(May 25, 
1824) 
Provide 
security for 
passengers on 
steamboats 
(Lewis Condict 
Jackson 
Republican-NJ) 
H. Rept. 
125 
No Does not pass 
House 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury to inquire 
into the causes of 
explosions and be 
given power to 
regulate the 
construction and use 
of engines 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 361 
 
 
18-2  
(Feb. 25, 
1825) 
 
Enrolling or 
Registering 
Steam Vessels 
House Commerce 
Committee 
(Thomas Newton, 
Jr., Adams-Clay 
Republican – VA) 
 
 No Becomes 
Law 
March 3, 
1825 
 
4 Stat. L. 129 
 5 
S. 128 
 
All 
21-1 
(March 10, 
1830) 
Vessels to 
show lights at 
night 
(Samuel Smith, 
Jacksonian-MD) 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (Levi 
Woodbury, 
Jacksonian-NH) 
  Does not pass 
Senate 
 4, b 
5, c, p 
H.R. 458  
 
Steam 
21-1  
(May 4, 
1830) 
Amend Acts 
for registering 
and licensing 
steamboats and 
provide for the 
security of 
passengers 
House Select 
Committee on 
Memorial of 
Merchants and 
Steamboat Owners 
(Charles Wickliffe, 
Jacksonian–KY)  
 No Does not Pass 
House 
 4 
5, f, h, i 
H.R. 582 
 
Steam 
22-1 
(May 18, 
1832) 
Provide for the 
Better Security 
of Passengers 
in Steam 
Vessels 
Select Committee 
on Steam (Charles 
Wickliffe, 
Jacksonian–KY) 
H. Rept. 
478 
No Does not Pass 
House 
 4, a 
5, c, d, f, 
h, p 
H.R. 749 
 
All 
22-2  
(Feb. 25, 
1833) 
Amend 1819 
Act Regulating 
Passenger 
Ships and 
Vessels 
Commerce 
Committee 
(Benjamin Chew 
Howard, 
Jacksonian-MD)  
 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Allows some 
exceptions to the 
1819 Act so as to 
carry more 
passengers per ton 
for blacks emigrating 
to Liberia 
5, a 
APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
 
260 
Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 452 
 
Steam 
23-1 
(April 26, 
1834) 
Authorizes 
Navy to test 
Steam Engine 
Improvements 
House Select 
Committee on the 
Memorial of  
Benjamin Phillips 
(Edward D. White, 
Whig-LA); 
Sen. Nav. Affairs 
Comm. (Samuel 
Southard, Anti-
Jacksonian-NJ) 
H. Rept. 
426 
No Becomes 
Law  
June 30, 
1834 
 
 
4 Stat. L. 728  
Appropriates 
$5,000 to test steam 
engines of 
Benjamin Phillips 
and others 
2 
S. 201 
 
Steam 
23-1 & 23-
2 
(June 12, 
1834) 
Regulation of 
Steam Vessels 
Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs 
(Samuel Lewis 
Southard, Anti-
Jacksonian-NJ) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
 4, a 
5, b, c, f, 
h, i, j, k, n, 
o, p 
S. 20 
 
Steam 
23-2 
(Dec. 15, 
1834) 
Regulate Steam 
Vessels 
Senate Naval 
Affairs – (Samuel 
Southard, Anti-
Jacksonian—NJ) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
President appoints 
inspectors. Inspect 
hulls 1/year & test 
boilers every 3 
months.  License & 
test engineers.  
4, a 
5, b, c, f, 
h, i, j, k, n, 
o, p 
S. 183 
 
Steam 
24-2 
(Feb. 1, 
1837) 
Authorize Tests 
of Steam 
Engine 
Inventions 
Senate Select 
Committee on 
Memorial of A.B. 
Quinby (John 
Davis, W-MA) 
S. Rept. 
125 
No Passes 
Senate, Not 
House 
The House received 
this bill late in the 
short session and 
took no action on it 
1 
2 
5, l 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 1 
 
Steam 
25-2 
(Dec. 6, 
1837) 
Better 
Security of 
Passengers in 
Steam Vessels 
(The 1838 
steamboat act) 
Senate Select 
Committee on 
Steam (Felix 
Grundy, D-TN) 
House Judiciary 
Committee 
(Thomas Corwin, 
W-OH) 
 Jan. 22, 
1838: 
Senate 
defeats 
amendment 
to forbid 
racing: 
Yeas 15 
Nays 21; 
June 16, 
1838: 
House 
agrees to 
suspend the 
rules to 
consider the 
bill:  
Yeas 121 
Nays 56 
Becomes 
Law July 7, 
1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 304 
Inspect hulls and 
boilers to determine 
if they are safe and 
seaworthy.  Keep 
safety valve open 
when stopped. 
Inspectors to be 
appointed by 
district court judges 
and paid $5 per 
inspection by vessel 
masters.  
Explosions to serve 
as prima facie 
evidence of 
negligence. 
4, a 
5, c, d, f, i, 
p 
S. 73 
 
Steam 
25-2 
(Dec. 20, 
1837) 
Test 
Inventions to 
Prevent Boiler 
Explosions 
 
Senate Committee 
on Patents (John 
Ruggles, D-ME); 
House Commerce 
Committee (F.O.J. 
Smith, D-ME & 
Samuel Cush-man, 
D-NH) 
 June 16, 
1838: 
House 
agrees to 
suspend 
the rules 
to consider 
the bill:  
Yeas 121 
Nays 56 
Becomes 
Law  
June 28, 
1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 252 
 
This resulted in an 
investigation 
chaired by Prof. 
James Renwick 
which produced H. 
Doc. 170 (25-3) 
2 
S. 119  
 
Steam 
25-2 
(Jan. 3, 
1838) 
Examine 
Samuel Raub’s 
Safety Valve 
Senate Committee 
on Roads & Canals 
(John Tipton, D-IN) 
S. Rept. 
69 
 Does not pass 
Senate 
Superseded by S. 73, 
25-2 
2 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 365 
 
Steam 
25-2 
(Jan. 9, 
1838) 
Apply Samuel 
Raub’s Safety 
Valve to U.S. 
Vessels 
Select Committee 
on Steam (David 
Petrikin, D-PA;  
George W. Owens, 
D-GA) 
 
H. Rept. 
323  
No Does not pass 
House 
 3 
S. 389 
 
Steam 
25-2 
(July 4, 
1838) 
Supplemental 
to S. 73 to Test 
Inventions to 
Prevent Boiler 
Explosions 
Senate Select 
Committee on the 
Memorial of 
Edward D. Tippett 
(William D. 
Merrick, W-MD) 
 No Becomes 
Law July 7, 
1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 261 
Test Tippett’s 
safety steam engine 
and other 
promising 
inventions.  Results 
reported in H. Doc. 
170 (25-3) 
 
2 
H.R. 1071 
 
Steam 
25-3  
(Jan. 23, 
1839) 
Supplementary 
to the 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Select Committee 
on Steam Boilers 
(John Sergeant, W-
PA)  
 No Does not pass 
House 
Modify iron rods & 
chains provision of 
1838 Steamboat Act 
3 
4 
S. 303 
 
Steam 
25-3 
(Feb. 25, 
1839) 
Better Security 
of Passengers 
in Steam 
Vessels 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Ruggles, D-ME) 
Senate 
Document 
13 (25-3) 
No Does not pass 
Senate 
This was one of the 
most extensive early 
Senate steamboat 
bills with regulatory, 
penal and 
administrative 
provisions 
4, a 
5, c, f, h, i, 
k 
S. 247 
 
Steam 
26-1 
(March 2, 
1840)  
 
Better Security 
of Steam 
Vessel 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Ruggles, D-ME) 
S. Rept. 
241 
No Does not pass 
Senate 
Extensive early 
Senate steamboat bill 
with regulatory, 
penal and 
administrative 
provisions 
1 
4, a, b 
5, d, f, g, 
h, j, k, n, 
o, p 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 310 
 
All 
26-1 
(April 16, 
1840) 
 
Amend 1819 
Act for 
Regulating 
Passenger 
Ships and 
Vessels 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA); 
House Commerce 
Committee (Edward 
Curtis, W-NY) 
S. Rept. 
390 
 
No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
 5, a 
H.R. 484 
 
Steam 
26-1 
(July 10, 
1840) 
Purchase 
Samuel Raub’s 
Safety Valve 
Select Committee 
on the Petition of 
Samuel Raub 
(David Petrikin, D-
PA; Joseph Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY) 
H. Rept. 
651 
 
No Does not pass 
House 
Consideration 
postponed several 
times in order to deal 
with appropriations 
bills.  Session ended 
without action 
3 
H.R. 485 
 
Steam 
26-1 
(July 10, 
1840) 
Test Fire 
Prevention 
Apparatus for 
Steamboats 
Select Committee 
on Petition of 
Samuel Raub 
(David Petrikin, D-
PA; Joseph Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY) 
H. Rept. 
651 
(July 10, 
1840) 
No Does not pass 
House 
Postponed several 
times in order to 
consider 
appropriations bills.  
Session ended 
without action 
2 
H.R. 486 
 
Steam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26-1 
(July 10, 
1840) 
Amend the 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Select Committee 
on the Petition of 
Samuel Raub 
(Joseph Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY) 
H. Rept. 
651 
(July 10, 
1840) 
No Does not pass 
House 
This was the most 
detailed bill drafted 
by the House to date 
& required Raub’s 
Safety Valve.  
Considered mainly in 
the 2nd, brief session 
of Congress – 
postponed several 
times in order to 
consider 
appropriations bills.  
3 
4 
5, c, f, h, i, 
k, p 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 486 
 
Session ended 
without action 
S. 148 
 
Steam
 1
 
26-2 
(Dec. 24, 
1840) 
Better Security 
of Steam 
Vessel 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Ruggles, D-ME) 
 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Revised from S. 247  
(26-1) 
4, a 
5, c, h, i, j, 
k, l, n, o, p 
H.J.R. 19 
 
Steam 
27-2 
(Aug. 23, 
1842) 
 
 
Test Samuel 
Colt’s 
Submarine 
Battery and 
also test Boiler 
Safety Devices 
House Committee 
on Naval Affairs 
(Francis Mallory, 
W-VA) 
Senate Committee 
on Naval Affairs 
(William S. 
Archer, W-VA) 
 August 25, 
1842: 
House 
Passes: 
Yeas 110 
Nays 51 
Enacted 
August 31, 
1842 
 
5 Stat. L. 584 
Authorizes $15,000 
to test Colt’s 
invention and 
$6,000 to test boiler 
inventions by 
Thomas Easton, 
Ethan Campbell,  
A. B. Quinby & 
others 
 
2 
H.R. 602 
 
Steam 
27-2  
(Aug. 22, 
1842) 
and 27-3 
& 
(Feb. 3, 
1843) 
Modify the 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Select Committee 
on Steam (Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY) 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (Jabez 
Huntington, W-
CT) 
H. Rept. 
1033 
No Becomes 
Law 
March 3, 
1843 
 
5 Stat. L. 626 
Requires extra 
steering apparatus 
and amends 1838 
provision for rods 
& chains; adds 
$5,000 for H.J.R. 19 
Commission to test 
inventions, which 
resulted in S. 
Document 405 (28-
1) 
2 
4 
5, m, p 
S.J.R. 8 
 
Steam 
27-3 
(Feb. 10, 
1843) 
Test Invention 
to protect 
steamboats 
  No Does not pass 
Senate 
Protect against snags 2 
                                                 
1
 S. 148, 26
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
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Bill or 
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Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
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Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 829 
 
Steam 
27-3  
(Feb. 23, 
1843) 
Test Josiah 
Kirk’s Snag 
Fender 
Committee on 
Roads and Canals 
(Thomas 
McKennan, W-PA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 2 
H.R. 71 
 
Steam 
28-1 
(Jan. 18, 
1844) 
Amend the 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
W. Tibbatts, D-KY; 
Preston King, D-
NY) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Includes proposal for 
$20,000 to establish 
schools to train 
engineers in 
Cincinnati and St. 
Louis 
4 
5, c, f, h, j, 
k, l, n 
H.R. 594 
 
Steam 
28-2 
(Feb. 7, 
1845) 
Purchase 
Raub’s and 
Barnum’s 
Safety Valve 
for Public 
Steamships 
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
(Richard Franklin 
Simpson, D-SC) 
H. Rept. 
115 
No Does not pass 
House 
Appropriates $5,000 
to test and attach 
Raub’s valve and 
Barnum’s fire 
extinguisher to 5 
public steamships 
2 
H.J.R. 11 
 
Steam 
29-1 
(Jan. 27, 
1846) 
Test James 
Montgomery’s 
boiler safety 
invention 
Naval Affairs 
(Thomas Butler 
King, W-GA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 3 
H.R. 305 
 
Steam 
29-1  
(March 27, 
1846) 
Amend the 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
W. Tibbatts, D-KY) 
H. Doc. 25 No Does not pass 
House 
Requires hydrostatic 
testing of boilers 
every 6 months 
4, a, b 
5, g, h 
H.R. 501 
 
Efficient 
29-1 
(July 13, 
1846) 
Test Seth 
Lamb’s Paddle 
Wheels 
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
(William B. 
Maclay, D-NY) 
H. Rept. 
762 
No Does not pass 
House 
$2,000 to be 
appropriated for 
testing 
2 
H.R. 551 
 
Efficient 
29-1 
(August 
10, 1846) 
Sickels & 
Cook’s cut-off 
for Steam 
Engines 
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
(William B. 
Maclay, D-NY) 
H. Rept. 
834 
No Does not pass 
House 
Authorize Navy to 
purchase the “patent 
cut-off” for navy 
steamers—this was 
an efficiency device 
3 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 609 
 
Steam 
29-2 
(Jan. 20, 
1847) 
Steamboats on 
bays, sounds 
and lakes to 
have anchors, 
etc. 
(Robert C. 
Winthrop, W-MA); 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
W. Tibbatts, D-KY) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Requires steamers on 
bays, sounds, & 
lakes to carry 
anchors, chains, 
cables, pumps, etc. 
5, c 
H.R. 637 
 
All 
 
29-2 
(Feb. 1, 
1847) 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Merchant 
Vessels 
House Judiciary 
Committee 
(George Rathbun, 
D-NY); 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Adams Dix, D-NY) 
 Feb. 1, 
1847 
House 
passes:  
Yeas 94 
Nays 48 
Becomes 
Law 
Feb. 22, 1847 
 
 
9 Stat. L. 127 
Limits number of 
passengers in 
relation to deck 
space 
4 
5, a 
S. 177 
 
All 
29-2 
(Feb. 23, 
1847) 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Merchant 
Vessels 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Senator John 
Davis, W-MA); 
House Judiciary 
Committee 
(George Rathbun, 
D-NY) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
March 2, 
1847 
 
 
9 Stat. L. 149 
Clarifies time when 
9 Stat. L. 127 will go 
into effect. 
5, a 
S. 54 
 
All 
30-1  
(Jan. 5, 
1848) 
Exempt 
Colonization 
Vessels from 
Acts re: 
Carriage of 
Passengers 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Reverdy Johnson, 
W-MD) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
Jan 31, 1848 
 
 
9 Stat. L. 210 
Exempts Am. 
Colonization 
Society vessels 
carrying people to 
Africa from 1847 
Acts regulating 
passengers 
5, a 
H.R. 115 
 
All 
30-1 
(Jan. 25, 
1848) 
 
Amend Act to 
Regulate 
Passengers in 
Merchant 
Vessels 
Commerce 
Committee (Joseph 
Grinnell, W-MA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, a 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 218 
 
Steam 
30-1 
(Feb. 9, 
1848) 
Amend the 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
(James B. Bowlin, 
D-MO); Commerce 
Committee (Bannon 
G. Thibodeaux, LA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
  
H.R. 254 
 
Steam 
30-1 
(Feb. 29, 
1848) 
Supplementary 
to the 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (Bannon 
G. Thibodeaux, LA) 
H. Rept. 
260 
No Does not pass 
House 
Inspections to be in 
front of witnesses; 
additional penalties 
for bursting boilers 
4 
5, c, f, p 
H.R. 292 
 
All 
30-1 
(March 6, 
1848) 
 
Ventilation of 
Passenger 
Vessels 
House Commerce 
Committee (Joseph 
Grinnell, W-MA);  
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
May 17, 
1848 
 
 
9 Stat. L. 220 
 
Provide for 
adequate 
ventilation, cooking 
facilities and 
provisions; 
Customs inspectors 
to check on 
compliance; suits 
may be brought in 
district courts 
4 
5, a, b, l 
H.R. 738 
 
All 
30-2 
(Jan. 25, 
1849) 
Extend Laws 
Re: Carriage 
of Passengers 
in Merchant 
Vessels 
House Commerce 
Committee (Joseph 
Grinnell, W-MA) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
March 3, 
1849 
 
9 Stat. L. 399 
Apply laws for 
carriage of 
passengers to ports 
on the Pacific 
Ocean 
4 
5, a, b, l 
S. 60 
 
Steam 
31-1  
(Jan. 21, 
1850) 
31-2  
Authorizes 
District Courts 
to Appoint 
Additional 
Steamboat 
Inspectors  
(Sen. Solon 
Borland, D-AR) 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Hannibal Hamlin, 
D-ME) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
Extend existing 
(1838) steamboat 
inspection system to 
the Arkansas River. 
Similar to S. 25 (32-
1) 
4 
5 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 242 
 
Steam 
31-1 
(May 24, 
1850) 
Additional 
Security for 
Lives and 
Property of 
Persons 
navigating the 
Western 
Waters 
William K. 
Sebastian (D-AR); 
Senate Comm. 
Comm. (Hannibal 
Hamlin, D-ME); 
House Comm. 
Comm. (Charles 
Stetson, D-ME) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
Require non-steam 
vessels on the 
western rivers to 
display navigation 
lights and to use 
bells in poor 
visibility 
4 
5, c 
S. 284 
 
Steam 
31-1 
(July 16, 
1850) 
Amend Act 
Providing for 
the Security of 
Steam Vessel 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
In the Special 
Session (March 4-13, 
1851) Senator John 
Davis asked for a 
comprehensive 
report on steam 
vessels in the U.S.  
Results in S. Exec. 
Doc. 42 (32-1) 
4 
5, c, p 
H.R. 386 
 
Steam 
31-1 
(Sept. 7, 
1850) 
Amend 1838 
Steamboat Act 
House Commerce 
Committee (Robert 
M. McLane, D-
MD); Senate 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA) 
 No Passes House, 
not Senate 
H.R. 386 was passed 
by the House very 
late in the 1
st
 session.  
The bill was reported 
out of the Senate 
Commerce 
Committee in the 2
nd
 
session, but the 
Senate took no 
action.  Senator John 
Davis asked for a 
report on steam 
vessels in the U.S., 
which resulted in S. 
Exec. Doc. 42 (32-1) 
4 
5, a, c, h, i, 
j, k, l, o, p 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 25 
 
Steam 
32-1 
(Dec. 9, 
1851) 
Supplementary 
to the 1838 
Steamboat Act 
 
Senate Commerce 
Committee  (Solon 
Borland, D-AR) 
House Commerce 
Committee  
 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
Make Little Rock, 
AR a port of entry & 
authorizes district 
court to appoint 
additional steamboat 
inspectors (under the 
1838 Steamboat 
Law) 
 
4 
5, i 
H.R. 33 
 
All 
32-1  
(Dec. 17, 
1851) 
Amend Acts 
Regulating 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Merchant 
Vessels 
 
(John Henry Hobart 
Haws, W-NY) 
Commerce 
Committee Thomas 
J.D. Fuller, (D-ME) 
H. Rept. 
25 
No Does not pass 
House 
Imposes additional 
penalties for carrying 
too many passengers 
4 
5, a 
S.J.R. 12 
 
Steam 
32-1 
Jan. 15, 
1852 
Authorize 
investigation 
into boiler 
explosions 
(Charles T. James, 
D-RI); Committee 
on Naval Affairs 
(William M. Gwin 
(D-CA) 
 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Appoint a 5-member 
board to investigate 
causes prevention of 
explosions 
1 
S. 216  
 
All 
32-1  
(Feb. 16, 
1852) 
Amend Feb. 
22, 1847 Act to 
Regulate 
Carriage of 
Passengers on 
Merchant 
Vessels 
Commerce 
Committee 
(Hamilton Fish, W-
NY) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 223 
“The 
Steamboat 
Act” 
 
Steam 
32-1 
(Feb. 18, 
1852) 
Amend the 
Act for the 
Better 
Security of 
Passengers on 
Steam Vessels 
 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis W-MA); 
House Commerce 
Committee (David 
Seymour, D-NY; 
Thomas J.D. 
Fuller, D-ME) 
S. Exec. 
Doc. 42; 
S. Misc. 
Doc. 32 
Aug. 25, 
1852 
House 
passes: 
Yeas 147 
Nays 27; 
Aug. 28, 
1852 
Senate 
motion to 
table is 
defeated: 
Nays 43 
Yeas 8 
Becomes 
Law 
August 30, 
1852 
 
10 Stat. L. 61 
Inspect vessels and 
boilers; Appoint 
salaried inspectors; 
Examine and 
license engineers 
and pilots; penalties 
for noncompliance 
4 
5, b, c, g, 
h, i, j, k, 
m, n, o, p 
S. 260 
 
All 
32-1 
(March 3, 
1852) 
Amend 1847 
and 1848 Acts 
to Regulate 
Carriage of 
Passengers on 
Merchant 
Vessels 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA);  
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
Impose additional 
penalties on vessel 
masters for 
violations of the 
passenger laws 
4 
5, a 
H.R. 267 
 
All 
32-1  
(May 26, 
1852) 
Guard Against 
Vessel 
Collisions at 
Night 
 
Commerce 
Committee (Thomas 
B. Florence, D-PA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Sec. of Treasury to 
make regulations for 
night signal lights 
4, a 
5, c 
S. 492 
[Originally 
S.J.R. 50] 
 
All 
32-1 
(July 14, 
1852) 
Provide 
additional 
Security to 
Passengers on 
the Western 
Waters 
(William K. 
Sebastian, D-AR); 
Senate Comm. 
Comm. (Hannibal 
Hamlin, D-ME) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
Require signal lights 
at night on non-
steamboats and bells 
during fog.  Similar 
to S. 242 (31-1) 
4 
5, c 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S.J.R. 67 
 
Steam 
32-2 
(Dec. 29, 
1852) 
Allow more 
time for 
steamers to 
comply with 
the 1852 
Steamboat Act 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA); 
House Commerce 
Committee 
(David L. 
Seymour, D-NY) 
 
 
 No Becomes 
Law 
Jan 7, 1853 
 
 
10 Stat. L. 
261 
Give inspectors 
discretionary power 
to give steamers 
more time to 
comply with the 
1852 Steamboat Act 
5 
S.J.R. 79 
 
Steam 
32-2 
(Feb. 22, 
1853) 
Amend S.J.R. 
67 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (John 
Davis, W-MA); 
House Commerce 
Committee (James 
H. Duncan, W-
MA) 
 Feb. 22, 
1853 
amend to 
give vessel 
owners 4 
additional 
months to 
comply 
with the 
Steamboat 
Act is 
defeated: 
Yeas 14 
Nays 35 
 
Becomes 
Law 
March 3, 
1853 
 
 
10 Stat. L. 
262 
Allows inspectors 
flexibility to exempt 
steamers from some 
penalties & give 
more time to 
comply with the 
1852 Steamboat Act 
5 
S. 393 
 
 
33-1  
(June 8, 
1854) 
& 33-2 
Preserve Life 
& Property in 
Shipwrecks 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Hannibal Hamlin, 
D-ME); 
House Commerce 
Committee 
(Thomas J.D. 
Fuller, D-ME) 
 No Becomes 
Law 
Dec 14, 1854 
 
 
10 Stat. L. 
597 
Establish additional 
lifesaving stations 
with keepers and 
superintendants on 
NY & NJ coasts 
5  
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 408 
 
Steam 
33-1 
(June 21, 
1854) 
Supplemental 
to the 
Steamboat Act 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Hannibal Hamlin, 
D-ME) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
  
S. 489 
 
All 
33-1 
(Aug. 2, 
1854) 
Better 
Protection of 
Life and Health 
on Passenger 
Ships 
Select Committee 
on Sickness in 
Passenger Ships 
(Hamilton Fish, W-
NY) 
S. Rept. 
386 
No Does not pass 
Senate 
Require space for air 
and exercise; limit 
the number of 
passengers; require 
ventilation, sufficient 
food & water; 
protect female 
passengers; compile 
log of passengers; 
customs officials to 
inspect 
4 
5, a, b 
H.R. 559
2
 
 
Steam 
33-2 (Dec. 
7, 1854) 
Further 
Security of 
Steam Vessel 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (Felix 
Zollicoffer, W-TN) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Replaces 1838 
inspectors with the 
1852 act’s 
inspectors. Creates 
Supervising 
Inspector for Pacific 
Coast 
 
5, j 
H.R. 632 
 
All 
33-2 
(Jan. 10, 
1855) 
Regulate 
Carriage of 
Turpentine 
(Phillip Phillips, D-
AL); Commerce 
Committee (Tappan 
Wentworth, W-MA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Reported adversely 
by Mr. Wentworth 
and tabled with no 
further action 
 
 
                                                 
2
 H.R. 559, 33nd Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 669 
 
All 
33-2 
(Feb. 15, 
1855) 
Better 
Protection of 
Life and Health 
on Passenger 
Ships 
Commerce 
Committee 
(William Henry 
Seward, R-NY) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Limit the number of 
passengers; require 
sufficient food & 
water; customs 
officials to inspect 
 
 
 
4 
5, a, b, c 
H.R. 757 
 
Steam 
33-2  
(Feb. 23, 
1855) 
Further Amend 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (Aaron 
Harlan, W-OH) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Extend 1852 
Steamboat Act to 
ferry boats, tug 
boats, & tow boats; 
hire additional 
inspectors; mandate 
emergency signals 
for disasters & 
additional penalties 
for violations 
 
 
4 
5, c, e, j, p 
H.R. 752 
 
Steam & 
All 
33-2  
(Feb. 24, 
1855) 
 
Regulate 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Steamships 
and Other 
Vessels 
House Commerce 
Committee 
(Thomas J.D. 
Fuller, D-ME); 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (Judah 
P. Benjamin, W-
LA) 
 No Becomes 
Law March 
3, 1855 
 
 
10 Stat. L. 
715 
Required additional 
food & water. 
Better ventilation & 
living conditions to 
secure to and from 
foreign ports.  
Customs officials to 
inspect and 
administer the act 
 
 
 
4 
5, a, b, c 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 112 
 
Steam 
34-1 
(Feb. 25, 
1856) 
Amend the Act 
for the Security 
of Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee 
(Hannibal Hamlin, 
D-ME) 
S. Rept. 
138  
No Does not pass 
Senate 
Extend 1852 
Steamboat Act to 
ferry boats, tug 
boats, & towing 
boats; regulate 
transport of 
hazardous materials; 
rules for signal lights 
and passing vessels; 
hire additional 
inspectors 
 
4, a 
5, c, e, g, j, 
l, n, o, p 
H.R. 92 
 
Steam 
34-1 & 34-
2 & 34-3 
(Feb. 28-
Apr. 22, 
1856) 
Further to 
Amend the Act 
for the Security 
of Passengers 
Committee of 
Commerce (Elihu 
Benjamin 
Washburne, 
Opposition-IL) 
 
H. Rept. 
68 
No Passes House, 
not Senate 
Extend 1852 Steam-
boat Act to ferry 
boats, tug boats, & 
tow boats.  Similar to 
H.R. 757 (33-2)s 
4 
5, c, f, g, 
n, o, p 
S. 168 
 
Steam 
34-1 
(Mar. 14, 
1856) 
Amend the Act 
for the Security 
of Passengers 
Committee of 
Commerce 
(Clement C. Clay, 
D-AL)  
S. Rept. 
138 
No Does not pass 
Senate 
  
S. 188 
 
All 
34-1 
(Mar. 24, 
1856) 
 
Amend 1819 
Act Regulating 
Passenger 
Vessels 
Committee of 
Commerce (Charles 
Sumner, 
Opposition- MA; 
Hannibal Hamlin, 
D-ME) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Keep record of 
people entering U.S. 
by land 
5 
S. 277 
 
All 
34-1 & 34-
2 
(May 1, 
1856) 
Provide 
Uniform Code 
of Maritime 
Signals 
Committee of 
Commerce (Judah 
Philip Benjamin, 
Opposition-LA) 
S. Rept. 
150 
No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
 3 
4 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 437 
 
All 
34-1  
(July 2, 
1856) 
Better Security 
of Sail and 
Steam 
Passengers 
(William W. Valk, 
American-NY) 
  Does not pass 
House 
  
S. 506 
 
Steam 
34-3 
(Jan. 15, 
1857) 
Further to 
amend the 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee 
(William Henry, R-
NY) 
 
S. Doc. 9 
& S. Exec. 
Doc. 15 
No  
(p. 91 SJ) 
 
Does not pass 
Senate 
Additional 
provisions to prevent 
and extinguish fires 
5, c 
S. 599 
 
Steam 
34-3 
(Feb. 18, 
1857) 
Further Amend 
1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee 
(William Henry 
Seward, R-NY) 
 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Similar to S. 112 
(34-1) 
4, a 
5, c, g, j, l, 
o, p 
H.R. 676
3
 
 
Steam 
34-3 
 
Establish 
Inspection 
District in 
Paducah, KY 
Commerce 
Committee (Henry 
C. Burnett, D-KY) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, j 
H.R. 45 
 
Steam 
35-1 &  
35-2 
(Jan. 6, 
1858) 
Further to 
Amend the 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (Elihu 
Benjamin 
Washburne, R-IL) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
Similar to H.R. 757 
(33-2)  
4, a 
5, a, c, j, k, 
o, p 
 
H.R. 103 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(Jan. 18, 
1858) 
Amend the 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (Miles 
Taylor, D-LA) 
 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 4, b 
5, c 
H.R. 162 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(Jan. 20, 
1858) 
Provide better 
Security for 
Ocean Steamer 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (Charles 
Lewis Scott, D-CA) 
 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 3 
4 
5, a, c 
                                                 
3
 H.R. 676, 34
th
 Cong., 3
rd
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
APPENDIX A (CONTINUED) 
 
276 
Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
H.R. 205 
 
All 
35-1 
(Jan. 21, 
1858) 
Introduce 
National Code 
of Marine 
Signals 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Cochrane, D-NY) 
 
 
 
 No  Does not pass 
House 
 3 
4, a 
5, p 
S. 84 
 
All 
35-1 
(Jan. 25, 
1858) 
 
[Amended 
March 19, 
1858] 
Provide for 
better night 
signals on 
sailing vessels 
Commerce 
Committee (Charles 
Edward Stuart, D-
MI; Judah P. 
Benjamin, D-LA) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
 4 
5, c, p 
H.R. 241
4
 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(Jan. 28, 
1858) 
 
Establish 
Inspection 
District in 
Paducah, KY 
Commerce 
Committee (Henry 
C. Burnett, D-KY; 
Elihu Washburne, 
R-IL) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, l 
S. 138 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(Feb. 15, 
1858) 
Further 
Security of 
Steamboat 
Passengers 
 
Commerce 
Committee (Judah 
Philip Benjamin, D-
LA) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Similar to S. 599, 34-
3 
3 
4, a 
5, a, c, g, j, 
k, l, m, o, 
p 
S. 174 
 
All 
35-1 
(March 2, 
1858) 
 
 
Amend March 
3, 1855 Act to 
Regulate 
Carriage of 
Passengers 
 
 
Committee on the 
Judiciary (William 
Henry, R-NY) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
Protect female 
passengers on ocean 
voyages 
4 
5 
                                                 
4
 H.R. 241, 35
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 192 
 
All 
35-1 
(Mar. 12, 
1858) 
 
 
Provide for 
International 
Code of Marine 
Signals 
 
 
Commerce 
Committee (Judah 
Philip Benjamin, 
W- LA) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
 3 
H.R. 401
5
 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(March 16, 
1858) 
 
Establish 
Inspection 
District at 
Napoleon, Ark. 
Commerce 
Committee (Edward 
A. Warren, D-AR; 
Elihu Washburne, 
R-IL) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, l 
H.R. 485 
 
All 
35-1 
(Apr. 15, 
1858) 
Amend the 
March 3, 1855 
Act Regulating 
the Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Steamships 
Commerce 
Committee (John 
Cochrane, D-NY) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 4 
5 
S. 285
6
 
 
Steam 
35-1 
(April 24, 
1858) 
Better Security 
of Passengers 
on Ocean 
Steamers 
Committee of Post 
Offices and Post 
Roads (William M. 
Gwin, D-CA) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
 4 
5, a, c, k 
H.R. 694
7
 
 
Steam 
35-2 
(Dec. 23, 
1858) 
Establish 
Inspection 
District at 
Memphis, TN 
Commerce 
Committee 
(William T. Avery, 
D-TN; Elihu 
Washburne, R-IL) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, l 
                                                 
5
 H.R. 401, 35
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
6
 S. 285, 35
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
7
 H.R. 694, 35
th
 Cong., 2
nd
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
S. 3 
 
All 
36-1 
(Dec. 21, 
1859) 
Amend March 
3, 1855 Act to 
Regulate 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Steamships 
House Committee 
on the Judiciary; 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (James 
Asheton, Bayard, Jr. 
D-DE) 
 No Passes 
Senate, not 
House 
 4 
5 
H.R. 62 
 
Steam 
36-1 
(Feb. 16, 
1860) 
Amend the 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee (Miles 
Taylor, D-LA) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
  
H.R. 77
8
 
 
Steam 
36-1 
(Feb. 16, 
1860) 
Establish 
Inspection 
District for 
Paducah, KY 
Commerce 
Committee 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, l 
H.R. 83
9
 
 
Steam 
36-1 
(Feb. 16, 
1860) 
Establish Local 
Inspectors at 
Memphis, TN 
Commerce 
Committee 
(William T. Avery, 
D-TN) 
 No Does not pass 
House 
 5, l 
H.R. 114 
 
Steam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36-1 
(Mar. 1, 
1860) 
Further Safety 
of Steam 
Vessel 
Passengers 
Commerce 
Committee (Elihu 
Washburne, R-IL; 
John Cochrane, D-
NY); 
Senate Commerce 
Committee 
(Hannibal Hamlin, 
R-ME) 
H. Rept. 9 May 18, 
1860 
House vote 
to 
recommit 
the bill to 
the 
Commerce 
Committee  
Failed: 
55 Yeas 
Passes House, 
not Senate 
Extensively debated 
in the House; 
provisions similar to 
S. 138, 35-1 and 
H.R. 45, 35-1; House 
printed 500 extra 
copies of the 
committee report 
 
                                                 
8
 H.R. 77, 36
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
9
 H.R. 83, 36
th
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., Bound Volumes of Bills, NA. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
Congress – 
Session 
and Date 
Introduced 
Brief Name/ 
Description 
Responsible 
Committee(s) & 
(Legislator(s)) 
Related 
Report or 
Document 
Roll Call Outcome Comments Categories 
 
 
H.R. 114 
97 Nays 
May 18, 
1860 
House vote 
on passing 
the bill  
Succeeded: 
87 Yeas 
74 Nays 
H.R. 19 
 
All 
36-1 
(Mar. 7, 
1860) 
Amend March 
3, 1855 Act 
Regulating the 
Carriage of 
Passengers 
House Commerce 
Committee (John 
Cochrane, D-NY) 
Senate Commerce 
Committee (James 
A. Bayard, Jr., D-
DE)  
 No Becomes 
Law 
March 24, 
1860 
 
 
12 Stat. L. 3 
Further protection 
of emigrant female 
passengers 
4 
5 
S. 267 36-1 
(Mar.12, 
1860) 
Additional 
Equipment for 
Lifesaving 
Stations 
Commerce 
Committee (John C. 
Ten Eyck, R-NJ) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
  
S. 288 
 
Steam 
36-1 
(Mar. 16, 
1860) 
 
Create Pacific 
Coast 
Steamboat 
Inspection 
District 
(Milton Slocum 
Latham, D-CA); 
Commerce 
Committee 
(Clement Claiborne 
Clay, Jr., D-AL) 
 
S. Rept. 
162 
No Does not pass 
Senate 
 5, j 
S. 320 
 
All 
36-1 
(Mar. 29, 
1860) 
Introduce 
International 
Code of Marine 
Signals 
Commerce 
Committee 
(Clement Claiborne 
Clay, Jr., D-AL) 
 No Does not pass 
Senate 
 3 
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Most of the bills cited are available online at the Library of Congress, American Memory, Lawmaking Home, Bills and Resolutions. 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwhbsb.html (accessed August 1-15, 2009).  Others are available in the National Archives, 
Record Groups 46 and 233 in the Original Bill Files and the files of Bills Upon Which Further Action was Taken, as well as the 
Bound Volumes of Bills. 
 
The list is comprehensive for the years 1824 to 1860 regarding bills introduced to address the safety of sail and steam vessels.  There 
are several other relevant bills documented, including the original act to have steam vessels registered, as well as two acts before 1824 
concerning the health of passengers and crews on sailing vessels. 
 
Rows in bold type indicate bills enacted into law. 
 
Columns: 
Bill or Resolution: Number of the bill and indication of whether it was first introduced into the House or Senate.  “Steam” indicates 
that the bill was intended to apply to steam vessels.  “All” indicates that the bill was primarily directed toward sailing vessels, but that 
some provisions would generally affect steam vessels.  “Efficient” indicates an invention to be examined and tested intended to 
improve performance, rather than safety.  “Steam and All” refers to a bill in 1855 that was directed toward both sail and steam vessels, 
as by that time a growing number of steamers were regularly making lengthy oceanic voyages. 
 
Congress — Session and Date Introduced: Self-explanatory. 
 
Brief Name/Description: Abbreviated name or description of the bill or resolution. 
 
Responsible Committee(s) & (Legislator(s)): Committees to which the bills were referred and legislators who either introduced and/or 
were the major sponsors of the legislation, including their party affiliations and state.  When the bill reached the other house, the 
institutional affiliation of the legislator and committee is indicated. 
 
Related Report or Document: Committee report or Executive document (see Appendix B) that initiated, accompanied or was 
produced as a result of the bill. 
 
Roll Call: Whether or not a roll call vote was held on the legislation and the results.  Detailed results from these bills are in Appendix 
C. 
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Outcome: Whether or not the bill passed the House or Senate and date it was signed into law, as well as reference in the Statutes-at-
Large. 
 
Comments: Additional information about the bill or the process of consideration. 
 
Categories: Components of the bills and legislation.  In the case of laws, these apply to what was enacted, not as introduced or any 
intermediate amendments.  In some cases, a copy of the bill was not identified, and the Categories section has been left blank. 
1) – Investigate and report on the causes of accidents 
 
2) – Examine and Test inventions and apparatus, such as safety valves, engines, life preservers and lifeboats 
 
3) – Subsidize or Purchase safety apparatus with payment by the government or require vessels to use particular types of apparatus.  
E.g. Purchase patents for use by the U.S. (such as Raub’s Safety Valve) or mandate use of patented articles on all vessels, or give 
competitive advantages to certain safety devices (such as Evans’s Safety Guard) by requiring use of generic devices  
  
4) – Penalize vessel owners, masters, and/or operators with imprisonment or fines for reckless, unsafe behavior and noncompliance 
with other requirements 
 a) Informers to receive part of monetary penalties 
b) Deny insurance reimbursement & force those liable to pay for damages 
 
5) – Regulate operation of steam or other vessels 
 a) Limit number of passengers 
 b) Require adequate food stores and/or medicines 
c) Require safety equipment, such as fire pumps, lifeboats, & navigational lights 
d) Inspect hulls — standards left to discretion of inspector 
e) Inspect hulls, with specific standards for design and construction 
f) Inspect boilers/engines/machinery —  leave standards to the discretion of inspectors 
g) Inspect boilers/engines/machinery — specify standards for design, construction, & operation 
h) Test the strength of boilers at regular intervals, as by hydrostatic/hydraulic pressure 
i) Appoint inspectors at request of vessel owners and masters – vessel owner/master compensates them directly  
j) Hire and pay expert inspectors as salaried government employees 
k) Impose sanctions on inspectors for not performing duties 
l) Create or assign government administrative body to oversee operation of the act 
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m) Inspect and certify quality of materials, such as boiler iron 
n) Issue licenses to pilots and engineers after examining them for competence and character 
o) Regulate transport of dangerous materials  
– e.g. require protective containers for explosive or flammable cargo 
p) Set standards for safe operation – e.g. rules for passing other vessels, opening safety valves when stopped, etc. 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Rept. 125 18-1  
(May 22, 
1824) 
 
Report on causes of 
Steamboat 
Disasters  
Commerce 
Committee 
[Thomas Newton, 
Jr., Adams-Clay 
Republican-VA] 
Rejected a ban on high-
pressure engines, but 
advocated testing boiler 
strength boilers, requiring 
safety valves, penalizing 
weighting down safety 
valves & forbidding cast 
iron boilers 
Joint Resolution 
(H.J.R. 10) and 
bill H.R. 238  -- 
do not pass 
House 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Exec. Doc. 
69 
18-2 
(Jan. 31, 
1825) 
Report on accidents 
involving 
steamboats 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury  
Sec’y of the Treasury 
William Crawford 
recommended against 
legislation, except to 
penalize operators in case of 
disasters  
  
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 131  
 
21-2 
(March 3, 
1831) 
 
 
Information re: 
Dangers of 
Bursting Boilers 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury; Select 
Committee on 
Improving the 
Mississippi River 
and Protecting 
Passengers 
[Charles 
Wickliffe, 
Jacksonian-KY]  
Sec’y of the Treasury 
Samuel Ingham reported 
that steamboat owners and 
masters resisted giving 
information about bursting 
boilers, but that the 
department and Franklin 
Institute were cooperating 
to investigate the matter 
The Treasury 
Department 
eventually 
funded the 
Franklin 
Institute 
Investigation 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 226 22-1 
(May 2, 
1832) 
Petition Requesting 
experiment on J.O. 
Blair’s safe method 
for steam 
generation 
House Select 
Committee On 
Steam 
Includes a report by a 
committee of the Louisiana 
Legislature on Blair’s 
design for a safe steam 
engine along with Blair’s 
petition and discussion of 
the causes of boiler 
explosions. Contains 
versions of the water 
flashing into steam myth 
and explosive element myth 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 478 
 
22-1 
(May 18, 
1832) 
Committee Report 
and Info. Collected 
re: Bursting Boilers 
and Protecting 
Passengers 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury; House 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Charles 
Wickliffe, 
Jacksonian-KY] 
194-page report included a 
draft bill for greater security 
of passengers, testimony 
from people in the U.S. and 
information from abroad.  
Some errant theories were 
repeated, including the low 
water alone & water 
flashing into steam myths.  
Prof. Walter R. Johnson of 
the Franklin Institute gave 
results of experiments with 
steam.  Reprints diagrams 
of J.O. Blair’s safety 
devices 
H.R. 582  
– Does not pass 
the House 
 
6,000 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
S. Doc. 
[Document 
number  not 
listed] 
22-2 
(March 1, 
1833) 
Reprints H. Rept. 
478 from 22
nd
 
Congress, 1
st
 
Session 
Reprinting House 
Select Committee 
Report of May 18, 
1832 [William 
Wilkins, 
Jacksonian-PA] 
See above H. Rept. 478 (22-
1) 
  
3,000 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc.  
12 
23-1 
(Dec. 19, 
1833) 
Schenectady, NY 
inhabitants to 
prevent steamboat 
accidents 
Committee on 
Naval Affairs 
Asks for fire-fighting 
equipment on steam vessels, 
licensing for engineers and 
other measures 
S. 201 – does 
not pass Senate 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 426 23-1 
(April 26, 
1834) 
 
Recommends that 
the Sec’y of the 
Navy be authorized 
to test steam 
improvements 
House Select 
Comm. on the 
Invention of 
Benjamin 
Phillips; [Edward 
D. White, W-LA]
1
  
Propagates the myths of low 
water alone and water 
flashing into steam.  
Phillips’s steam engine was 
designed to avoid low water 
in the boilers and limit the 
damage if an explosion took 
place. 
See also comments on H. 
Doc. 35 (24-1) 
H.R. 452 
became law – 
Appropriated 
$5,000 for tests 
by the Navy  
 
 
__ 
 
No 
                                                 
1
 Representative Edward D. White of Louisiana was wounded in an explosion of the steamboat Lioness on the Red River on May 19, 1833.  Senator Josiah 
Johnston of Louisiana was killed in the same accident.  See James T. Lloyd, Lloyd’s Steamboat Directory and Disasters on the Western Rivers (Cincinnati, OH: 
James T. Lloyd & Co., 1856), 83, 87.  
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc.  
35 
24-1 
(Dec. 29, 
1835) 
Memorial of John 
C. Fr. Salomon to 
have his steam 
safety devices 
tested  
House Committee 
on Naval Affairs; 
Sec’y of the Navy 
Salomon was responding to 
the tests by the Navy Dept. 
authorized under H.R. 452 
(23-1) and wanted to 
present his improvements; 
Referred to the Sec’y of the 
Navy 
  
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 162 24-1 
(March 1, 
1836) 
Report from the 
Franklin Institute – 
Part 1 (Technical 
Report on 
Experiments) 
Committee of the 
Franklin Institute 
of Philadelphia; 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury 
Provides evidence from 
experiments on steam 
power & investigations into 
the causes of explosions.  
Reports ways to prevent 
them.  The evidence 
contradicts common myths 
about the causes of 
explosions  
 
 The Sec’y of the 
Treasury printed 500 
copies for the 
members of 
Congress.  The 
House printed 1035 
copies (“the usual 
number”) -- 5,000 
extra copies were 
proposed, but not 
ordered – the report 
was printed & 
excerpted in other 
publications 
--- 
No 
H. Doc. 114 24-2 
(Dec. 31, 
1836) 
Memorial of John 
C. Fr. Salomon 
Commerce 
Committee 
Salomon complains that the 
experiments on his engine 
plan by the Navy 
Department in February 
1836  were unfair 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
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or Document 
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[Legislator] 
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Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
Not printed as 
a House 
Document 
24-2  
(Dec. 20, 
1836) 
 
 
Report from the 
Franklin Institute – 
Part 2 – General 
Report 
Committee of the 
Franklin Institute 
of Philadelphia; 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury; Select 
Committee on 
Steamboat 
Navigation 
General report includes a 
detailed analysis of the 
causes of steamboat 
accidents plus a draft bill 
for Congress to consider.  
Report was referred to the 
House Select Committee on 
Steamboat Navigation 
Portions of the 
Institute’s draft 
bill were used as 
a template for  
S. 1 ( 25-2) 
Printed serially in 
The Journal of the 
Franklin Institute & 
excerpted elsewhere
2
 
--- 
Yes and No -  
The report was 
referred to a 
committee and was 
never printed 
S. Rept. 125 24-2 
(Feb. 1, 
1837) 
Recommends 
testing steam safety 
devices 
Select Committee 
on Memorial of 
A.B. Quinby 
[John Davis, W-
MA] 
Committee recommends an 
appropriation to test steam 
apparatus submitted by all 
interested inventors 
S. 183 –  
passed by 
Senate, not 
House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Rept. 159 24-2 
(Feb. 7, 
1837) 
Committee report 
and petition of 
Samuel Raub for 
his steam safety 
valve 
Committee on 
Roads & Canals 
[William 
Hendricks, Anti-
Jackson-IN] 
The Committee asked the 
Chief Engineer of the Navy 
to inspect Raub’s invention 
and recommended a $5,000 
appropriation to test it.  
Includes diagram of Raub’s 
apparatus & a favorable 
review published in the 
Journal of the Franklin 
Institute 
 
S. 183 –  
passed by 
Senate, not 
House 
 
2,000 
 
__ 
 
No 
                                                 
2
Bruce Sinclair, Philadelphia’s Philosopher Mechanics: A History of the Franklin Institute, 1824-1865 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1974), 181.  
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Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
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[Legislator] 
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Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
Not printed as 
a House 
Document 
25-2 
(Dec. 7, 
1837) 
Report on the 
strength of 
materials relating to 
steam boilers 
Franklin Institute 
on behalf of the 
Treasury 
Department 
Third part of Franklin 
Institute Report with tests 
overseen by Prof. Walter R. 
Johnson on boiler materials  
 Printed serially in the 
Journal of the 
Franklin Institute 
-- 
S. Doc.  
17 
25-2 
(Dec. 14, 
1837) 
A.B. Quinby’s 
petition to have his 
invention tested  
[John Davis, W-
MA] Committee 
on Patents and the 
Patent Office 
[John Ruggles, D-
ME] 
 
Includes copy of Feb. 1, 
1837 S. Rept. #125 (24-2) 
and also endorsements for 
Quinby’s invention 
S. 73 &  
S. 389 
-- Both bills to 
test safety 
devices became 
law 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc.  
51  
25-2  
(Dec. 29, 
1837) 
Petition of Samuel 
Raub  
Select Committee 
[David Petrikin, 
D-PA] 
Raub asked to have his 
invention applied to all 
steam engines owned by the 
U.S.  (see H. Rept. 323, 25-
2, below) 
H.R. 365 – did 
not pass the 
House -- bills  
S. 73 and S. 389 
became law 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Rept.  
69 
25-2 
(Jan. 3, 
1838) 
Report on Samuel 
Raub’s petition to 
test his invention 
Committee on 
Roads and Canals 
[John Tipton, D-
IN] 
The committee had seen 
Raub demonstrate a model 
of his invention during the 
24
th
 Cong. Includes 
diagrams of Raub’s 
modified apparatus 
 
S. 119 to test 
Raub’s 
Invention – did 
not pass Senate 
(though S. 73 & 
S. 389 to test 
inventions 
became law) 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 323 25-2 
(Jan. 9, 
1838) 
Report on the 
Petition of Samuel 
Raub for the 
government to 
purchase his safety 
valve  
Select Committee 
on Samuel Raub’s 
Memorial 
[George 
Welshman 
Owens, D-GA] 
Raub requested his 
invention be used on all 
steam engines owned by 
U.S. Gov’t.  Committee 
recommended $3,000 to test 
it 
H.R. 365 – this 
bill did not pass 
the House, but 
related bills S. 
73 and S. 389 
became law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Session & 
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Contents of Report 
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Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
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Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 100 25-2 
(Jan. 15, 
1838) 
Petition of Jonathan 
Morgan of Maine 
on Boiler 
Explosions 
 Puts forth theory of 
explosions contrasting with 
some of the findings of the 
Franklin Institute along with 
an explosive element myth 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 199 25-2 
(Feb. 15, 
1838) 
Memorial of the 
Mississippi 
Legislature 
 Asks for Congress to take 
action to improve the 
quality of steamboats and 
steamboat officers 
S. 1 – 
Becomes law 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 284 25-2 
(March 26, 
1838) 
Memorial of 
Delaware River 
Steamboat Owners 
Committee of the 
Whole 
Protests against S.1 
becoming law and critiques 
the bill that had already 
passed the Senate. Repeats 
the low water alone and 
water flashing into steam 
myths 
S. 1 –  
Becomes law  
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 289 25-2 
(March 26, 
1838) 
Memorial of 
Edward D. Tippett 
for his safety steam 
engine 
 Tippett asks for a subsidy 
from Congress 
S. 73 and S. 389 
to test 
inventions 
became law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Produced 
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Session & 
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Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 314 25-2  
(April 9, 
1838) 
Memorial of New 
York Steamboat 
Owners 
Judiciary 
Committee 
Duplicates arguments and 
text in H. Doc. 284, (25-2) 
as it memorializes against 
the bill S.1 becoming law.  
Also repeats the low water 
alone and water flashing 
into steam myths 
S. 1 –  
Becomes law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 335 25-2 
(April 16, 
1838) 
Memorial of 
Raritan River 
Steamboat Owners 
against the 
steamboat bill S.1 
Committee of the 
Whole 
Duplicates arguments and 
text in H. Doc. 314 (25-2) 
as it memorializes against 
the bill S.1 becoming law.  
Also repeats myths 
S. 1 –  
Becomes law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc.  
21 
25-3 
(Dec. 13, 
1838)  
 
Information Re: 
Use of Steam 
Engines in the U.S. 
Sec’y of 
Treasury; Select 
Committee on 
Steam Engines 
[John Sergeant, 
W-PA] 
472-page document gives 
the numbers of steam 
engines, explosions & other 
losses.  Extensive testimony 
gathered by Customs 
collectors.  Reports that 
many believe in the low 
water alone and water 
flashing into steam myths 
H.R. 1071 – 
does not pass 
House.   
 
10,000 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 13 25-3 
(Dec. 13, 
1838) 
Memorial of 
Louisville, KY 
Steamboat 
Proprietors and 
Operators 
Commerce 
Committee [John 
Ruggles, D-ME] 
Suggests extensively 
modifying the 1838 
steamboat act, including 
licensing engineers and 
more effectively inspecting 
hulls and engines  
S. 303 – does 
not pass Senate 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 87 
(Duplicate of 
S. Doc. 13, 
25-3, above) 
25-3 
(Dec. 20, 
1838); 
(ordered 
printed 
Jan. 16, 
1839) 
Memorial of 
Louisville, KY 
Steamboat 
Proprietors and 
Operators 
Select Committee 
on Steam [John 
Sergeant, W-PA] 
See S. Doc. 13 (25-3) above H.R. 1071 – 
does not pass 
House 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 88 25-3 
(Jan. 16, 
1839) 
Petition from 
Pittsburgh 
endorsing 
Cadwallader 
Evans’s Invention 
Select Committee 
on Steam [John 
Sergeant, W-PA] 
Cadwallader Evans asks for 
a committee to examine his 
invention and a small 
appropriation to test it.  
Accompanied by a 
description and 
endorsement by Pittsburgh 
citizens 
 
H.R. 1071 – 
does not pass 
House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 66 
& H. Doc. 99 
25-3 
(January 9, 
1839) & 
(January 
19, 1839) 
Letter from the 
Sec’y of the Navy 
concerning tests on 
steam inventions 
Sec’y of the 
Navy; Prof. James 
Renwick of NY 
chaired the 
Commission of 
Examiners 
Status report on 
examinations of inventions 
under S. 73 (passed June 28, 
1838) & S. 389 (passed July 
9, 1838) – the tests were not 
yet complete 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 87 
(Duplicates S. 
Doc. 13, 25-3 
and H. Doc. 
87, 25-3 – see 
above) 
25-3 
(Jan. 16, 
1839) 
Petition of 
Louisville, KY 
Steamboat Owners  
Select Committee 
on Steam  
Suggests modifying the 
1838 Steamboat Act, 
licensing engineers & 
conducting more effective 
inspections of engines and 
hulls 
H.R. 1071 – 
does not pass 
House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Was Printing 
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S. Doc. 164 
 
25-3 
(Jan. 30, 
1839) 
Petition of Samuel 
Raub for his safety 
valve to be used on 
U.S. government 
steam engines 
Commerce 
Committee 
Includes a copy of Raub’s 
1837 petition with 
description and illustrations 
of his safety valve.  Also 
reprints S. Report 69 (25-2)  
& H. Report 323 (25-2) [see 
above] which recommended 
testing Raub’s device  
  
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 173 25-3 
(Feb. 4, 
1839) 
Essay on Steam by 
Jacob Walter --
originally printed in 
a Louisville 
Newspaper 
Select Committee 
on Steam  
Walter was one of the 
inspectors in Louisville 
under the 1838 Steamboat 
Act.  He combined good 
recommendations for safe 
practices with fanciful 
theoretical speculations, 
including the explosive 
element and water flashing 
into steam myths 
  
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 170 25-3  
(Feb. 7, 
1839) 
Report of the 
Commissioners to 
Test Boiler 
Inventions under 
the Acts of June 28, 
1838 and July, 
1838 
Sec’y of the 
Navy; Prof. James 
Renwick of NY 
chaired the 
Commission of 
Examiners 
The report noted that some 
of the inventions (such as 
by Paul Boynton of NY, 
Owen Rankin of NC and 
A.B. Quinby of DC) were 
useful, but that no device 
could provide perfect safety 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 192 25-3 
(Feb. 7, 
1839) 
Document by 
Robert Schuyler on 
the causes of boiler 
explosions 
Commerce 
Committee 
Suggests modifying the 
1838 Steamboat Law, 
which Schuyler says is 
ineffective.  Propagates the 
low water alone myth  
S. 303 – does 
not pass Senate 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Was Printing 
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S. Doc. 217 25-3 
(Feb. 14, 
1839) 
Document by 
Loudon J. 
McCormick on 
Preventing Boiler 
Explosions 
Commerce 
Committee 
Criticizes the 1838 
Steamboat Law because it is 
not effectively 
administered.  Recommends 
better training for engineers, 
requiring larger safety 
valves, and more thorough 
inspections  
 
 
S. 303 – does 
not pass Senate 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 204 25-3 
(Feb. 18, 
1839) 
Petition of Samuel 
Raub requesting 
new tests on his 
safety valve 
Select Committee 
on Steam Boilers 
[David Petrikin, 
D-PA] 
Raub asks to demonstrate 
his invention and claims he 
did not get a fair test of it 
under the laws of June 28 
and July 9, 1838 (S. 73 & S. 
389) 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 151 26-1  
(Feb. 4, 
1840) 
Communication 
from Noah 
Fairbank on 
steamer fires 
Commerce 
Committee 
Recommends changes to 
vessel design to allow 
vessels to be steered in case 
of fire 
 
  
__ 
 
No 
S. Rept. 241 26-1 
(March 2, 
1840) 
Report on 
Amending the 1838 
Steamboat Act  
Commerce 
Committee [John 
Ruggles, D-ME] 
92-page report argues for a 
more comprehensive 
steamboat law, gives 
information on safety 
innovations, foreign 
technical developments & 
actions by European 
governments  
S. 247 -- does 
not pass Senate 
 
1,000 
 
__ 
 
No 
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S. Doc. 270 26-1 
(March 10, 
1840) 
Western lakes 
Steamboatmen 
asking modification 
of 1838 Steamboat 
Law  
 Argues that 1838 Steamboat 
Act is flawed by 
requirement that steering 
apparatus must have iron 
rods and chains to maintain 
steerage in case of fire 
 
S. 247 – does 
not pass Senate 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 309 26-1 
(March 24, 
1840) 
Steam Vessel 
Proprietors for 
modifying the 1838 
Steamboat law; 
appends 
information on 
American & 
English steamers & 
accidents 
 
 Says the 1838 Steamboat 
Act is intrusive & 
ineffectual and that 
steamboat owners are 
improving safety on their 
own (Portions repeated in 
H. Doc. 158, 26-1 [below] 
& S. Doc. 113, 26-2) 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
 
 
H. Doc. 158 26-1 
(March 30, 
1840) 
Steam Vessel 
Proprietors for 
modifying the 1838 
Steamboat law; 
Commerce 
Committee 
Says the 1838 Steamboat 
Act is intrusive & 
ineffectual and that 
steamboat owners are 
improving safety on their 
own (Repeats S. Doc. 309, 
26-1 [above] & portions 
repeated in S. Doc. 113, 26-
2) 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 208 26-1 
(May 18, 
1840) 
Resolution of the 
Mass. Legislature  
Commerce 
Committee 
Asks national government 
for more action to prevent 
loss of life in steamboats 
 __ 
 
No 
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S. Doc. 582 26-1 
(June 29, 
1840) 
Pittsburgh citizens 
memorial against 
requiring particular 
steam machinery 
 Pittsburgh citizens claim 
that the invention of 
Cadwallader Evans is 
superior to that of Samuel 
Raub, and that Congress 
should not give an 
advantage to any inventor 
 
H.R. 484 &  
H.R. 486 – 
Do not pass 
House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 597 26-1 
(July 7, 
1840) 
Washington DC 
citizens for 
requiring Raub’s 
safety valve 
 Claim that Raub’s safety 
valve is used by steamboats 
in the DC area and will 
prevent most explosions 
 
H.R. 484 – 
Does not pass 
House 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 651 
 
[Report was 
reprinted as H. 
Rept. 92, (26-
2) below] 
26-1 
(July 10, 
1840) 
Recommends 
purchasing Raub’s 
Safety Valve, 
Testing Apparatus 
to Extinguish 
Steamboat Fires, 
and Amending the 
1838 Steamboat 
Act 
Select Committee 
on Steam 
[Joseph Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY] 
34-page report recommends 
testing boilers, purchasing 
Raub’s safety valve, 
licensing engineers and 
changes in vessel design; 
gives testimony about the 
causes of explosions.  
Propagates the low water 
alone myth  
H.R. 484 
H.R. 485 
H.R. 486 
[None of these 
bills passed the 
House] 
Mr. Underwood 
made a motion to 
print 5,000 extra 
copies – no record 
that this was 
approved before the 
end of the session 
 
__ 
No 
H. Doc. 21 26-2, 
(Dec. 21, 
1840) 
List of Steam 
Vessel Accidents 
compiled by J.P. 
van Tyne (a private 
citizen) 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY] 
Van Tyne compiled tables 
from H.Doc. 21 (25-3) & 
other sources.  Blames a 
few reckless steamboat 
owners for the accidents & 
says the 1838 law is 
ineffective  
  
__ 
 
No 
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H. Rept. 92 
 
[Reprinting H. 
Rept. 651, 
(26-1)] 
26-2 
(Jan. 8, 
1841) 
Recommends 
purchasing Samuel 
Raub’s Safety 
Valve -- Testing 
Apparatus to 
Extinguish 
Steamboat Fires, & 
Amending 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Select Comm. on 
Steam (Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY) 
34-page report recommends 
testing boilers, purchasing 
Raub’s safety valves, 
licensing engineers, changes 
in vessel design and 
testimony about the causes 
of explosions.  Propagates 
the low water alone myth as 
a primary cause of 
explosions 
 
H.R. 484 
H.R. 485 
H.R. 486 
[None of these 
bills passed the 
House] 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 113 
[Partial 
duplicate of S. 
Doc. 309, 26-
1] 
26-2 
(Jan. 23, 
1841) 
Memorial of Steam 
Vessel Proprietors 
to modify 1838 
Steamboat Act 
 New York citizens engaged 
in steam navigation protest 
the 1838 Steamboat Law as 
unjust and injurious  
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc.  
79 
26-2 
(Jan. 25, 
1841) 
Charles T. James 
on Steamboat 
Boilers 
Committee of the 
Whole 
James insists there is 
definitive evidence that 
boilers burst only from too 
much pressure or from 
weakness of the boiler.  
Criticizes H. Repts. 651 
(26-1) & 92 (26-2) for 
misinformation on the 
causes of boiler explosions, 
especially for repeating the 
low water alone myth 
 
H.R. 486 – does 
not pass House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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S. Doc. 168 26-2 
(Feb. 8, 
1841) 
Samuel Raub’s 
Memorial for the 
Government to 
purchase his safety 
valve and require 
its use 
Commerce 
Committee 
Raub reasserts his belief 
that “deficiency of water” is 
the major cause of boiler 
explosions, a version of the 
low water alone myth 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 188 26-2 
(Feb. 15, 
1841) 
Memorial of 
Pittsburgh citizens 
to examine 
inventions to 
prevent boiler 
explosions 
 Pittsburgh engineers, engine 
builders, vessel captains and 
merchants against requiring 
Raub’s safety valve on 
steamers.  They assert that 
two inventions by 
Pittsburgh citizens are 
superior to Raub’s device 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. No. 
124 
27-2 
(March 7, 
1842) 
Memorial of 
Thomas S. Easton 
asking the 
government to test 
his invention and 
purchase his patent 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY; Mr. Shields] 
Easton’s device was 
examined by the Navy 
Department.  See Senate 
Exec. Doc. 336 (below) 
Sec’y of the 
Navy A. P. 
Upshur suggests 
that a regular 
appropriation be 
made for the 
Navy to test 
valuable 
inventions 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Was Printing 
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S. Exec. Doc. 
336 
27-2 
(June 25, 
1842) 
Report on Thomas 
Easton’s first 
invention to 
prevent explosions 
Sec’y of the Navy 39-page report by Prof. 
Walter R. Johnson, states 
that, with modifications, 
Easton’s invention can be 
useful in preventing boiler 
explosions.  The report 
gives numerous 
recommendations to 
improve the mechanism 
Sec’y of the 
Navy Abel P. 
Upshur suggests 
that a regular 
appropriation be 
made for the 
Navy to test 
valuable 
inventions  
 
500 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Exec. Doc. 
439 
27-2 
(Aug. 22, 
1842) 
Report on Thomas 
Easton’s second 
invention to 
prevent explosions 
Sec’y of the 
Navy; Committee 
on Naval Affairs 
Report authored by Prof. 
Walter R. Johnson says 
Easton’s second invention 
“merits attention” -- 
Includes printed diagram of 
Easton’s apparatus 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 1033 27-2 
(Aug. 22, 
1842) 
Report on the 
petition of 
steamboat owners 
to modify the 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Joseph 
R. Underwood, 
W-KY] 
Recommends repealing 
provision of 1838 steamboat 
act requiring iron rods or 
chains as part of steering 
mechanisms 
H.R. 602 – 
becomes law in 
1843 & directs 
the Navy Dept. 
to examine 
inventions 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 
59 
 
27-3 
(January 
13, 1843) 
Thomas Easton’s 
memorial asking 
for more tests to 
compare his 
invention to all 
others 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W-
KY] 
 
Easton includes a copy of 
the report by the Navy 
Department on his previous 
invention [S. Exec. Doc.  
439, 27-2] as evidence of its 
effectiveness 
 
  
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 
145 
 
[Partially 
identical to  
H. Doc. 68, 
28-1] 
27-3 
(Feb. 13, 
1843) 
Supplement to the 
Petition of 
Cincinnati 
Association of 
Steam Engineers 
for a new 
investigation into 
the causes of 
explosions 
Select Committee 
on Steam [Joseph 
Rogers 
Underwood, W- 
KY] 
The engineers cite 
contradictory opinions on 
the causes of boiler 
explosions from sources 
including the Franklin 
Institute reports.  Argue that 
Congress needs information 
from practical engineers, 
not theorists 
 
  
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc.178 27-3 
(Feb. 15, 
1843) 
Statement of Boats 
Lost on the 
Western Rivers 
from 1840-43 
 Statement by insurance 
representative Calvin Case 
on the values of boats and 
cargoes lost on the 
Missouri, Mississippi and 
Ohio Rivers, 1840-42 
 
  
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 170 27-3  
(Feb. 22, 
1843) 
Information re: 
steamboats on the 
Mississippi River 
and Northern Lakes 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury 
Statement of the numbers, 
values and losses of 
steamboats on the 
Mississippi and the Great 
Lakes from Jan 1, 1841 to 
Jan. 1, 1843 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc.  
68 
 
[Partially 
identical to  
H. Doc. 145, 
27-3] 
28-1 
(Jan. 18, 
1844) 
Supplement to the 
Petition of Steam 
Engineers of 
Cincinnati 
Commerce 
Committee 
[John W. 
Tibbatts, D-KY] 
Reprints the engineer’s 
petition published Feb. 13, 
1843 as H. Doc. 145 (27-3).  
It  also critiques the 1838 
law and suggests amending 
it to give greater safety to 
passengers 
H.R. 71 –  
Does not pass 
House 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Doc. 267  28-1 
(May 27, 
1844) 
Letter re: Report on 
experiments on 
inventions to 
prevent boiler 
explosions 
Sec’y of the 
Navy; Prof. 
Walter R. Johnson 
led a commission 
conducting 
experiments 
Prof. Johnson writes that the 
investigation is proceeding, 
but that the appropriation 
has been exhausted and the 
board members are using 
their personal funds for 
experiments 
 
H.R. 602 – 
authorized tests 
on safety 
devices 
 
5 Stat. L. 626 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
 
S. Doc. 405  28-1 
(June 17, 
1844) 
Report on 
experiments on 
inventions to 
prevent boiler 
explosions 
Sec’y of the 
Navy; Prof. 
Walter R. Johnson 
of Philadelphia 
was the lead 
examiner 
Investigation authorized by 
the March 3, 1843 revisions 
of the 1838 Steamboat Act.  
The examiners judged that 
some mechanisms were 
effective, but that no device 
could provide security in 
the face of “ignorance and 
temerity.”  Includes 
diagrams of some devices 
 
 
H.R. 602 – 
authorized tests 
on safety 
devices 
 
5 Stat. L. 626 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Rept. 115 28-2 
(Feb. 7, 
1845) 
Report on safety 
devices including 
Raub’s & 
Barnum’s safety 
valves  
Naval Affairs 
Committee 
[Richard Franklin 
Simpson, D-SC] 
Endorses Samuel Raub’s 
and D. Barnum’s safety 
valves – Report propagates 
low water alone myth 
H.R. 594 – does 
not pass the 
House.  
Proposed $5,000 
to install the 
valves on public 
vessels 
 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Rept. 123 28-2  
(Feb. 13, 
1845) 
Dr. William M. 
Wright of 
Pittsburgh asks for 
tests of his safety 
valve 
Committee on 
Patents [Thomas 
J. Henley, D-IN] 
Committee likes the concept 
of Wright’s valve but asks 
for tests before 
recommending its purchase.  
Report propagates low 
water alone myth 
 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
H. Doc. 25 
 
[Reprints H. 
Doc. 145 (27-
3) and H. Doc. 
68 (28-1)] 
29-1 
(Dec. 11, 
1845) 
Supplement to the 
Petition of practical 
steam engineers of 
Cincinnati 
Commerce 
Committee 
The petition recommends a 
new steamboat law, 
including funding 
experiments on boilers to be 
conducted by practical 
steam engineers 
H.R. 305 – does 
not pass House 
 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 174 29-1 
(Feb. 26, 
1846) 
Report by the Sec’y 
of the Treasury on 
Vessels carrying 
lights  
Sec’y of the 
Treasury, 
Commerce 
Committee  
The Sec’y recommends that 
vessels on the Delaware 
River should carry lights at 
night to avoid collision 
  
__ 
 
No 
S. Doc. 
11 
29-2  
(Dec. 15, 
1846) 
Report by the Sec’y 
of the Treasury on 
all vessels on the 
coasts to carry 
lights 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury, 
Commerce 
Committee 
The Sec’y recommends that 
while lights should be used 
on vessels in the interior, 
many believe that they will 
cause confusion on the 
coasts 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
H. Rept. 260 30-1 
(Feb. 29, 
1848) 
Revisions of 1838 
Steamboat Act 
Commerce 
Committee 
[Bannon G. 
Thibodeaux, LA] 
Proposes to add penalties 
for violating the 1838 law, 
that inspections take place 
before witnesses & more 
fire safety equipment be 
required  
H.R. 254 –  
Did not pass the 
House 
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Rept. 135 30-1 
(April 19, 
1848) 
Report on 
Requiring Use of 
Cadwallader 
Evans’s Safety 
Valve 
Commerce 
Committee [John 
A. Dix, D-NY] 
The committee believed that 
Evans’s Guard was 
effective, but preferred to 
leave introduction and use 
of inventions in private 
hands 
  
__ 
 
No 
S. Rept. 241 30-1 
(Aug. 11, 
1848) 
Committee Report 
on Loss of Life and 
Property in 
Steamers 
Commerce 
Committee [John 
Davis, W-MA] 
Report asks Sec’y of the 
Treasury to gather and 
report on all useful 
information about steam 
vessel explosions and 
collisions 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
S. Exec. Doc. 
9 
30-2  
(Jan. 8, 
1849) 
Report on Patented 
Innovations to 
Prevent Boiler 
Explosions 
Commissioner of 
Patents; 
Committee on 
Patents; 
[Senator James 
Westcott, D-FL] 
The Commissioner reported 
that none of the inventions 
that Congress asked about 
were novel or had been 
issued patents 
  
 
__ 
 
No 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
S. Exec. Doc. 
18  
30-2 
(Jan. 8, 
1849) 
Report on 
Explosions of 
Steam Boilers and 
on the question of 
whether Amending 
the Patent Laws is 
appropriate 
Commissioner of 
Patents; 
Commerce 
Committee, 
[Sen. James 
Westcott, D-FL 
and Sen. John 
Davis, W-MA] 
Concludes that safety 
mechanisms can be helpful, 
but none can guarantee 
perfect safety  -- Includes 
extensive information from 
the Franklin Institute Report 
 10,000 (9,500 for use 
of the Senate and 500 
for the Commissioner 
of Patents ordered on 
Jan. 24, 1849) 
__ 
No, though Senator 
Westcott requested 
30,000 extra copies 
S. Doc.  
4 
31-Special 
Session 
(March 15, 
1849) 
Documents on 
Preventing Steam 
Boiler Explosions 
Commerce 
Committee [John 
Davis, W-MA] 
94-page compilation of 
information received by 
Congress on the subject 
since 1842 
  
__ 
 
No 
S. Misc. Doc. 
13 
31-2 
(Jan. 29, 
1851) 
Communication 
from W.W. Guthrie 
re: Causes of Boiler 
Explosions 
Commerce 
Committee [John 
Davis, W-MA] 
Criticizes S. 242 of 31st 
Cong., 1
st
 Sess.  Includes 
treatise on explosions.  
Recommends limiting 
pressure & using Evans’s 
Safety Guard 
  
__ 
 
No 
S. Exec. Doc.  
42 
32-1 
(Jan. 21, 
1852) 
 
Report on the 
History and 
Statistics of the 
Steam Marine of 
the U.S. 
Sec’y of the 
Treasury; 
Commerce 
Committee [Sen. 
John Davis, W-
MA] 
Senator John Davis cited 
extensively from this report 
when he introduced S. 223 
S. 223 – 
Becomes law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
APPENDIX B (CONTINUED) 
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Document(s) 
Produced 
Congress: 
Session & 
Date 
Contents of Report 
or Document 
Source(s) and/or 
Reference & 
[Legislator] 
Comments 
 
Related Bill(s), 
Joint 
Resolution or 
Other Action 
 
Number of Extra 
Copies Printed 
--- 
Was Printing 
Contested? (Yes/No) 
S. Misc. Doc. 
32 
32-1 
(Feb. 6, 
1852) 
Memorial of 
engineer Alfred P. 
Guthrie on causes 
of explosions 
Commerce 
Committee 
[John Davis, W-
MA and James 
Shields, D-IL] 
Guthrie evaluates the causes 
of explosions & explains 
and illustrates his inventions 
designed to prevent them 
S. 223 – 
Becomes law 
5,500 – 500 for 
Guthrie’s use and 
5,000 for Senate use 
__ 
Yes – a senator 
objected
3
 
S. Misc. Doc. 
84 
32-1 
(May 13, 
1852) 
Memorial of 
Benjamin Crawford 
on behalf of the 
Pittsburgh 
Association of 
Engineers in favor 
of S. 223 
 Crawford praises the 
provisions of S. 223 and 
asserts that Western 
steamboatmen favor it.  
Crawford consulted with 
Senator John Davis while 
Davis drafted the bill.
4
 
S. 223 –  
Becomes law 
 
 
__ 
 
No 
 
Explanation of headings 
 
Document(s) Produced: Indicates whether the document was printed by order of the House of Representatives or the Senate, if it was 
a document or a legislative committee report.  Documents were often compiled by an executive department; though they were also 
sometimes letters or communications sent to Congress by private citizens, non-governmental organizations, or resolutions by state 
legislatures. 
 
Congress – Session and Date: Session of Congress and date the document was ordered printed.  E.g., “18-2” means the 18th Congress, 
2
nd
 Session. 
 
Contents of Report or Document: Brief description of the document’s contents. 
                                                 
3
 John P. Hale of New Hampshire objected to printing the extra copies, but they were printed anyway. CG, 32
nd
 Cong., 1
st
 sess., 1852, 24, 487. 
4
 Benjamin Crawford was later, under the 1852 Steamboat Act, appointed a supervising inspector at the port of Pittsburgh. 
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Source(s) or Reference [& Legislator]: Name of the executive department or other group that did most of the work on the document 
and/or the name of the committees that generated it or to which it was referred.  Name of the legislator or legislators most closely 
concerned with the document; usually, this was a member of the committee to which it was referred.  When this section is blank, it 
usually means that the document was tabled.  Documents were sometimes tabled because the House or Senate was engaged in other 
business when the document was received, because it was received at the end of a session, because the document duplicated 
information that was already available, or because the relevant committee had already completed its work on the subject. 
 
Comments: Information about what was in the document. 
 
Related Bill(s), Joint Resolutions or Action: Number of bill that accompanied the document or was produced by a congressional 
committee that was considering the question of steam vessel accidents.  Indication of whether the bill was passed or not, or if other 
action was taken. 
 
Number of Extra Copies Printed – Printing Contested? (Yes/No): Number of extra copies ordered of the document over and above 
the “usual number.”  A “Yes” means there was some objection and debate about printing the document recorded in the House or 
Senate Journals or floor proceedings; a “No” means the proposed printing was agreed to without objection.  Almost all of these 
documents were printed without objection. 
 
The “Usual Number” of Documents  
The “usual number” of documents was how many copies of documents were printed when one chamber ordered a document printed 
but ordered no extra copies.  Hundreds of copies of documents were routinely produced every time the Senate or House ordered a 
document to be printed.  They were available for use by congressmen and some of them were sent out to executive departments, state 
legislatures and governors, libraries and historical societies. The usual number increased over the years.  In the Senate, for example, 
the usual number was 600 copies of documents, 400 copies of bills and 3,000 copies of the President’s Annual Message during the 
19
th
 Congress (1825-1827).  During the Second Session of the 28
th
 Congress (1844-1845) the Senate’s usual number was 1214 
documents, 770 copies of public bills and 554 copies of private bills.
5
  In 1833 the House of Representative’s usual number was 1,000 
copies of Documents and Reports, 485 copies of bills and 10,000 copies of the President’s Annual Message.  In 1847 the usual 
number in the House was 1380 copies of documents and reports and 600 copies of bills.
6
 
                                                 
5
 August A. Imholtz, Jr., “The Printing and Distribution of the Serial Set: A Preliminary Contribution to 19 th Century Printing,” DTTP: Documents to the 
People,  31/1 (2003): 8-17. 
6
 Ibid. 
APPENDIX B (CONTINUED) 
 
306 
 
Popular Myths about Explosions
7
 
Explosive element myth – This was the belief that processes in the steam boiler caused an explosive element or compound to form.  
The most common version of this myth was that interaction with the metal caused water to decompose into oxygen and explosive 
hydrogen.  While this myth was debunked numerous times, it was repeated for many decades in newspapers and other journals.  It 
often was combined with the Low water alone myth to theorize that the hydrogen gas was formed when water suddenly contacted 
heated boiler metal. 
 
Low water alone myth – This was the belief, especially persistent in the West, that low water in the boiler was the most important or 
only cause of explosions.  There were two main versions: that when water became low in the boiler and was replaced too rapidly the 
contact with hot metal or superheated steam caused it to flash into highly expansive steam (Water flashing into steam myth) which 
would cause an explosion as too much pressure overcame the structure of the boiler.  The second version was related to the Explosive 
element myth, with the belief that metal uncovered by water somehow interacted with other elements to produce an explosive force.  
Many inventors worked to devise mechanisms to assure an adequate water supply, provide effective ways to monitor the water level 
or give a warning when the water level was low.  Low water in the boiler did contribute to explosions, but was not the exclusive or 
most likely cause.  Low water caused problems mainly because overheated metal lost tensile strength (and was thus more vulnerable 
to failure) and also uneven heating of metal would cause fatigue or parts to separate as they expanded and contracted at different rates. 
 
Water flashing into steam myth – There were two main versions of this belief.  The first was more a case of misdirection than a myth.  
This was the belief that the primary or only cause of explosions was from exposing water to hot boiler metal which would suddenly 
produce a huge amount of expansive steam which would overload the boiler.  The Franklin Institute investigation showed that steam 
could be generated in this way and it probably did cause some explosions.  However, it was probably not as much of a danger as many 
observers believed, since red hot boilers did not generate as much steam when water contacted them as they did at an intermediate 
temperature.  This belief also tended to distract steamboat operators into emphasizing maintaining adequate water levels rather than 
making sure the pressure was within acceptable limits and the boiler was clean and free of weakness.  Another version was pushed 
especially by engineer Jacob Perkins, who claimed that overheated metal produced steam so saturated with heat that water added was 
instantly converted to expansive steam that could burst the boiler.
8
  The experiments conducted by the Franklin Institute found 
evidence that Perkins’s theory was incorrect and that injecting cold water into steam actually reduced the pressure.9 
                                                 
7
 The best brief discussion of the causes of explosions and these popular myths can be found in Louis C. Hunter, Steamboats on the Western Rivers: An 
Economic and Technological History (New York, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 1993), 289-304. 
8
 Sinclair, Philadelphia’s Philosopher Mechanics, 179. 
9
 Letter of the Sec’y of the Treasury Transmitting a Report on the Subject of Steam Boilers (March 3, 1831), 21st Cong., 2nd sess., H. Doc.131,18-19, 21, 24. 
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Note on the Report of the Board of Supervising Inspectors of Steamboats 
The 1852 Steamboat Act created this Board, which met and oversaw the act and issued annual reports beginning in 1853.  These 
reports were attached to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury and printed along with it.  From 1855-58, the Senate 
ordered 10,500 extra copies of the Secretary’s Annual Report to be printed, with 500 for the use of the Treasury Department and 
10,000 for use by the Senate. 
 
APPENDIX C – ROLL CALL VOTES 
 
308 
Bill or 
Resolution 
& Congress 
– Session 
Chamber 
& Date 
of Vote 
Numbers in 
Chamber and 
Party 
Distribution as 
of Election 
Brief Name/ 
Description of 
Legislation & 
Nature of Roll 
Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
S. 1 
 
25-2 
 
Became 
Law July 
7, 1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 
304 
 
 
Senate 
 
 
Jan. 22, 
1838 
 
52 Senate 
Seats 
 
D: 35 (67.3%) 
W: 17 (32.7%) 
Better Security 
of Passengers in 
Steam Vessels 
(The 1838 
steamboat act)  
– An attempt to 
amend the bill 
was defeated in 
a roll call vote 
15  
(41.7%) 
 
D: 9 of 26 (34.6%) 
W: 4 of 6 (66.7%) 
Anti-Jackson: 2 of 3 
(66.7%) 
 
 
F: 8 of 18 (44.4%) 
S: 7 of 18 (38.9%) 
21  
(58.3%) 
 
D: 17 of 26 (65.4%) 
W: 2 of 6 (33.3%) 
Jacksonian: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
 
 
F: 10 of 18 (55.6%) 
S: 11 of 18 (61.1%) 
The Senate defeated an 
amendment to forbid 
racing that was 
proposed by Whig 
Senator Oliver Smith of 
Indiana; the Senate then 
approved the bill 
without a roll call vote 
on the question of 
passage. 
S. 1 
(The 1838 
steamboat 
act) 
 
25-2 
 
Became 
Law July 
7, 1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 
304 
 
 
House 
 
 
June 16, 
1838 
 
242 House 
Seats 
 
D: 128 
(52.9%) 
W: 100 
(41.3%) 
Anti-Mason: 7 
(2.9%) 
Independent: 1 
(.4%) 
Nullifier: 6 
(2.5%) 
Better Security 
of Passengers in 
Steam Vessels 
- A motion to 
suspend the 
rules in order to 
consider the bill 
was successful 
in a roll call 
vote 
121  
(68.4%) 
 
D: 56 of 87 (64.4%) 
W: 59 of 81 (72.8%) 
Anti-Mason: 4 of 6 
(66.7%) 
Nullifier: 2 of 3 
(66.7%) 
 
 
F: 79 of 109 (72.5%) 
S: 42 of 68 (61.8%) 
56  
(31.6%) 
 
D: 31 of 87 (35.6%) 
W: 22 of 81 (27.2%) 
Anti-Mason: 2 of 6 
(33.3%) 
Nullifier: 1 of 3 
(33.3%) 
 
 
F: 30 of 109 (27.5%) 
S: 26 of 68 (38.2%) 
The House voted by the 
necessary 2/3 majority 
to suspend the rules in 
order to consider S. 1, 
along with S. 73, out of 
the regular order.  Both 
the House and the 
Senate later approved 
the bill without roll call 
votes on the question of 
passage.  
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Bill or 
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– Session 
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Call 
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S. 73 
 
25-2 
 
Became 
Law June 
28, 1838 
 
5 Stat. L. 
252 
 
 
House 
 
 
June 16, 
1838 
 
242 House 
Seats 
 
D: 128 
(52.9%) 
W: 100 
(41.3%) 
Anti-Mason: 7 
(2.9%) 
Independent: 1 
(.4%) 
Nullifier: 6 
(2.5%) 
Test Inventions 
to Prevent 
Boiler 
Explosions 
- A motion to 
suspend the 
rules in order to 
consider the bill 
was successful 
in a roll call 
vote 
121  
(68.4%) 
 
D: 56 of 87 (64.4%) 
W: 59 of 81 (72.8%) 
Anti-Mason: 4 of 6 
(66.7%) 
Nullifier: 2 of 3 
(66.7%) 
 
 
F: 79 of 109 (72.5%) 
S: 42 of 68 (61.8%) 
56  
(31.6%) 
 
D: 31 of 87 (35.6%) 
W: 22 of 81 (27.2%) 
Anti-Mason: 2 of 6 
(33.3%) 
Nullifier: 1 of 3 
(33.3%) 
 
 
F: 30 of 109 (27.5%) 
S: 26 of 68 (38.2%) 
The House voted by the 
necessary 2/3 majority 
to suspend the rules in 
order to consider this 
bill, together with S.1, 
out of the regular order.  
Both the House and the 
Senate later approved S. 
73 without roll call 
votes on passage. 
HJR 19 
 
27-2 
 
Became 
Law Aug. 
31, 1842 
 
5 Stat. L. 
584 
 
House 
 
 
Aug. 25, 
1842 
 
242 House 
Seats 
D: 98 (40.5%) 
W: 142 
(58.7%) 
1 Independent 
(.4%) 
1 Independent 
Democrat 
(.4%) 
Joint Resolution 
to Test Colt’s 
Submarine 
Battery and 
Test Boiler 
Safety Devices 
- The House 
voted to pass 
the joint 
resolution 
110  
(68.3%) 
 
D: 34 of 59 (57.6%) 
W: 75 of 101 
(74.3%) 
Ind. Dem: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
 
 
F: 63 of 91 (69.2%) 
S: 47 of 70 (67.1%) 
 
51  
(31.7%) 
 
D: 25 of 59 (42.4%) 
W: 26 of 101 (25.7%) 
 
 
 
 
F: 28 of 91 (30.8%) 
S: 23 of 70 (32.9%) 
The House passed the 
joint resolution with a 
large majority in favor.  
The Senate approved it 
without a roll call vote 
on passage. 
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Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
H.R. 637 
 
29-2 
 
Became 
Law Feb. 
22, 1847 
 
9 Stat. L. 
127 
 
House 
 
 
Feb. 1, 
1847 
 
228 House 
Seats 
 
D: 142(62.3%) 
W:  
79 (34.6%) 
American: 6 
(2.6% ) 
Vacant: 1 
(.5%) 
Carriage of 
Passengers in 
Merchant 
Vessels –  
limits number 
of passengers in 
relation to deck 
space – the 
House voted to 
pass the bill 
94  
(66.2%) 
 
D: 94 of 97 (96.9%) 
W: 0 (0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
F: 50 of 83 (60.2%) 
S: 43 of 58 (74.1%) 
 
48  
(33.8%) 
 
D: 3 of 97 (3.1%) 
W: 40 of 40 (100%) 
American: 4 of 4 
(100%) 
Undeclared: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
 
F: 33 of 83 (39.8%) 
S: 15 of 58 (25.9%) 
 
There was extensive 
partisan polarization in 
this House roll call vote, 
which was taken in the 
midst of the Mexican 
War.  The Senate, by 
contrast, approved the 
measure without a roll 
call  
S. 223 
“The 
Steamboat 
Act” 
 
32-1 
 
Became 
Law 
August 30, 
1852 
 
10 Stat. L. 
61 
 
 
House 
 
 
Aug. 23, 
1852 
 
233 House Seats 
 
D: 127 (54.5%) 
W: 85 (36.5%) 
Unionists: 10 
(4.3%) 
Free Soil: 4 
(1.7%) 
States Rights: 3 
(1.3%) 
Ind. Dem: 3 
(1.3%) 
Ind. Whig: 1 
(.4%) 
Amend the 
1838 Act for the 
Better Security 
of Passengers 
on Steam 
Vessels 
- The House 
voted on a 
procedural 
question on 
how to consider 
the bill 
 
54  
(30.7%) 
 
 
D: 28 of 101 (27.7%) 
W: 22 of 67 (32.8%) 
Unionist: 3 of 4 (75%) 
Ind. Dem: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
 
 
 
F: 29 of 111 (26.1%) 
S: 25 of 65 (38.5%) 
122  
(69.3%) 
 
 
D: 73 of 101 (72.3%) 
W: 45 of 67 (67.2%) 
States Rights: 2 of 2 
(100%) 
Unionist: 1 of 4 (25%) 
Free Soil: 1 of 1 (100%) 
 
F: 82 of 111 (73.9%) 
S: 40 of 65 (61.5%) 
 
The House defeated a 
motion to consider the 
bill in the Committee of 
the Whole, which might 
have delayed it.  The 
next day the House 
passed the bill by an 
even larger margin than 
in this procedural vote. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
& Congress 
– Session 
Chamber 
& Date 
of Vote 
Numbers in 
Chamber and 
Party 
Distribution as 
of Election 
Brief Name/ 
Description of 
Legislation & 
Nature of Roll 
Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
S. 223 
“The 
Steamboat 
Act” 
 
32-1 
 
Became 
Law 
August 30, 
1852 
 
10 Stat. L. 
61 
 
 
House 
 
 
Aug. 25, 
1852 
 
233 House 
Seats 
 
D: 127 
(54.5%) 
W: 85 (36.5%) 
Unionists: 10 
(4.3%) 
Free Soil: 4 
(1.7%) 
States Rights: 
3 (1.3%) 
Ind. Dem: 3 
(1.3%) 
Ind. Whig: 1 
(.4%) 
Amend the Act 
for the Better 
Security of 
Passengers on 
Steam Vessels 
- the House 
voted on 
passing the bill 
 
147  
(84.5%) 
 
D: 76 of 97 (78.4%) 
W: 62 of 66 (93.9%) 
Unionist: 3 of 5 
(60%) 
Free Soil: 2 of 2 
(100%) 
States Rights: 2 of 2 
(100%) 
Independent Dem: 2 
of 2 (100%) 
 
F: 100 of 108 
(92.6%) 
S: 47 of 66 (71.2%) 
27  
(15.5%) 
 
D: 21 of 97 
(21.6%) 
W: 4 of 66 
(6.1%) 
Unionist: 2 of 5 (40%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F: 8 of 108 (7.4%) 
S: 19 of 66 (28.8%) 
The House voted to pass  
S. 223 by a huge margin 
after amending the 
version sent to it by the 
Senate  
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Bill or 
Resolution 
& Congress 
– Session 
Chamber 
& Date 
of Vote 
Numbers in 
Chamber and 
Party 
Distribution as 
of Election 
Brief Name/ 
Description of 
Legislation & 
Nature of Roll 
Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
S. 223 
“The 
Steamboat 
Act” 
 
32-1 
 
Became 
Law 
August 30, 
1852 
 
10 Stat. L. 
61 
 
Senate 
 
Aug. 25, 
1852 
 
Senate 
62 Senate 
Seats 
 
D: 36 (58.1%) 
W: 23 (37.1%) 
Free Soil: 3 
(4.8%) 
Amend the Act 
for the Better 
Security of 
Passengers on 
Steam Vessels 
- the Senate 
voted on a 
motion to delay 
consideration of 
the bill 
 
8  
(15.7%) 
 
 
D: 6 of 30 (20%) 
W: 1 of 17 (5.9%) 
Free Soil: 1 of 4 
(25%) 
 
 
F: 3 of 27 (11.1%)  
S: 5 of 24 (20.8%) 
43  
(84.3%) 
 
 
D: 24 of 30 (80%) 
W: 16 of 17 (94.1%) 
Free Soil: 3 of 4 
(75%) 
 
 
F: 24 of 27 (88.9%) 
S: 19 of 24 (79.2%) 
The Senate had 
previously passed S. 
223 without a roll call 
vote.  The House passed 
an amended version.  
The Senate voted on 
tabling the House’s 
version, which might 
have delayed it until the 
next session.  The 
Senate subsequently 
approved the House 
version without a roll 
call vote  
S.J.R. 79 
 
32-2 
 
Enacted 
March 3, 
1853 
 
10 Stat. L. 
262 
 
Senate 
 
Feb. 22, 
1853 
62 Senate 
Seats 
 
D: 36 (58.1%) 
W: 23 (37.1%) 
Free Soil: 3 
(4.8%) 
Amend an 
earlier Senate 
Joint Resolution 
(SJR 67) to 
allow the 
steamboat 
inspectors the 
discretion to 
give owners 
additional time 
to comply with 
the Steamboat 
Act 
14  
(28.6%) 
 
D: 10 of 27 (37%) 
W: 3 of 19 (15.8%) 
Free Soil: 1 of 3 
(33.3%) 
 
 
F: 6 of 25 (24%) 
S. 8 of 24 (33.3%) 
35  
(71.4%) 
 
D: 17 of 27 (63%) 
W: 16 of 19 (84.2%) 
Free Soil: 2 of 3 
(66.7%) 
 
 
F: 19 of 25 (76%) 
S: 16 of 24 (66.7%) 
The Senate defeated this 
effort to amend the joint 
resolution.  The 
amendment would have 
allowed inspectors the 
option to permit vessel 
owners an additional 4 
more months to comply 
with the Steamboat Act.  
The Senate then passed 
the resolution without a 
roll call vote, as did the 
House. 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
& Congress 
– Session 
Chamber 
& Date 
of Vote 
Numbers in 
Chamber and 
Party 
Distribution as 
of Election 
Brief Name/ 
Description of 
Legislation & 
Nature of Roll 
Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
H.R. 114 
 
36-1 
 
Passed 
House, not 
Senate 
 
House 
 
May 18, 
1860 
238 House 
Seats 
 
D: 83 (34.9%) 
R: 116 
(48.7%) 
Opposition: 19 
(8%)  
Anti-
Lecompton 
Dem: 8 (3.4%) 
Ind. Dem: 7 
(2.9%) 
Americans: 5 
(2.1%) 
Further Safety 
of Steam Vessel 
Passengers  
-- bring steam 
towboats and 
freight boats 
under the 
authority of the 
1852 act 
55 
(36.2%) 
 
D: 22 of 49 (44.9%) 
R: 21 of 76 (27.6%) 
Opposition: 8 of 14 
(57.1%) 
Anti-Lecompton 
Dem: 3 of 5 (60%) 
Ind. Dem: 1 of 3 
(33.3%) 
 
 
 
 
F: 27 of 96 (28.1%) 
S: 28 of 56 (50%) 
97 
(63.8%) 
 
D: 27 of 49 (55.1%) 
R: 55 of 76 (72.4%) 
Opposition: 6 of 14 
(42.9%) 
Anti-Lecompton Dem: 2 
of 5 (40%) 
Ind. Dem: 2 of 3 
(66.7%) 
American: 3 of 3 
(100%) 
Free Soil: 1 of 1 (100%) 
Unionist: 1 of 1 (100%) 
 
F: 69 of 96 (71.9%) 
S: 28 of 56 (50%) 
 
The House defeated a 
motion to recommit the 
bill to the Commerce 
Committee  
 
H.R. 114 
 
36-1 
 
Passed 
House, not 
Senate 
 
 
 
 
 
House 
 
May 18, 
1860 
238 House 
Seats 
 
D: 83 (34.9%) 
R: 116 
(48.7%) 
Opposition: 19 
(8%)  
Anti-
Lecompton 
Dem: 8 (3.4%) 
Further Safety 
of Steam Vessel 
Passengers 
-- bring steam 
towboats and 
freight boats 
under the 
authority of the 
1852 act 
87 
(54%) 
 
D: 21 of 59 (35.6%) 
R: 53 of 74 (71.6%) 
Opposition: 4 of 14 
(28.6%) 
Anti-Lecompton 
Dem: 4 of 6 (66.7%) 
American: 3 of 3 
(100%) 
74 
(46%) 
 
D: 38 of 59 (64.4%) 
R: 21 of 74 (20.3%) 
Opposition: 10 of 14 
(71.4%) 
Anti-Lecompton Dem: 
2 of 6 (33.3%) 
Ind. Dem: 3 of 3 
(100%) 
Similar versions of this 
bill had been introduced 
since 1854.  The House 
voted to pass the bill.  
There was significant 
partisan and sectional 
polarization.   
The Senate did not pass 
H.R. 114, so it did not 
become law 
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Bill or 
Resolution 
& Congress 
– Session 
Chamber 
& Date 
of Vote 
Numbers in 
Chamber and 
Party 
Distribution as 
of Election 
Brief Name/ 
Description of 
Legislation & 
Nature of Roll 
Call 
Ayes Nays Outcome and Comments 
 
H.R. 114 
Ind. Dem.: 7 
(2.9%) 
American: 5 
(2.1%) 
 
Free Soil: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
Unionist: 1 of 1 
(100%) 
 
F: 72 of 102 (70.6%) 
S: 15 of 59 (25.4%) 
 
 
 
 
 
F: 30 of 102 (29.4%) 
S: 44 of 59 (74.6%) 
 
D= Democratic Party 
F= Free State Representatives and Senators 
R= Republican Party 
S= Slave State Representatives and Senators 
W= Whig Party 
American = Supporter of the Nativist/ Anti-Immigrant Party 
Anti-Jackson = Opponent of Andrew Jackson 
Anti-Lecompton Dem = Northern Democrats who opposed the 1857 Kansas state constitution that would permit slavery 
Anti-Mason = Opponent of the Masonic Order and other secret societies 
Free Soil = Northern opponent of slavery extension 
Ind. Dem. = Independent Democrat 
Jacksonian = Supporter of Andrew Jackson 
Nullifier = South Carolina supporter of the doctrine of nullification 
Opposition = Upper South opponent of the Democratic Party 
States Rights = Southern supporter of slavery extension 
Unionist = Southern supporter of maintaining the Union 
 
Rows in bold type indicate bills that were enacted into law. 
 
The outcomes of the roll call votes are from the Journals of the House and Senate for the relevant Congress and Session. 
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Partisan affiliations are taken from the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress, 1774-Present, 
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (Accessed August 1-15, 2009.) or Kenneth C. Martis, The Historical Atlas of 
Political Parties in the United States Congress, 1789-1989, (NY: Macmillan & Co., 1989). 
 
Most of the bills cited are available online at the Library of Congress, American Memory, Lawmaking Home, Bills and Resolutions. 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwhbsb.html (accessed August 1-15, 2009). 
 
Information on the partisan distribution for the 36
th
 Congress is from the Office of the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, House 
History, and Party Divisions of the House of Representatives. http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html 
(Accessed March 15, 2010) 
 
Information on the partisan distribution of the Senate is taken from U.S. Senate, Art & History, Statistics and Lists, Political Parties 
and Leadership, Party Division, 1789-Present, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm 
(Accessed March 15. 2010) 
 
Considering the number of bills introduced regarding vessel safety, there were relatively few roll call votes on the legislation.  Like 
most legislation, much of it died in committee or was never taken up by Congress after it was introduced.  However, when these laws 
were passed, most often they were passed by consensus and without either the House of the Senate conducting a vote.  As we can see 
in the above votes, when roll call votes were taken, there were generally large majorities that favored the legislation.  Partisan 
differences were sometimes evident, but overall the more noticeable feature is that majorities from both parties, and from both slave 
and free states, generally supported this legislation during roll call votes. 
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